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analyzing-slack-space-and-file-system-artifacts: Claude Code skill

analyzing-slack-space-and-file-system-artifacts inspects NTFS slack space and MFT entries. Useful during forensic disk investigations when standard file recovery is not enough.

Apache-2.0 233 installs ★ 36,511 updated 2026-08-31

Install into Claude Code · Skills CLI (Vercel) All methods and platforms ↓
npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-slack-space-and-file-system-artifacts -a claude-code
Open on GitHub

What analyzing-slack-space-and-file-system-artifacts does

This skill guides low-level forensic examinations on raw NTFS disk images. It directs the agent to extract critical artifacts like $MFT and $UsnJrnl:$J using The Sleuth Kit tools such as icat, mmls, and blkls.

Included workflows cover MFT parsing through MFTECmd or Python scripts. The steps detect timestomping by comparing $SI and $FN timestamps, parse file activity from USN change logs, and carve residual payloads out of unallocated cluster slack using foremost or bulk_extractor.

Without TSK installed on the host machine, artifact extraction from raw disk images will fail immediately. The workflow also depends on Python libraries such as analyzeMFT and pyusn.

What it helps with

  • extract raw slack space and carve residual files using foremost
  • detect timestomping by comparing MFT $SI and $FN timestamp attributes
  • reconstruct file modification history from the NTFS USN Change Journal
  • locate Alternate Data Streams used to hide payload data

Example prompts for the agent

  • Extract $MFT and volume slack space from /cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd
  • Write a Python script to parse the extracted MFT and flag deleted entries
  • Search slack_space.raw for sensitive keyword patterns and file signatures

How to install analyzing-slack-space-and-file-system-artifacts

1Skills CLI (Vercel)

npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-slack-space-and-file-system-artifacts -a claude-code

2Manually: put the files in place

~/.claude/skills/analyzing-slack-space-and-file-system-artifacts/SKILL.md

Copy the whole skill folder; for one project use .claude/skills/analyzing-slack-space-and-file-system-artifacts/

Step by step, with commands for each platform: How to install skills in Claude Code: five ways

Questions about analyzing-slack-space-and-file-system-artifacts

How to install analyzing-slack-space-and-file-system-artifacts in Claude Code?

Run npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-slack-space-and-file-system-artifacts -a claude-code in your terminal.

What does analyzing-slack-space-and-file-system-artifacts do?

It guides the agent through inspecting NTFS structures, reconstructing deleted file metadata from MFT records, and extracting artifacts from unallocated slack space.

What tools are required to run these forensic workflows?

You need an NTFS raw disk image, The Sleuth Kit binaries (icat, blkls, istat), Eric Zimmerman's MFTECmd, and Python with analyzeMFT or pyusn.

Source text

SKILL.md · Apache-2.0
---
name: analyzing-slack-space-and-file-system-artifacts
description: Examine NTFS slack space, MFT entries, the USN Change Journal, and Alternate Data Streams (ADS) to recover hidden or residual data, reconstruct deleted-file metadata, and reconstruct available file-system change activity from USN records. Use during deep forensic analysis of an NTFS image when standard file recovery is insufficient, such as hunting for data hidden in ADS.
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: digital-forensics
tags:
- forensics
- slack-space
- ntfs
- mft
- usn-journal
- alternate-data-streams
- file-system-analysis
version: '1.0'
author: mahipal
license: Apache-2.0
nist_csf:
- RS.AN-03
- DE.AE-02
- RS.MA-01
mitre_attack:
- T1070.006
- T1564.004
- T1070.004
- T1005
- T1006
---

# Analyzing Slack Space and File System Artifacts

## When to Use
- When searching for hidden or residual data in file system slack space
- For analyzing NTFS Master File Table (MFT) entries for deleted file metadata
- When reconstructing file operations from the USN Change Journal
- For detecting Alternate Data Streams (ADS) used to hide data or malware
- During deep forensic analysis requiring examination beyond standard file recovery

## Prerequisites
- Forensic disk image with NTFS file system
- The Sleuth Kit (TSK) tools: istat, icat, fls, blkls, blkstat
- MFTECmd (Eric Zimmerman) for MFT parsing
- MFTExplorer for interactive MFT analysis
- Understanding of NTFS structures (MFT, $UsnJrnl, $LogFile, ADS)
- Python with analyzeMFT or mft library for automated parsing

