adversarial-review — Claude Code rule for change verification
The adversarial-review rule requires an independent check for behavioural changes and defines three outcomes. It helps teams avoid treating a failed review as approval.
MIT ★ 880 updated 2026-09-03
.claude/rules/adversarial-review.mdWhat adversarial-review does
The rule covers changes that affect system behaviour, including code, commands, hooks and configuration. Documentation edits and typos are exempt; when the boundary is unclear, treat the change as behavioural. Higher-risk work, such as authorization, payments, secrets or destructive data changes, needs two separate review lanes.
A checker must return APPROVE, REQUEST_CHANGES or UNVERIFIED. A crash, timeout, empty response or review of an outdated revision counts as UNVERIFIED, never as a pass. The checker needs a fresh context, must not have authored the change, and must leave the source untouched.
Independence relies on team practice rather than repository enforcement, so the dispatcher has to assign someone other than the author. After the same finding receives REQUEST_CHANGES twice, stop the loop and give a human the finding, both attempted fixes, and the reproduction command with its output.
What it helps with
- Separate behavioural changes from documentation edits
- Distinguish approval from a reproduced defect or an inconclusive check
- Add a second review lane for high-risk changes
- Escalate a finding after two unsuccessful fixes
Example prompts for the agent
- Review this behavioural change under
adversarial-reviewand return one of its three verdicts. - Check that the reviewer starts fresh, did not author the change, and makes no edits.
- The same finding received
REQUEST_CHANGEStwice; prepare the evidence for a human.
How to install adversarial-review
Manually: put the files in place
.claude/rules/adversarial-review.mdThe paths frontmatter field limits the files
AGENTS.md
Codex reads AGENTS.md: paste the rule text there
Manually: put the files in place
.cursor/rules/adversarial-review.mdcFrontmatter: description, globs, alwaysApply
Manually: put the files in place
.github/instructions/adversarial-review.instructions.mdThe applyTo field sets which files it applies to
Manually: put the files in place
.devin/rules/adversarial-review.mdManually: put the files in place
.clinerules/adversarial-review.mdStep by step, with commands for each platform: AGENTS.md vs CLAUDE.md: what they are and which one to use
Questions about adversarial-review
How do I install adversarial-review in Claude Code?
Add the rule file at .claude/rules/adversarial-review.md.
What does adversarial-review do?
It sets rules for independent review of behavioural changes and defines three outcomes: APPROVE, REQUEST_CHANGES and UNVERIFIED.
What should I do if the checker times out?
Treat the result as UNVERIFIED and retry with another checker, runtime or strategy. If no checker can be reached, stop and report that the change remains unverified.
Source text
adversarial-review.md · MIT
---
name: adversarial-review
load: always
audience: team
sensitivity: L1
category: verification
critical: true
description: Behavioural changes are done when an independent checker approves them, not when the author believes they work — the three verdicts, what checker independence means, and when to stop and ask a human.
---
# Adversarial Review (CRITICAL)
> Analogy: nobody grades their own exam. The author of a change has already convinced themselves;
> that is why they shipped it. The only reading that adds information comes from someone who did
> not write it and is trying to prove it wrong.
## When the loop is mandatory
Every change to behaviour goes through the loop in `skills/review-loop/SKILL.md` before it is
called done: executable code, shell/Python/JS/TS/SQL, CI/CD, hooks, commands, agent and skill
definitions, runtime prompts, and configuration that changes what the system does.
Prose docs, copy and typos are exempt. Diff size is not an exemption in either direction: a one-line
change to an authorization check is behavioural, and a large documentation reflow is not. When a
change is ambiguous, treat it as behavioural.
Ordinary changes need one independent checker. Auth, authorization, payments, access-control rules,
secrets, destructive data changes and irreversible deploys need two lanes run by different checkers:
correctness, plus the risk-specific angle (runtime security, or rollback).
