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personal-data-protection — Claude Code plugin: SEA PDPA reference

personal-data-protection is a plugin for Claude Code and Codex that groups personal-data duties in six Southeast Asian countries by stack layer. It includes checklists for new features, data fields, vendors and breaches.

MIT ★ 1,596 updated 2026-10-29

Install into Claude Code · Plugin marketplace All methods and platforms ↓
/plugin marketplace add hashgraph-online/awesome-codex-plugins
/plugin install personal-data-protection@awesome-codex-plugins
Open on GitHub

What personal-data-protection does

The plugin is a compliance reference for engineers whose code handles personal data of users in Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines or Vietnam. Duties are grouped by the layer they land on: architecture, data model, access controls, feature UX, disclosure, operations. You open the file for the part of the system you are changing instead of hunting a section number. Nothing in it assumes a particular stack.

Checklists cover the tasks that keep coming up — a new feature, a new data field, a new vendor, a breach. A statute map works in reverse when a PR description or an audit reply needs a citation, and an incident template gives the breach runbook somewhere to start. It ships as a Claude skill and as a Codex plugin.

The repo states plainly that this is engineering material, not legal advice, so a compliance call still goes to the official statute and a DPO or lawyer. Regimes outside the region, GDPR and CCPA among them, are left out on purpose.

What it helps with

  • map which parts of the stack a new personal-data column touches
  • sort notification clocks for a breach across several SEA jurisdictions
  • find the statute section to cite in a pull request description
  • vet a vendor before it gets access to user records
  • tell sensitive personal information from ordinary PI in the Philippines

Example prompts for the agent

  • I'm adding a PhilSys number column to the KYC table — what changes under the Philippines DPA?
  • A broken access policy exposed employee records in Singapore and Thailand. What are the notification clocks and who do we tell?
  • Check this new vendor against Malaysia PDPA before we hand over user data.

How to install personal-data-protection

Plugin marketplace

/plugin marketplace add hashgraph-online/awesome-codex-plugins
/plugin install personal-data-protection@awesome-codex-plugins

Step by step, with commands for each platform: Claude Code plugins: marketplaces, installing, and building your own

Questions about personal-data-protection

How do I install personal-data-protection in Claude Code?

Add the marketplace with /plugin marketplace add hashgraph-online/awesome-codex-plugins, then run /plugin install personal-data-protection@awesome-codex-plugins.

What does personal-data-protection do?

It collects personal-data duties from six Southeast Asian regimes and maps them onto stack layers, with checklists, a statute map and an incident template.

Is it legal advice?

No. It is engineering reference material, so verify against the official statute and involve a DPO or lawyer before relying on it for a compliance decision.

Source text

personal-data-protection-skill · MIT
# personal-data-protection-skill

> ⚠ **Engineering reference material — not legal advice.** This skill summarises personal-data-protection obligations as they apply to building software. It is **not** authoritative legal guidance and **must not** be used as the sole basis for compliance decisions. Always verify against the official statute and consult a qualified DPO or lawyer. See [DISCLAIMER.md](DISCLAIMER.md).
>
> **Source-text posture:** this skill **does not reproduce or republish any of the underlying statutes**. It provides engineer-facing interpretation, layered patterns, and short attributed quotations of operative phrases under fair-dealing principles, with links to the official sources. Anyone planning to package or redistribute this content beyond similar engineering-reference use should read [DISCLAIMER.md § Copyright in source materials](DISCLAIMER.md#copyright-in-source-materials) — Malaysia's PNMB-published Act 709 / Act A1727 carry the strictest publisher's notice of the populated jurisdictions and may require prior permission.

A multi-agent personal-data-protection compliance reference for engineers — packaged as both a [Claude Code skill](https://docs.claude.com/en/docs/claude-code/skills) and a Codex plugin, with `AGENTS.md` routing for Cursor and Copilot — organised by where in the stack each obligation lands rather than by statute section number.