## Workflow

### Step 1: Identify and Extract NTFS File System Artifacts

```bash
# Determine partition layout
mmls /cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd

# Extract key NTFS system files
# $MFT - Master File Table
icat -o 2048 /cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd 0 > /cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/MFT

# $UsnJrnl:$J - USN Change Journal
icat -o 2048 /cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd 62-128 > /cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/UsnJrnl_J

# $LogFile - Transaction log
icat -o 2048 /cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd 2 > /cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/LogFile

# Extract all slack space from the volume
blkls -s -o 2048 /cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd > /cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/slack_space.raw

# Get file system information
fsstat -o 2048 /cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd | tee /cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/fs_info.txt
```

### Step 2: Analyze the Master File Table (MFT)

```bash
# Parse MFT with MFTECmd (Eric Zimmerman)
MFTECmd.exe -f "C:\cases\ntfs\MFT" --csv "C:\cases\analysis\" --csvf mft_analysis.csv

# Parse with analyzeMFT (Python)
pip install analyzeMFT

analyzeMFT.py -f /cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/MFT \
   -o /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/mft_analysis.csv \
   -c

# Custom MFT analysis with Python
python3 << 'PYEOF'
from mft import PyMft
import csv

mft = PyMft(open('/cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/MFT', 'rb').read())

deleted_files = []
suspicious_files = []

for entry in mft.entries():
    if entry is None:
        continue

    filename = entry.get_filename()
    if filename is None:
        continue

    is_deleted = not entry.is_active()
    is_directory = entry.is_directory()
    created = entry.get_created_timestamp()
    modified = entry.get_modified_timestamp()
    mft_modified = entry.get_mft_modified_timestamp()
    size = entry.get_file_size()

    # Flag deleted files for recovery
    if is_deleted and not is_directory and size > 0:
        deleted_files.append({
            'filename': filename,
            'size': size,
            'created': str(created),
            'modified': str(modified),
            'entry_number': entry.entry_number
        })

    # Detect timestomping (MFT modified time != $SI modified time)
    si_modified = entry.get_si_modified_timestamp()
    fn_modified = entry.get_fn_modified_timestamp()
    if si_modified and fn_modified:
        if abs((si_modified - fn_modified).total_seconds()) > 86400:  # >1 day difference
            suspicious_files.append({
                'filename': filename,
                'si_modified': str(si_modified),
                'fn_modified': str(fn_modified),
                'delta': str(si_modified - fn_modified)
            })

print(f"=== DELETED FILES (recoverable metadata) ===")
print(f"Total: {len(deleted_files)}")
for f in deleted_files[:20]:
    print(f"  [{f['modified']}] {f['filename']} ({f['size']} bytes)")

print(f"\n=== POTENTIAL TIMESTOMPING ===")
print(f"Total suspicious: {len(suspicious_files)}")
for f in suspicious_files[:10]:
    print(f"  {f['filename']}: $SI={f['si_modified']}, $FN={f['fn_modified']} (delta: {f['delta']})")
PYEOF
```

### Step 3: Analyze Slack Space for Hidden Data

```bash
# Search slack space for strings
strings -a /cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/slack_space.raw > /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/slack_strings.txt

# Search for specific patterns in slack space
grep -iab "password\|secret\|confidential\|credit.card\|ssn" \
   /cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/slack_space.raw > /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/slack_keywords.txt

# Analyze individual file slack
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import struct

# File slack consists of:
# 1. RAM slack: bytes between file end and next sector boundary (filled with RAM content or zeros)
# 2. Drive slack: remaining sectors in the cluster after the last file sector

# Analyze slack for specific MFT entries
# Using Sleuth Kit to get file slack for a specific file
import subprocess

# Get file details
result = subprocess.run(
    ['istat', '-o', '2048', '/cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd', '14523'],
    capture_output=True, text=True
)
print(result.stdout)

# The output shows data runs - the last cluster may contain slack data
# Calculate slack size: (allocated_size - file_size) bytes
PYEOF

# Search for file signatures in slack space (embedded files)
foremost -t jpg,pdf,zip -i /cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/slack_space.raw \
   -o /cases/case-2024-001/carved/slack_carved/

# Use bulk_extractor to find structured data in slack
bulk_extractor -o /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/bulk_extract/ \
   /cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/slack_space.raw
```