## The three verdicts
There are exactly three. A fourth phrasing ("approve with comments", "looks good, but") is a
category error: decide which of the three it is.
| Verdict | What it means | What it obligates |
|---|---|---|
| `APPROVE` | The checker tried to break the claim against the current revision and failed, with no CRITICAL or HIGH finding | Completion is allowed, for **this** revision only. Any further edit voids it |
| `REQUEST_CHANGES` | At least one CRITICAL or HIGH finding, reproduced | The maker fixes exactly those findings, re-runs the evidence, and dispatches a **fresh** checker. Not the same one |
| `UNVERIFIED` | No judgement was reached: the checker never ran, returned empty or malformed output, timed out, was rate-limited, or reviewed a revision that has since moved | Retry with a different checker, runtime or strategy. Never convert it to a pass |
### Audit statuses are not verdicts
`skeptical-auditor` returns `PASS`, `FAIL` or `UNCERTAIN`. Those are audit statuses about a claim
another agent already made, not loop verdicts, and the two vocabularies must not be mixed in the
same sentence. When an audit feeds a completion decision, map it:
| Audit status | Loop verdict | Why |
|---|---|---|
| `PASS` | `APPROVE` | The claimed steps were re-run and actually pass |
| `FAIL` | `REQUEST_CHANGES` | A blockable finding was reproduced |
| `UNCERTAIN` | `UNVERIFIED` | No judgement was reached: turn budget exhausted, the revision moved, or the evidence could not be re-run |
`UNCERTAIN` maps to `UNVERIFIED` and never to `REQUEST_CHANGES`. "I could not judge this" is a
different statement from "this is broken", and collapsing the two sends the maker off to fix a
defect nobody has demonstrated.
## Reviewer death is not approval
A checker that crashes, times out, hits a rate limit, or returns nothing has told you nothing. The
absence of findings is not the absence of defects. Treat every one of these as `UNVERIFIED` and
dispatch again; if no checker can be reached at all, report the change as unverified and stop.
Self-review does not substitute for a dead reviewer. That substitution is the failure this rule
exists to prevent, because it feels like diligence while removing the only independent signal.
## What makes a checker independent
All four must hold:
1. **Fresh context.** The checker starts from the change and the goal, not from the conversation
that produced them. It has not seen the reasoning that justified the code.
2. **Did not author the change.** Not this revision, and not an earlier revision of the same work.
A past maker is permanently disqualified as that change's checker.
3. **Not a fork of the maker.** A continuation, fork or resumption of the authoring session carries
the author's assumptions, which is precisely what needs testing.
4. **Read-only.** If the checker edits the source, it has joined the maker set and its verdict is
void. Findings go back to the maker.
A checker that reads the maker's summary and agrees with it has verified the summary, not the code.
Independence is about what the checker reproduces, not about which model ran it.
These four conditions are enforced by convention, not by machinery: nothing in this repository
physically prevents a maker from reviewing its own change, and a self-review returns an envelope
that looks exactly like a real one. The loop is only as good as the dispatcher honouring condition 2.
That is why the honest failure report is `UNVERIFIED` rather than a verdict you were in no position
to issue.
## Escalate to a human after two
When the same finding comes back `REQUEST_CHANGES` twice in a row, stop. Two failed fixes on one
defect mean the diagnosis is wrong, and the third attempt usually enlarges the damage rather than
the understanding.
Surface to the human: the finding, both attempted fixes, the reproduction command and its output,
and what you now believe is actually wrong. Do not keep looping, do not lower the severity, and do
not restate the goal so the current code satisfies it.
## Related
- `skills/review-loop/SKILL.md` — the loop itself, dispatch instructions, re-verification etiquette
- `agents/adversarial-reviewer.md` — the checker and the `forge.review/v1` verdict envelope
- `agents/skeptical-auditor.md` — re-verification after a self-verifying agent claims a pass
- `docs/VERIFICATION-LOOP.md` — a worked example, with three real defects this loop caught
- `rules/verification.md` — evidence before completion claims (this rule adds: whose evidence)
© sangrokjung · MIT · sangrokjung/claude-forge