**Status:** Singapore PDPA, Thailand PDPA, Indonesia UU PDP, Malaysia PDPA, Philippines DPA, and Vietnam PDPL all populated. Repo ships dual plugin manifests — [`.claude-plugin/`](.claude-plugin/) (Claude Code / Cowork via `/plugin install`) and [`.codex-plugin/`](.codex-plugin/) (Codex) — plus [`AGENTS.md`](AGENTS.md) routing for Cursor / Copilot. Vietnam PDPL added in v0.5, written against Law 91/2025/QH15 and Decree 356/2025/NĐ-CP.

**Audience:** anyone building any app or service that handles personal data of users in Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, or Vietnam. Tech-agnostic — works whether your stack is Supabase, Firebase, AWS, your own backend, native iOS/Android, Flutter, React Native, web, a headless API, or anything else.

## Coverage — Southeast Asia focus

This skill is **deliberately SEA-focused**. Most products built in or for the region are subject to two or more of these regimes concurrently (a Singapore-headquartered app with Thai and Indonesian users, a Malaysian fintech with Singapore corporate customers, a Philippine fintech with Indonesian and Singapore users, etc.), and the "strictest rule wins" approach only works when the regimes are factored against a shared set of implementation layers. Broader global skills (GDPR / CCPA / PIPL) exist elsewhere and are intentionally **out of scope** here — coverage breadth would dilute the SEA depth.

| Jurisdiction | Regulation | Regulator | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Singapore | PDPA 2012 (post-2020 Amendments) | PDPC | ✅ Populated |
| Thailand | PDPA B.E. 2562 (2019) | PDPC Thailand | ✅ Populated |
| Indonesia | UU PDP No. 27/2022 | Komdigi | ✅ Populated |
| Malaysia | PDPA 2010 (with 2024 Amendments — Act A1727) | JPDP | ✅ Populated |
| Philippines | Data Privacy Act 2012 (RA 10173) | NPC | ✅ Populated |
| Vietnam | Law on Personal Data Protection 91/2025/QH15 + Decree 356/2025/NĐ-CP | A05 (MPS) | ✅ Populated |

**Not in scope:** GDPR, UK GDPR, CCPA / CPRA and other US state laws, PIPL (China), APPI (Japan), PIPA (Korea), DPDP Act (India), LGPD (Brazil), POPIA (South Africa), Privacy Act 1988 (Australia), PIPEDA (Canada). If your product is also subject to one of these, pair this skill with a jurisdiction-specific reference for that regime.

## Why this exists

Personal-data-protection statutes are written by lawyers, for lawyers. Engineers shipping features need answers like *"I'm adding a new column that stores user PII — what do I touch?"*, not section numbers. This skill bridges the two:

- **Layered guidance** by where in the stack the obligation lives (architecture, data model, controls, feature/UX, disclosure, operational) — universal across jurisdictions.
- **Jurisdiction-specific obligations** mapped to the relevant statute sections.
- **Entry-point checklists** for common tasks: new feature, new data field, new vendor, breach response.
- **Statute-map** for reverse lookup when you need to cite a section in a PR description, audit response, or breach notification.

## Use cases

Three scenarios that show what this skill actually helps with — each one is a real engineering trap that a developer would otherwise miss.

### 1. SG-based fintech expanding to Philippines for OFW remittances

Your KYC flow already collects a TIN, SSS, and PhilSys number. **In Singapore those are plain PI; in the Philippines they're Sensitive Personal Information under § 3(l) of RA 10173** — the SPI category in PH explicitly includes all government-issued identifiers, which is broader than every other jurisdiction this skill covers.

