detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon — Claude Code skill
detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon is a Claude Code skill that analyzes Sysmon events for signs of code injected into processes. It runs during defense-evasion hunts, EDR alert investigations, and Sysmon coverage checks.
Apache-2.0 ★ 71 updated 2026-11-13
npx skills add freyrswift/UaStation --skill detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon -a claude-codeWhat detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon does
The skill correlates Sysmon events to find remote thread creation, cross-process memory access, and suspicious DLL loads. It covers techniques such as DLL injection and process hollowing, and links injection activity to process creation events to build an attack chain.
It requires Sysmon configured to capture Events 1, 7, 8, 10, and 25, plus a SIEM platform for correlation and alerting. Event 25 detection of process hollowing requires Sysmon 13 or later. Filters exclude known legitimate cross-process activity from debuggers, antivirus products, and other listed software.
What it helps with
- spot remote thread creation in another process
- find suspicious cross-process memory access
- detect DLLs loaded from unusual directories
- trace injection activity back to process creation
- check Sysmon coverage for injection detection
Example prompts for the agent
- Check Sysmon events for signs of code injected into processes.
- Investigate an EDR alert about suspicious access between processes.
- Assess whether Sysmon is configured to detect process hollowing.
How to install detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon
1Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add freyrswift/UaStation --skill detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon -a claude-code2Manually: put the files in place
~/.claude/skills/process-injection-detect/SKILL.mdCopy the whole skill folder; for one project use .claude/skills/process-injection-detect/
1Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add freyrswift/UaStation --skill detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon -a codex2Manually: put the files in place
.agents/skills/process-injection-detect/SKILL.mdFor all projects use ~/.agents/skills/
1Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add freyrswift/UaStation --skill detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon -a cursor2Manually: put the files in place
.cursor/skills/process-injection-detect/SKILL.mdCursor also reads .agents/skills/ and .claude/skills/
1GitHub CLI
gh skill install freyrswift/UaStation resources/skills/process-injection-detect2Manually: put the files in place
.github/skills/process-injection-detect/SKILL.md1Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add freyrswift/UaStation --skill detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon -a gemini-cli2Platform CLI
gemini skills install https://github.com/freyrswift/UaStation --path resources/skills/process-injection-detectManually: put the files in place
.devin/skills/process-injection-detect/SKILL.mdThe legacy .windsurf/skills/ path still works
Claude.ai
Zip the folder and upload it in Settings → Capabilities → Skills
Step by step, with commands for each platform: How to install skills in Claude Code: five ways
Questions about detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon
How do I install detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon in Claude Code?
Run npx skills add freyrswift/UaStation --skill detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon -a claude-code. The skill file is at ~/.claude/skills/process-injection-detect/SKILL.md.
What does detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon do?
It analyzes Sysmon events to identify cross-process memory access, remote thread creation, and unusual DLL loads. It supports investigations into techniques including DLL injection and process hollowing.
What does detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon require?
It needs Sysmon capturing Events 1, 7, 8, 10, and 25, and a SIEM platform for correlation and alerting. Detecting process hollowing through Event 25 requires Sysmon 13 or later.
Source text
SKILL.md · Apache-2.0
---
name: detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon
description: Detect process injection techniques (T1055) - including DLL injection, process
hollowing, and APC injection - by analyzing Sysmon Event IDs 1, 7, 8, 10, and 25 for
cross-process memory operations, remote thread creation, and anomalous DLL loads. Use
when hunting defense-evasion activity that hides code inside legitimate processes, investigating
an EDR alert on suspicious cross-process access, or validating Sysmon coverage for injection
detection.
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: threat-hunting
tags:
- threat-hunting
- process-injection
- sysmon
- mitre-t1055
- defense-evasion
- dll-injection
- process-hollowing
version: '1.0'
author: mahipal
license: Apache-2.0
d3fend_techniques:
- Executable Denylisting
- Execution Isolation
- File Metadata Consistency Validation
- Content Format Conversion
- File Content Analysis
nist_csf:
- DE.CM-01
- DE.AE-02
- DE.AE-07
- ID.RA-05
mitre_attack:
- T1055.001
- T1055.002
- T1055.003
- T1055.012
---
# Detecting T1055 Process Injection with Sysmon
## When to Use
- When hunting for defense evasion techniques that hide malicious code inside legitimate processes
- After EDR alerts for suspicious cross-process memory access or remote thread creation
- When investigating malware that injects into svchost.exe, explorer.exe, or other system processes
- During purple team exercises testing detection of process injection variants
- When validating Sysmon configuration coverage for injection detection
## Prerequisites
- Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration capturing Events 1, 7, 8, 10, 25
- Event ID 8 (CreateRemoteThread) enabled for remote thread detection
- Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) configured with appropriate access mask filters
- Event ID 7 (ImageLoaded) for DLL injection detection
- Event ID 25 (ProcessTampering) for process hollowing on Sysmon 13+
- SIEM platform for correlation and alerting
## Workflow
1. **Monitor CreateRemoteThread (Event 8)**: Detect when one process creates a thread in another process's address space. This is the primary indicator of classic DLL injection and shellcode injection.
2. **Analyze ProcessAccess (Event 10)**: Track cross-process handle requests with PROCESS_VM_WRITE (0x0020), PROCESS_VM_OPERATION (0x0008), and PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD (0x0002) access rights. Legitimate processes rarely need these on other processes.
