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audit-logging — Claude Code skill: audit trails and SIEM

A skill for setting up centralized audit logging, retention and SIEM forwarding. Useful when you need an action trail for compliance or incident review.

Install into Claude Code · Skills CLI (Vercel) All methods and platforms ↓
npx skills add BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills --skill audit-logging -a claude-code
Open on GitHub

What audit-logging does

The skill lays out which events belong in an audit log: authentication, authorization, data access, administrative actions and system events. Each category lists what to record — login attempts, password changes, permission grants, reads and deletes on sensitive data, key rotation.

It ships working configs. The rsyslog example reads application logs with imfile, formats them as JSON and forwards to a central server over TCP with TLS and certificate name checks. The journald config covers persistent storage, compression, sealing and limits on size and retention. For applications there is a Python AuditLogger class that chains hashes: every entry points at the previous hash, so after-the-fact edits show up. A decorator called audit_trail logs function calls and exceptions.

Forwarding to a central server needs its address and certificates for gtls, otherwise rsyslog will not bring the connection up. The skill file stops partway through the Fluent Bit section, so there is nothing to rely on there.

What it helps with

  • pull application and system events into one audit log
  • forward events to a SIEM over an encrypted channel
  • set retention and size limits for journals
  • detect tampering with a hash chain on log entries
  • log function calls and errors automatically

Example prompts for the agent

  • Set up centralized audit logging and forward events to the SIEM over TLS
  • Add an AuditLogger with a hash chain for data access events in this service
  • Configure journald for persistent storage with sealing

How to install audit-logging

1Skills CLI (Vercel)

npx skills add BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills --skill audit-logging -a claude-code

2Manually: put the files in place

~/.claude/skills/audit-logging/SKILL.md

Copy the whole skill folder; for one project use .claude/skills/audit-logging/

Step by step, with commands for each platform: How to install skills in Claude Code: five ways

Questions about audit-logging

How do I install audit-logging in Claude?

Run npx skills add BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills --skill audit-logging -a claude-code. The skill file then lands at ~/.claude/skills/audit-logging/SKILL.md.

What does audit-logging do?

It defines which events to write to an audit log and provides configs for rsyslog, journald and Python application logging. That gives you an action trail for compliance and incident review.

What do I need to forward logs to a central server?

The server address and certificates for gtls — the rsyslog example connects over TCP and checks the name in the certificate.

Source text

SKILL.md · MIT
---
name: audit-logging
description: Implement centralized audit logging and SIEM integration. Configure log retention and security monitoring. Use when implementing audit trail requirements.
license: MIT
metadata:
  author: devops-skills
  version: "1.0"
---

# Audit Logging

Implement comprehensive audit logging for compliance, security monitoring, and forensic analysis across infrastructure and applications.

## When to Use

- Setting up centralized logging for compliance frameworks (SOC 2, HIPAA, PCI DSS)
- Implementing security event monitoring and alerting
- Building audit trails for regulatory requirements
- Configuring log retention and tamper-proof storage
- Integrating application logs with SIEM platforms

## Log Categories

```yaml
audit_events:
  authentication:
    - Login attempts (success and failure)
    - MFA enrollment and verification events
    - Session creation, renewal, and termination
    - Password changes and resets
    - API key and token generation

  authorization:
    - Access grants and denials
    - Permission changes and role assignments
    - Privilege escalation events
    - Resource sharing modifications
    - Policy evaluation results

  data_access:
    - Read operations on sensitive data
    - Write and update operations
    - Delete and purge operations
    - Bulk export and download events
    - Data classification changes

  administrative:
    - Configuration changes
    - User and group management
    - System startup and shutdown
    - Backup and restore operations
    - Network and firewall rule changes

  system:
    - Service health state changes
    - Resource provisioning and deprovisioning
    - Certificate and key rotation events
    - Scheduled job execution results
    - Integration and webhook events
```