What you'd touch in the skill:
- [`jurisdictions/ph-dpa/obligations/02-consent.md`](skills/personal-data-protection/jurisdictions/ph-dpa/obligations/02-consent.md) — § 13 explicit-consent requirement for SPI
- [`layers/03-data-model.md`](skills/personal-data-protection/layers/03-data-model.md) — column-tagging + SPI gating patterns
- [`checklists/new-data-field.md`](skills/personal-data-protection/checklists/new-data-field.md) — invoked when adding the PhilSys field

Resulting engineering work: separate explicit-consent dialog before SPI capture, SPI-tier audit logging on reads (§ 26(b) negligent access carries 3–6 years prison + ₱500k–₱4M), masked display, no clear-text logging, deletion / blocking flow distinct from regular PII.

### 2. B2B HR SaaS with customers across all five SEA jurisdictions — Tuesday-afternoon RLS misconfig exposes 50,000 employee records

You don't get one notification clock. You get five lanes simultaneously, and the strictest rule applies per user:
- **Singapore:** 3 calendar days to PDPC after assessment (s26D(1))
- **Thailand:** 72 hours from awareness to PDPC (s37(4))
- **Indonesia:** 72 hours from awareness to **both** regulator AND subjects (Pasal 46(1))
- **Malaysia:** 72 hours to Commissioner (s12B(1) + JPDP Guideline 25 Feb 2025) + 7-day subject notification
- **Philippines:** 72 hours to **both** NPC AND affected subjects (§ 38 IRR + NPC Circular 16-03 § 12); § 30 concealment is its own offence (1.5–5 years + ₱500k–₱1M); § 34 makes the engineering manager who approved the RLS migration personally liable for the corporate prison terms

What you'd touch:
- [`checklists/breach-response.md`](skills/personal-data-protection/checklists/breach-response.md) — entry point, per-jurisdiction triage
- [`jurisdictions/<code>/obligations/06-breach-notification.md`](skills/personal-data-protection/jurisdictions/) — content and timing for each lane
- [`templates/INCIDENT_RESPONSE.md.template`](skills/personal-data-protection/templates/INCIDENT_RESPONSE.md.template) — pre-staged so subject-comms aren't being drafted at hour 60

Resulting engineering work: detection pipeline reliable enough to start the clock on **first credible signal** (not on confirmation); SOP that runs all five notifications in parallel; pre-filled regulator forms and pre-templated subject emails; an incident register that survives staff turnover (the input to PH's 31 March annual report).

### 3. Indonesian consumer app launching server-side face unlock

The biometric embedding crosses to your backend. Three Pasal triggers fire simultaneously:
- **Pasal 4** — biometric data is "Specific" Personal Data
- **Pasal 20(2)(a)** — explicit consent required before any processing
- **Pasal 34 — mandatory DPIA before launch.** Biometric processing is one of the seven enumerated triggers; skipping the DPIA renders the processing non-compliant, regardless of how good the rest of the implementation is

What you'd touch:
- [`jurisdictions/id-pdp/obligations/02-consent.md`](skills/personal-data-protection/jurisdictions/id-pdp/obligations/02-consent.md) — Specific PD definition + Pasal 20(2)(a) explicit consent
- [`jurisdictions/id-pdp/obligations/05-care.md`](skills/personal-data-protection/jurisdictions/id-pdp/obligations/05-care.md) — Pasal 34 DPIA triggers and content
- [`layers/05-feature-ux.md`](skills/personal-data-protection/layers/05-feature-ux.md) — soft-prompt dialog pattern, opt-in framing

Resulting engineering work: DPIA artefact on file **before** the feature ships (a launch gate, not best practice); explicit-consent modal separate from the signup checkbox; schema tagging for biometric columns; **72-hour consent-withdrawal SLA under Pasal 40** — the deletion sweep for biometric embeddings must run on a 72-hour cycle, not weekly.

## How the six statutes diverge — developer view

This table is **application code and UX only**. Each row starts with *"If your app does X..."* and the per-jurisdiction columns describe how the implementation actually differs — what UI element to add, what column to create, what flow to build, what template to ship.

Governance/legal items (DPO appointment, staff AUP wording, vendor DPA contracts, regulator notification portals, penalty-cap exposure) are **excluded** — those are real obligations but they don't change what your application does. See `skills/personal-data-protection/jurisdictions/<code>/obligations/` for those.