### Step 4: Parse the USN Change Journal

```bash
# Parse USN Journal with MFTECmd
MFTECmd.exe -f "C:\cases\ntfs\UsnJrnl_J" --csv "C:\cases\analysis\" --csvf usn_journal.csv

# Python USN Journal parsing
pip install pyusn

python3 << 'PYEOF'
import struct
import csv
from datetime import datetime, timedelta

def parse_usn_record(data, offset):
    """Parse a single USN_RECORD_V2."""
    if offset + 8 > len(data):
        return None, offset

    record_len = struct.unpack_from('<I', data, offset)[0]
    if record_len < 56 or record_len > 65536 or offset + record_len > len(data):
        return None, offset + 8

    major_ver = struct.unpack_from('<H', data, offset + 4)[0]
    if major_ver != 2:
        return None, offset + record_len

    mft_ref = struct.unpack_from('<Q', data, offset + 8)[0] & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF
    parent_ref = struct.unpack_from('<Q', data, offset + 16)[0] & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF
    usn = struct.unpack_from('<Q', data, offset + 24)[0]
    timestamp = struct.unpack_from('<Q', data, offset + 32)[0]
    reason = struct.unpack_from('<I', data, offset + 40)[0]
    source_info = struct.unpack_from('<I', data, offset + 44)[0]
    security_id = struct.unpack_from('<I', data, offset + 48)[0]
    file_attrs = struct.unpack_from('<I', data, offset + 52)[0]
    filename_len = struct.unpack_from('<H', data, offset + 56)[0]
    filename_off = struct.unpack_from('<H', data, offset + 58)[0]

    name = data[offset + filename_off:offset + filename_off + filename_len].decode('utf-16-le', errors='ignore')

    # Convert Windows FILETIME to datetime
    ts = datetime(1601, 1, 1) + timedelta(microseconds=timestamp // 10)

    # Decode reason flags
    reasons = []
    reason_flags = {
        0x01: 'DATA_OVERWRITE', 0x02: 'DATA_EXTEND', 0x04: 'DATA_TRUNCATION',
        0x10: 'NAMED_DATA_OVERWRITE', 0x20: 'NAMED_DATA_EXTEND',
        0x100: 'FILE_CREATE', 0x200: 'FILE_DELETE', 0x400: 'EA_CHANGE',
        0x800: 'SECURITY_CHANGE', 0x1000: 'RENAME_OLD_NAME', 0x2000: 'RENAME_NEW_NAME',
        0x4000: 'INDEXABLE_CHANGE', 0x8000: 'BASIC_INFO_CHANGE',
        0x10000: 'HARD_LINK_CHANGE', 0x20000: 'COMPRESSION_CHANGE',
        0x40000: 'ENCRYPTION_CHANGE', 0x80000: 'OBJECT_ID_CHANGE',
        0x100000: 'REPARSE_POINT_CHANGE', 0x200000: 'STREAM_CHANGE',
        0x80000000: 'CLOSE'
    }
    for flag, desc in reason_flags.items():
        if reason & flag:
            reasons.append(desc)

    record = {
        'timestamp': ts.strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S'),
        'filename': name,
        'mft_entry': mft_ref,
        'parent_entry': parent_ref,
        'reasons': '|'.join(reasons),
        'usn': usn
    }

    return record, offset + record_len

# Parse the journal
with open('/cases/case-2024-001/ntfs/UsnJrnl_J', 'rb') as f:
    data = f.read()

records = []
offset = 0
while offset < len(data) - 8:
    record, offset = parse_usn_record(data, offset)
    if record:
        records.append(record)
    else:
        offset += 8  # Skip zeros

# Filter for deletion events
deletions = [r for r in records if 'FILE_DELETE' in r['reasons']]
creations = [r for r in records if 'FILE_CREATE' in r['reasons']]
renames = [r for r in records if 'RENAME_NEW_NAME' in r['reasons']]

print(f"Total USN records: {len(records)}")
print(f"File creations: {len(creations)}")
print(f"File deletions: {len(deletions)}")
print(f"File renames: {len(renames)}")

print("\n=== RECENT DELETIONS ===")
for r in deletions[-20:]:
    print(f"  [{r['timestamp']}] DELETED: {r['filename']} (MFT#{r['mft_entry']})")

# Write full journal to CSV
with open('/cases/case-2024-001/analysis/usn_journal.csv', 'w', newline='') as f:
    writer = csv.DictWriter(f, fieldnames=['timestamp', 'filename', 'mft_entry', 'parent_entry', 'reasons', 'usn'])
    writer.writeheader()
    writer.writerows(records)
PYEOF
```

