team-security-review — Claude Code skill: what it does, how to install
team-security-review is a Claude Code skill that enforces a strict security auditing playbook. It inspects authentication flows, access control, input handling, and secret leaks.
MIT ★ 71 updated 2026-11-13
npx skills add sametcelikbicak/opencode-team --skill team-security-review -a claude-codeWhat team-security-review does
The skill defines a code-level security review process centered on verifying actual execution paths rather than theoretical risks. It guides checks across authentication, session lifetimes, access control, IDOR flaws, and input handling patterns against SQL injection, XSS, SSRF, and path traversal.
The workflow integrates package audits through tools such as npm audit, pip-audit, cargo audit, or govulncheck. Findings are compiled into Markdown reports detailing impact, file locations, reproduction steps, and fixes across four defined severity tiers without fabricated CVSS numbers.
What it helps with
- Audit API endpoints for IDOR and broken object-level authorization
- Detect exposed credentials and API keys in git history or logs
- Scan project packages for known CVEs using native audit tools
- Format vulnerability findings into actionable Markdown reports
Example prompts for the agent
- Run a security audit on the user profile endpoints using team-security-review
- Check
src/authfor session handling flaws and secret leaks - Inspect the codebase for IDOR vulnerabilities and generate a finding report
How to install team-security-review
1Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add sametcelikbicak/opencode-team --skill team-security-review -a claude-code2Manually: put the files in place
~/.claude/skills/team-security-review/SKILL.mdCopy the whole skill folder; for one project use .claude/skills/team-security-review/
1Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add sametcelikbicak/opencode-team --skill team-security-review -a codex2Manually: put the files in place
.agents/skills/team-security-review/SKILL.mdFor all projects use ~/.agents/skills/
1Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add sametcelikbicak/opencode-team --skill team-security-review -a cursor2Manually: put the files in place
.cursor/skills/team-security-review/SKILL.mdCursor also reads .agents/skills/ and .claude/skills/
1GitHub CLI
gh skill install sametcelikbicak/opencode-team skills/team-security-review2Manually: put the files in place
.github/skills/team-security-review/SKILL.md1Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add sametcelikbicak/opencode-team --skill team-security-review -a gemini-cli2Platform CLI
gemini skills install https://github.com/sametcelikbicak/opencode-team --path skills/team-security-reviewManually: put the files in place
.devin/skills/team-security-review/SKILL.mdThe legacy .windsurf/skills/ path still works
Claude.ai
Zip the folder and upload it in Settings → Capabilities → Skills
Step by step, with commands for each platform: How to install skills in Claude Code: five ways
Questions about team-security-review
How to install team-security-review in Claude Code?
Run npx skills add sametcelikbicak/opencode-team --skill team-security-review -a claude-code. Alternatively, copy the file to ~/.claude/skills/team-security-review/SKILL.md.
What does team-security-review do?
It provides an actionable security review playbook for AI agents. The instructions require reading source code paths, verifying authorization checks, auditing inputs, and documenting impact clearly.
What tools does team-security-review require for dependency checks?
It calls ecosystem-specific package scanners including npm audit, pip-audit, cargo audit, or govulncheck. The resulting report focuses on high and critical vulnerabilities present on active execution paths.
Source text
SKILL.md · MIT
--- name: team-security-review description: Security review methodology. Authentication, authorization, input validation, secret management, dependency scanning and finding reporting. The playbook of the security role. --- # Security Review ## Core principle **Read the code, do not guess.** A security finding is only a finding if you have read the actual code path. A "this might happen" hypothesis is not a finding — mark it as "suspicious". ## 1. Authentication - Password: strong hash (argon2id/bcrypt), never SHA/MD5, never plaintext - Session: cookie with `httpOnly` + `secure` + `sameSite`, idle and absolute timeout - Token: short lifetime, `refresh` rotation, revocable in case of leakage - Account lockout: attempt count + time-based throttling - Password reset: single-use and time-limited token - MFA: for administrator/critical operations ## 2. Authorization Do two checks for every endpoint: 1. **Functional**: does this person have permission to perform this action? 2. **Resource-based**: do they own this resource? (IDOR) Patterns to check: - An endpoint without authentication (not on the allowlist) - The `id` parameter used directly (not compared against the user's own record) - An "edit" endpoint exists but the "delete" endpoint has no permission check - Administrator endpoints are only hidden in the interface, not checked on the server - Bulk operation endpoints (could mix the user's data with someone else's) ## 3. Input validation | Attack | Protection | |---|---| | SQL/NoSQL injection | Parameterized queries, ORM, schema validation | | XSS | Output escaping, dangerouslySetInnerHTML forbidden, CSP | | SSRF | Allowlist of permitted hosts, private IP range blocking | | Path traversal | Path normalization, blocking escapes from the root directory | | Mass assignment | Allowlist of permitted fields | | Deserialization | Untrusted data is never deserialized | | ReDoS | No dangerous regex, input length limited | Checklist: - Does every user input pass through a class (type + format + length + range)? - Is input validation applied in the application layer, or only on the client? (client validation is not security) - Do error messages leak internal details (stack trace, SQL)? ## 4. Secret management - Are secrets embedded in the code? (Has `.env` entered the repo, is it in `git log`?) - Are there secrets in the logs? (token, password, full card number) - Is the secret in production or in development? - Is the error shown to the user separate from the error that is logged? - Is `.gitignore` correct? Is `.env` tracked? In the finding report, **do not write the value of the secret** — the file path and the type are enough. ## 5. Dependencies Run these and put the output in the report: ```bash npm audit # Node pip-audit # Python cargo audit # Rust govulncheck # Go ``` List the critical/high vulnerabilities and state which ones are actually on a code path that is used. ## 6. Transport and browser - HTTPS mandatory, HSTS - Cookie flags: `httpOnly`, `secure`, `sameSite` - CORS: `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` + authenticated requests = critical - Security headers: CSP, `X-Content-Type-Options`, `Referrer-Policy` - CSRF protection on form POSTs (cookie-based sessions) ## 7. Finding report For each finding: ``` [Severity] Title Location: file:line Impact: <what an attacker can do> Reproduction: <step by step> Fix: <concrete suggestion> Status: fixed / open / accepted ``` Severity levels: | Level | Criteria | |---|---| | Critical | Data leak, authentication bypass, remote code execution | | High | Privilege escalation, IDOR, secret leak | | Medium | XSS (reflected), CSRF, missing rate limit | | Low | Information leak, missing header, version disclosure | Do not make up a CVSS score. Write the impact and derive the severity from the impact. ## Common mistakes | Mistake | The right way | |---|---| | Making up a finding without reading the code | Read it, verify it, then write it | | Guessing a CVSS score | Write the impact text | | Writing the secret into the report | Location and type only | | Looking only at the application layer | Infrastructure and deployment settings are in scope too | | Closing a finding before it is fixed | Fix first, then verify | ## Output format Markdown: Summary / Finding table (severity, location, impact, status) / Finding details / Dependency scan output / Remaining risks. In the user's language (Turkish or English).
© sametcelikbicak · MIT · sametcelikbicak/opencode-team