Areas where the regimes are **equivalent** at the app level (consent capture, withdrawal symmetry, per-user data isolation, retention sweeps, EXIF strip, soft-prompt dialogs, backup retention) are also omitted — the same code satisfies all five.

| If your app... | Singapore PDPA | Thailand PDPA | Indonesia UU PDP | Malaysia PDPA | Philippines DPA | Vietnam PDPL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Has a signup consent screen** | Single bundled "I agree to T&C + Privacy" checkbox is acceptable when all processing is transactional | Same screen works, **but** if you collect any sensitive-category data (see below), add a separate explicit-consent modal for those fields specifically | **Stricter form requirements** (Pasal 22): consent must be written/recorded, clearly distinguishable, in simple/clear language. Non-compliant consent is **null and void by law** (Pasal 22(5)) — no fallback. **Pasal 25** also requires accessible alternative consent channels for persons with disabilities (screen-reader-compatible flows, alternative formats; consent obtainable from the person and/or their guardian) — unique to ID among the five | Bundled checkbox works, **but the privacy notice (s7) must be in BOTH Bahasa Malaysia AND English** (s7(3)). Maintain both versions in your release pipeline | Bundled checkbox works for transactional purposes (§ 12(a)/(b)), **but the privacy notice (§ 16(a) + § 34(a) IRR) is prescriptive** — must enumerate identity of PIC, DPO contact, purposes, lawful basis, recipients, retention, automated decision-making, and complaint channel (NPC + DPO). The notice must reference the version the user saw at signup | Consent **per purpose**, no bundling, **silence is not consent**, in a printable/copyable or **verifiable** format (Điều 9(3)–(4)) |
| **Collects sensitive data** (anything that could fall into health, biometrics, religion, sexuality, ethnicity, political opinion, criminal record, trade union, genetic, location patterns over time) | Apply the narrow deemed-significant-harm list — usually no special UX | Broad s26 — almost certainly need a **separate explicit-consent dialog** before collection, plus stricter logging on those fields | "Specific" Personal Data category (Pasal 4) — typically health, **biometric (face embeddings, fingerprints, voice prints, gait, iris)**, genetic, criminal records, children's data, financial. Requires explicit consent under Pasal 20(2)(a) | s4 list now includes **biometric data** (added 2024) — separate **explicit-consent dialog** under s40(1)(a). Face embeddings, fingerprint hashes, voice prints all in scope | **§ 3(l) "Sensitive Personal Information" is the broadest of the five** — health, education, genetic, sexual life, race, ethnic origin, marital status, age, colour, religion, philosophy, politics, criminal proceedings, AND **government-issued identifiers (PhilSys, SSS, GSIS, TIN, PhilHealth, passport, driver's licence)**. KYC flows that collect a TIN / SSS are SPI processing in PH (typically plain PI elsewhere). Separate explicit-consent dialog under § 13(a). § 25(b) penalty: 3–6 years prison + ₱500k–₱4M | Check **Decree Điều 4** first — a closed list that includes **positioning-service location**, e-ID credentials and ID-card images, bank/card/transaction/credit data, and **behaviour-tracking on online services**. Decree Điều 4(2) then requires access-limiting permissions, a documented procedure and security measures |
| **Ships a new feature involving high-risk processing** (sensitive data, large-scale profiling, automated decisions, novel tech, public-area monitoring, data matching, rights-restrictive processing) | No statutory DPIA; PDPC guidance recommends one — best-practice artefact, no launch gate | No statutory DPIA; common best practice for sensitive-data features | **Pasal 34 — mandatory DPIA before launch** when any of 7 enumerated triggers fires (automation, sensitive PD, large-scale, regular systematic monitoring, data matching, novel technology, rights-restrictive processing). Skipping renders processing non-compliant; have the artefact (purpose, categories, risk, mitigation) on file before deployment | No statutory DPIA; JPDP guidance encourages | No statutory DPIA; **NPC Advisory 2017-03 strongly encourages a Privacy Impact Assessment** for high-risk processing — not a launch gate, but expected on file. Inspectors look for it | Impact assessment is **filed with the regulator** — one original within **60 days of first processing** (Điều 21(1)), refreshed 6-monthly (Điều 22). Big data / AI / blockchain / virtual worlds add Điều 30 + Decree Điều 9–11 |