3. **Detect Anomalous DLL Loading (Event 7)**: Identify DLLs loaded from unusual paths (user temp directories, download folders) into system processes.
4. **Hunt Process Hollowing (Event 25)**: Sysmon 13+ generates ProcessTampering events when the executable image in memory diverges from what was mapped from disk -- a hallmark of process hollowing (T1055.012).
5. **Correlate with Process Creation**: Link injection events to the originating process creation (Event 1) to build the full attack chain from initial execution to injection.
6. **Filter Known-Good Cross-Process Activity**: Exclude legitimate software that performs cross-process operations (debuggers, AV products, accessibility tools, RMM agents).
7. **Map to ATT&CK Sub-Techniques**: Classify detected injection as classic injection (T1055.001), PE injection (T1055.002), thread execution hijacking (T1055.003), APC injection (T1055.004), thread local storage (T1055.005), process hollowing (T1055.012), or process doppelganging (T1055.013).
## Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| T1055.001 | Dynamic-link Library Injection |
| T1055.002 | Portable Executable Injection |
| T1055.003 | Thread Execution Hijacking |
| T1055.004 | Asynchronous Procedure Call (APC) Injection |
| T1055.005 | Thread Local Storage |
| T1055.012 | Process Hollowing |
| T1055.013 | Process Doppelganging |
| T1055.015 | ListPlanting |
| Sysmon Event 8 | CreateRemoteThread detected |
| Sysmon Event 10 | ProcessAccess with memory write permissions |
| Sysmon Event 25 | ProcessTampering (image mismatch) |
| Access Mask 0x1FFFFF | PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS -- full cross-process control |
## Tools & Systems
| Tool | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| Sysmon | Primary telemetry source for injection detection |
| Process Hacker | Manual investigation of process memory regions |
| PE-sieve | Scan running processes for hollowed/injected code |
| Moneta | Detect anomalous memory regions in processes |
| Splunk / Elastic | SIEM correlation of Sysmon events |
| Volatility | Memory forensics for injection artifacts |
| Hollows Hunter | Automated scan for hollowed processes |
## Detection Queries
### Splunk -- Remote Thread Creation
```spl
index=sysmon EventCode=8
| where SourceImage!=TargetImage
| where NOT match(SourceImage, "(?i)(csrss|lsass|services|svchost|MsMpEng|SecurityHealthService|vmtoolsd)\.exe$")
| eval suspicious=if(match(TargetImage, "(?i)(svchost|explorer|lsass|winlogon|csrss|services)\.exe$"), "high_value_target", "normal_target")
| where suspicious="high_value_target"
| table _time Computer SourceImage SourceProcessId TargetImage TargetProcessId StartFunction NewThreadId
```
### Splunk -- Suspicious ProcessAccess Patterns
```spl
index=sysmon EventCode=10
| where SourceImage!=TargetImage
| where match(GrantedAccess, "(0x1FFFFF|0x1F3FFF|0x143A|0x0040)")
| where match(TargetImage, "(?i)(lsass|svchost|explorer|winlogon)\.exe$")
| where NOT match(SourceImage, "(?i)(MsMpEng|csrss|services|svchost|taskmgr|procexp)\.exe$")
| table _time Computer SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace
```
### KQL -- Process Injection via Remote Thread
```kql
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType == "CreateRemoteThreadApiCall"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("csrss.exe", "lsass.exe", "services.exe", "svchost.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("svchost.exe", "explorer.exe", "lsass.exe", "winlogon.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```
### Sigma Rule -- Process Injection Detection
```yaml
title: Process Injection via CreateRemoteThread into System Process
status: stable
logsource:
product: windows
category: create_remote_thread
detection:
selection:
TargetImage|endswith:
- '\svchost.exe'
- '\explorer.exe'
- '\lsass.exe'
- '\winlogon.exe'
filter_legitimate:
SourceImage|endswith:
- '\csrss.exe'
- '\lsass.exe'
- '\services.exe'
- '\MsMpEng.exe'
condition: selection and not filter_legitimate
level: high
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1055
```
## Common Scenarios
1. **Classic DLL Injection**: Malware uses VirtualAllocEx + WriteProcessMemory + CreateRemoteThread to load a malicious DLL into a target process. Detected via Sysmon Event 8.
2. **Process Hollowing (RunPE)**: Attacker creates a suspended process, unmaps its image, writes malicious PE, and resumes execution. Detected via Sysmon Event 25.
3. **APC Injection**: Malware queues an Asynchronous Procedure Call to threads of a target process using QueueUserAPC. Harder to detect, requires Event 10 monitoring.
4. **Reflective DLL Injection**: DLL is loaded directly from memory without touching disk, bypassing ImageLoaded detection. Requires memory-level analysis.
5. **Process Doppelganging**: Leverages NTFS transactions to replace a legitimate process image. Detected via process integrity checking.
## Output Format
```
Hunt ID: TH-INJECT-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Host: [Hostname]
Source Process: [Injecting process path]
Source PID: [Process ID]
Target Process: [Target process path]
Target PID: [Process ID]
Injection Type: [DLL/Shellcode/Hollowing/APC]
Sysmon Events: [Event IDs triggered]
Access Mask: [Granted access value]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
ATT&CK Sub-Technique: [T1055.xxx]
```
© mahipal · Apache-2.0 · freyrswift/UaStation