### Step 5: Detect and Analyze Alternate Data Streams

```bash
# List all Alternate Data Streams in the image
find /mnt/evidence -exec getfattr -d {} \; 2>/dev/null | grep -i "ads\|zone\|stream"

# Using Sleuth Kit to find ADS
fls -r -o 2048 /cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd | grep ":" | \
   tee /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/ads_list.txt

# Extract specific ADS content
# Format: icat image inode:ads_name
icat -o 2048 /cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd 14523:hidden_stream \
   > /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/extracted_ads.bin

# Check Zone.Identifier streams (download origin tracking)
fls -r -o 2048 /cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd | grep "Zone.Identifier" | \
   while read line; do
       inode=$(echo "$line" | awk '{print $2}' | tr -d ':')
       echo "=== $line ==="
       icat -o 2048 /cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd "${inode}:Zone.Identifier" 2>/dev/null
       echo ""
   done > /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/zone_identifiers.txt

# Zone.Identifier content reveals:
# [ZoneTransfer]
# ZoneId=3          (3 = Internet, indicating file was downloaded)
# ReferrerUrl=https://malicious-site.com/payload.exe
# HostUrl=https://cdn.malicious-site.com/payload.exe
```

## Key Concepts

| Concept | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| File slack | Unused space between file end and cluster boundary containing residual data |
| RAM slack | Portion of slack from file end to sector boundary (historically filled with RAM) |
| MFT ($MFT) | Master File Table - NTFS metadata database with entries for every file |
| USN Journal ($UsnJrnl) | Change journal recording all file/directory modifications on NTFS |
| Alternate Data Streams | NTFS feature allowing multiple data streams per file (hidden storage) |
| $STANDARD_INFORMATION | MFT attribute with timestamps modifiable by user-mode applications |
| $FILE_NAME | MFT attribute with timestamps only modifiable by the kernel |
| Timestomping | Anti-forensic technique modifying file timestamps to avoid detection |

## Tools & Systems

| Tool | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| MFTECmd | Eric Zimmerman MFT and USN Journal parser with CSV output |
| MFTExplorer | Interactive GUI tool for MFT analysis |
| analyzeMFT | Python MFT parser with CSV/JSON output |
| The Sleuth Kit | File system forensics toolkit (fls, icat, blkls, istat) |
| bulk_extractor | Feature extraction from raw data including slack space |
| NTFS Log Tracker | Tool for parsing $LogFile transaction records |
| streams.exe | Sysinternals tool for listing NTFS Alternate Data Streams |
| Plaso | Super-timeline tool parsing MFT and USN Journal |

## Common Scenarios

**Scenario 1: Anti-Forensics Detection via Timestomping**
Compare $STANDARD_INFORMATION timestamps with $FILE_NAME timestamps in MFT entries, flag files where $SI timestamps predate $FN timestamps (impossible in normal operation), identify timestomped files as evidence of deliberate manipulation, correlate with other timeline evidence.

**Scenario 2: Hidden Data in Alternate Data Streams**
Scan for ADS attached to files beyond the standard Zone.Identifier, extract ADS content for analysis, check for hidden executables or documents stored in ADS, correlate ADS creation with user activity timeline, document findings for evidence.

**Scenario 3: Deleted File Reconstruction from MFT**
Parse MFT for inactive (deleted) entries, extract filenames, sizes, and timestamps of deleted files, recover file content using icat if data clusters are not overwritten, build list of deleted evidence files, correlate with USN Journal delete events.

**Scenario 4: File Activity Reconstruction from USN Journal**
Parse the USN Change Journal for the investigation period, identify file creation, modification, rename, and deletion events, reconstruct the sequence of file operations, detect evidence of data staging (create, copy, compress, delete pattern), identify anti-forensic file wiping.

## Output Format

```
File System Artifact Analysis:
  Volume: NTFS (Partition 2, 465 GB)
  Cluster Size: 4096 bytes

  MFT Analysis:
    Total Entries: 456,789
    Active Files: 234,567
    Deleted Entries: 12,345 (8,901 with recoverable metadata)
    Timestomped Files: 23 (SI/FN mismatch detected)

  USN Journal:
    Records Parsed: 2,345,678
    Date Range: 2024-01-01 to 2024-01-20
    File Creations: 45,678
    File Deletions: 23,456
    File Renames: 12,345

  Alternate Data Streams:
    Total ADS Found: 1,234
    Zone.Identifier: 890 (downloaded files)
    Custom/Suspicious ADS: 5 (hidden data detected)

  Slack Space:
    Total Slack: 12.3 GB
    Keyword Hits: 45 (passwords, credit cards)
    Carved Files: 23 from slack space

  Suspicious Findings:
    - 23 files with timestomped timestamps
    - 5 files with hidden ADS containing data
    - USN shows mass deletion on 2024-01-18 (anti-forensics)
    - Slack space contains residual email fragments

  Reports: /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/
```

© mahipal · Apache-2.0 · mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

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