| **Has a Settings screen with notification toggles** | Single "Notifications on/off" works for transactional-only apps; consent withdrawal handled "as soon as reasonably possible" (no statutory SLA) | Same — split into transactional vs marketing the moment marketing is added; no statutory SLA on withdrawal | Same — but **Pasal 40 requires processing to stop within 72 hours** of consent withdrawal. Encode this as a per-jurisdiction SLA constant in the consent-withdrawal handler | Same — split transactional vs marketing; honour s43 direct-marketing opt-out per channel; "reasonable period" under s38 (operationally treat as next send-batch) | Same split — transactional vs marketing. **§ 16(b) right to object is absolute for direct marketing**. Action window: **15 calendar days** default per NPC Circular 2022-04 § 11, extendable once by 15 days for complex cases | Per-purpose toggles defaulting off (Điều 9(4)); withdrawal must **fan out to processors** (Điều 10(3)) and is not retroactive (Điều 10(4)) |
| **Lets users delete their account** | Hard-delete + "Deleted User" attribution for shared content (chat history etc.) | Same flow works, **plus** offer "Anonymize" as an alternative choice in the confirmation UI (s33 explicitly covers erase OR anonymize) | Pasal 8 + 43 + 44 — explicit **erasure AND destruction** obligations (the Act distinguishes the two; destruction is more permanent). Subject can request both | s10 Retention Principle: must **destroy or permanently delete** when the purpose ends — soft-delete alone isn't compliant; pair with a sweep job | **§ 16(e) — right to erasure OR blocking**. The Act distinguishes the two: erasure = destruction; blocking = suspend further processing while retaining the record. Where statutory retention applies (tax / AML / sectoral), use **blocking** with a `deletion_state` column rather than erasing | Điều 14 covers deletion, destruction and **de-identification**; once de-identified the data leaves scope entirely (Điều 2(1)), and **re-identification is prohibited** (Điều 7) |
| **Lets users export their data** | Any structured format (JSON, CSV, ZIP) | Same, **but** format must be **suitable for transfer to another controller** — JSON works, ad-hoc proprietary blobs don't (s31) | Pasal 13 — machine-readable format; right to send/transfer to another Controller where systems can communicate securely. Must respond in **72 hours** (Pasal 32) | s30 access (21 days) + **s43A data portability (new 2024)** — direct transmission to another controller subject to technical-feasibility / format-compatibility caveat | NPC Circular 18-01 — *"electronic or structured format that is commonly used and allows for further use"*. JSON / CSV / ZIP works; user receives the export (no controller-to-controller default). 15-day SLA per NPC Circular 2022-04 | Provision right (Điều 4(1)(d), Điều 15) — export must cover all personal data held |
| **Lets users pause processing without deleting** their account | No such feature needed | **Build it** (s34) — schema: `processing_restricted_at` column on user record. UI: Settings toggle. Code: check on every mutation; reads still allowed | **Required (Pasal 11)** — same code mechanism as Thailand. PLUS **72-hour SLA** (Pasal 41) — must comply or document statutory exception | s42 — same `processing_restricted_at` mechanism; trigger is "substantial damage or distress", not at-will | **§ 16(e) blocking** — same `deletion_state = 'blocked'` mechanism; live-state check on every mutation. 15-day SLA per NPC Circular 2022-04 | Restriction right on doubt as to scope, purpose or accuracy (Điều 10(1)); mutation paths must check the restriction state |
| **Lets admins / support read individual user data** | Audit-log mutations (best practice; not strictly required) | Audit-log mutations + maintain a discoverable s39 record-of-processing-activities document for the regulator | Pasal 31 explicit Records of Processing Activities (RoPA) requirement for **all** processing — formalised inventory, regulator can request | s44 record obligation — list of disclosures + categories of recipients, produced on Commissioner's request. s9(1)(d) personnel-reliability requirement; audit reads of sensitive columns | § 26 IRR Records of Processing Activities required. **§ 26(a)/(b) negligent access is criminal** (3–6 years for SPI); **audit-log every read** of SPI columns. § 34 makes the responsible engineering manager personally liable for the prison term if the corporate offence engages | **Điều 37(1)(h)** — you must prevent unauthorised collection from your own systems, so rate limiting and enumeration defence on personal-data endpoints are compliance measures, not just abuse controls |
| **Is a B2B SaaS / processes personal data on behalf of other businesses** (i.e., you are a "data processor" / "data intermediary") | Narrow direct duties: s24 (protection) and s25 (retention) bind on data intermediaries (s4(2) + s11(2)). Otherwise controller-driven; flow obligations via DPA | s40 — processor must comply with s37 security standards, process only per controller's instructions, notify controller of breach without delay | Pasal 51–52 — processor obligations parallel controller; sub-processor controls; instructions-based processing | **New direct duty post-A1727 (1 Apr 2025): s5(1A) makes the processor directly bound by the Security Principle (s9), and s12A(2) requires the processor to appoint its own DPO** — independent statutory floor on top of the customer DPA. Plan your breach-notification flow-down so customers can still hit their 72h s12B(1) clock | The **PIP (processor) has its own statutory duties** — independent DPO appointment (§ 14 IRR), independent NPC registration of data processing systems, security obligations under § 20 RA 10173 + IRR §§ 25–29. § 14 RA 10173 keeps the PIC ultimately responsible. Flow-down breach notification ≤ 24h so the customer-PIC can hit the 72h NPC clock | Processor keeps its own impact-assessment dossier as agreed with the controller (Điều 21(3)); Điều 37(1)(đ) makes **selecting an appropriate processor** a named controller duty; Decree Điều 21–27 licenses data-processing service businesses |
| **Stores user data with cloud providers in another country** | Privacy policy mention of "service providers" is sufficient if vendor DPAs are in place | If relying on s28(2) consent: signup screen must disclose destination + that protection status is inadequate. If relying on s28(3) contractual necessity: vendor DPAs sufficient (most realistic) | **3-tier hierarchy (Pasal 56)**: adequacy → adequate-and-binding safeguards → consent. No published adequacy list yet from the regulator — most realistic basis is Tier 2 (vendor DPAs with binding clauses) | **s129 post-A1727 (1 Apr 2025) — whitelist regime deleted.** Realistic basis is **s129(3)(f) due diligence**: vendor DPA + cert audits (ISO 27001 / SOC 2) + documented assessment. Burden on the controller | **§ 21 PIC accountability** — no whitelist, no SCCs, no adequacy decisions; PIC is *"responsible for personal information... transferred to a third party for processing, whether domestically or internationally"*. Realistic basis: vendor outsourcing / data sharing agreement with NPC Circular 2020-03 clauses + documented due diligence on recipient controls | **Điều 20(1)(c) — using any platform outside Vietnam** to process data collected in Vietnam is a cross-border transfer. File a transfer impact assessment within **60 days of first transfer** (Điều 20(2)); regulator may inspect yearly and **suspend transfers** (Điều 20(4)–(5)). Decree Điều 12 adds cloud-specific measures |
| **Has an incident response runbook** | Lane: 3 calendar days from breach-assessment-as-notifiable; PDPC SG portal | Lane: 72 hours from *awareness* (faster); PDPC Thailand portal | **72-hour lane (Pasal 46)** — but distinct: notify **BOTH** subject AND regulator; "certain circumstances" trigger public notification. Operationally heavier than SG/TH | **72-hour Commissioner notification + 7-day subject notification** (s12B + JPDP Guideline 25 Feb 2025); JPDP Personal Data Protection System portal | **72-hour lane to BOTH NPC AND affected data subjects** (§ 38 IRR + NPC Circular 16-03 § 12). PLUS **annual Security Incident Report by 31 March** to NPC covering all incidents, notifiable or not. **§ 30 makes concealment its own offence** (1.5–5y + ₱500k–₱1M); **§ 34 makes responsible officers personally liable** for prison terms | **72 hours from detection of the act** (Điều 23(1)) — no assessment buffer. **Form No. 08** to the authority or the national portal (Decree Điều 28(2)); log must capture data **categories and volume** |

**How to use this table:** find the row matching what your app already does (or is about to do). Read across — if the per-jurisdiction columns are the same, you ship one implementation. If they differ, you either build the strictest version (covers all) or branch by user jurisdiction (more code, more nuanced UX).

For the section-by-section walkthrough, see [`skills/personal-data-protection/jurisdictions/`](skills/personal-data-protection/jurisdictions/) and [`skills/personal-data-protection/jurisdictions/_index.md`](skills/personal-data-protection/jurisdictions/_index.md).

## Install

The repo is laid out for both Claude Code and Codex packaging — skill content lives under [`skills/personal-data-protection/`](skills/personal-data-protection/), with plugin manifests in [`.claude-plugin/`](.claude-plugin/) and [`.codex-plugin/`](.codex-plugin/). Install paths depend on your tool:

### Claude Code / Claude Cowork — via this repo's marketplace (works today)

```bash
claude plugin marketplace add AltByteSG/personal-data-protection-skill
claude plugin install personal-data-protection@personal-data-protection-skill
```

The repo carries a [`marketplace.json`](.claude-plugin/marketplace.json) so it works as a single-plugin marketplace. Verify with `claude plugin list`.

### Claude Code / Claude Cowork — via the official Anthropic marketplace (once approved)

```
/plugin install personal-data-protection@claude-plugins-official
```

Pending Anthropic review of the submission. Both install paths can coexist — pick one.

### Codex / Cursor / Copilot

```bash
git clone https://github.com/AltByteSG/personal-data-protection-skill.git ~/.tools/personal-data-protection-skill
```

Then add a single line to your project's existing `AGENTS.md` / `.cursorrules` / `.github/copilot-instructions.md`:

```markdown
For personal-data-protection compliance, follow
~/.tools/personal-data-protection-skill/AGENTS.md
```

The root [`AGENTS.md`](AGENTS.md) routes the agent into the skill content under `skills/personal-data-protection/`.

The repo also includes [`.codex-plugin/plugin.json`](.codex-plugin/plugin.json) for Codex plugin packaging. Project-specific jurisdiction selection still belongs in the consuming project's `.pdp-compliance.json`, not in the plugin manifest.

### Pin a specific upstream version

```bash
cd <clone-path> && git checkout v0.4.0
```

## Adapt to your project

Two templates ship in [`skills/personal-data-protection/templates/`](skills/personal-data-protection/templates/). Setup instructions are in each file's header.

- **[`INCIDENT_RESPONSE.md.template`](skills/personal-data-protection/templates/INCIDENT_RESPONSE.md.template)** — *works with any agent.* Solo / small-team breach runbook. Copy to your project's `docs/` folder and fill in the `{{PLACEHOLDERS}}` (DPO contact, vendor list, jurisdictions).
- **[`pdp-nudge.sh.template`](skills/personal-data-protection/templates/pdp-nudge.sh.template)** — **Claude Code only.** Auto-nudges Claude into this skill on edits to PDP-sensitive paths via a `PostToolUse` hook. Codex CLI, Cursor, and Copilot do not have an equivalent hook system at time of writing, so this template is not portable — use the Codex guardrail pattern below if you want mechanical checks outside the agent.

### Codex guardrail: pre-commit / CI changed-file check

For Codex, use the skill as the reasoning layer and a deterministic changed-file script as the tripwire. The script should not try to decide legal compliance; it should only detect that a change probably touches personal data and requires a PDP review.

Recommended project config:

```json
{
  "personalDataProtection": {
    "jurisdictions": ["sg-pdpa", "my-pdpa"],
    "mode": "strictest-wins",
    "reviewPolicy": "warn"
  }
}
```

Save that as `.pdp-compliance.json` in the consuming project. Use the jurisdiction codes that apply to the application's users:

- `sg-pdpa` — Singapore PDPA 2012
- `th-pdpa` — Thailand PDPA B.E. 2562
- `id-pdp` — Indonesia UU PDP No. 27/2022
- `my-pdpa` — Malaysia PDPA 2010 with 2024 Amendments
- `ph-dpa` — Philippines Data Privacy Act 2012 (RA 10173)
- `vn-pdpl` — Vietnam Law on Personal Data Protection 91/2025/QH15

Unknown codes are rejected by the checker rather than silently ignored, so a typo surfaces immediately instead of yielding zero coverage.

`mode` is read by the **agent**, not by `pdp-check-changed-files.py` — it records how you want conflicting obligations resolved when several jurisdictions are active. The script is a tripwire only; it flags files and never resolves obligations.

Then wire the checker into local commits. Example `.pre-commit-config.yaml` in the consuming project:

```yaml
repos:
  - repo: local
    hooks:
      - id: pdp-compliance-check
        name: PDP compliance changed-file check
        entry: python3 scripts/pdp-check-changed-files.py --staged
        language: system
        pass_filenames: false
```

Install the hook:

```bash
pip install pre-commit
pre-commit install
```

For CI, run the same checker against the pull-request diff. Example GitHub Actions job:

```yaml
name: PDP Compliance Check

on:
  pull_request:
  push:
    branches: [main]

jobs:
  pdp-compliance:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest

    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
        with:
          fetch-depth: 0

      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
        with:
          python-version: "3.11"

      - name: Run PDP changed-file check
        run: |
          python3 scripts/pdp-check-changed-files.py \
            --base origin/main \
            --head HEAD \
            --review-policy block-on-sensitive-change
```

Suggested flow:

1. Developer edits code.
2. Pre-commit warns when PDP-sensitive files or keywords are touched.
3. Developer asks Codex to review the change against the selected jurisdictions.
4. CI blocks sensitive pull-request changes unless the team has an agreed review acknowledgement, such as a PR label or `PDP-Reviewed: yes` commit trailer.

## Versioning

Releases are tagged to track significant statute changes — see [CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md). Each jurisdiction's `README.md` records which version of the statute the content reflects and when it was last verified.

When PDPC (Singapore), MOCI (Indonesia), or PDPC (Thailand) publishes amendments or new guidance, the skill is updated and a new minor or patch version is released. You can pin to a specific tag in your submodule if you want to control the upgrade timing.

## Sources

This skill summarises and references the following statutes. Always defer to the official text — see [DISCLAIMER.md](DISCLAIMER.md).

### Singapore — Personal Data Protection Act 2012

- **Statute:** [sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/PDPA2012](https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/PDPA2012)
- **Regulator:** Personal Data Protection Commission — [www.pdpc.gov.sg](https://www.pdpc.gov.sg)
- **Subordinate regulations:**
  - Personal Data Protection (Notification of Data Breaches) Regulations 2021: [sso.agc.gov.sg/SL/PDPA2012-S64-2021](https://sso.agc.gov.sg/SL/PDPA2012-S64-2021)
- **Advisory guidelines:** [pdpc.gov.sg → Guidelines and Consultation](https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/guidelines-and-consultation)
- **Breach reporting portal:** [eservice.pdpc.gov.sg/case/db](https://eservice.pdpc.gov.sg/case/db)

### Indonesia — UU No. 27/2022 (Pelindungan Data Pribadi)

- **Statute...

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