## Rsyslog Configuration for Centralized Logging

```bash
# /etc/rsyslog.d/50-audit.conf

# Load imfile module to read application logs
module(load="imfile")

# Forward auth logs
input(type="imfile"
  File="/var/log/auth.log"
  Tag="auth"
  Severity="info"
  Facility="auth"
)

# Forward application audit logs
input(type="imfile"
  File="/var/log/app/audit.log"
  Tag="app-audit"
  Severity="info"
  Facility="local0"
)

# Structured JSON template
template(name="json-audit" type="list") {
  constant(value="{")
  constant(value="\"@timestamp\":\"")    property(name="timereported" dateFormat="rfc3339")
  constant(value="\",\"host\":\"")       property(name="hostname")
  constant(value="\",\"severity\":\"")   property(name="syslogseverity-text")
  constant(value="\",\"facility\":\"")   property(name="syslogfacility-text")
  constant(value="\",\"tag\":\"")        property(name="syslogtag" format="json")
  constant(value="\",\"message\":\"")    property(name="msg" format="json")
  constant(value="\"}\n")
}

# Forward to central syslog server over TLS
action(
  type="omfwd"
  target="syslog.internal.example.com"
  port="6514"
  protocol="tcp"
  StreamDriver="gtls"
  StreamDriverMode="1"
  StreamDriverAuthMode="x509/name"
  template="json-audit"
  queue.type="LinkedList"
  queue.size="50000"
  queue.filename="fwd_audit"
  queue.saveonshutdown="on"
  action.resumeRetryCount="-1"
)
```

## Journald Configuration for Persistent Logging

```ini
# /etc/systemd/journald.conf
[Journal]
Storage=persistent
Compress=yes
Seal=yes
SplitMode=uid
MaxRetentionSec=365d
MaxFileSec=30d
SystemMaxUse=10G
SystemKeepFree=2G
ForwardToSyslog=yes
```

```bash
# Query journald for audit events
journalctl _TRANSPORT=audit --since "24 hours ago" --output json-pretty

# Filter by specific audit types
journalctl _AUDIT_TYPE=1112 --since today  # user login events
journalctl _AUDIT_TYPE=1100 --since today  # user auth events

# Export for offline analysis
journalctl --since "7 days ago" --output export > /backup/journal-export.bin
```

## Application Logging with Structured JSON

```python
import logging
import json
import hashlib
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from functools import wraps

class AuditLogger:
    def __init__(self, service_name, logger_name="audit"):
        self.service = service_name
        self.logger = logging.getLogger(logger_name)
        handler = logging.FileHandler("/var/log/app/audit.log")
        handler.setFormatter(logging.Formatter("%(message)s"))
        self.logger.addHandler(handler)
        self.logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)
        self._prev_hash = None

    def log_event(self, event_type, user, resource, action, result,
                  metadata=None, source_ip=None):
        log_entry = {
            "timestamp": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
            "service": self.service,
            "event_type": event_type,
            "user": user,
            "resource": resource,
            "action": action,
            "result": result,
            "source_ip": source_ip,
            "metadata": metadata or {},
        }
        # Chain hash for tamper detection
        raw = json.dumps(log_entry, sort_keys=True)
        log_entry["prev_hash"] = self._prev_hash
        log_entry["hash"] = hashlib.sha256(
            f"{self._prev_hash}:{raw}".encode()
        ).hexdigest()
        self._prev_hash = log_entry["hash"]
        self.logger.info(json.dumps(log_entry))

    def log_auth(self, user, action, success, source_ip=None, mfa=False):
        self.log_event(
            event_type="authentication",
            user=user,
            resource="auth-service",
            action=action,
            result="success" if success else "failure",
            metadata={"mfa_used": mfa},
            source_ip=source_ip,
        )

    def log_data_access(self, user, resource, operation, record_count=0,
                        source_ip=None):
        self.log_event(
            event_type="data_access",
            user=user,
            resource=resource,
            action=operation,
            result="success",
            metadata={"record_count": record_count},
            source_ip=source_ip,
        )


def audit_trail(audit_logger, resource_name):
    """Decorator to automatically audit function calls."""
    def decorator(func):
        @wraps(func)
        def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
            user = kwargs.get("current_user", "system")
            try:
                result = func(*args, **kwargs)
                audit_logger.log_event(
                    event_type="operation",
                    user=user,
                    resource=resource_name,
                    action=func.__name__,
                    result="success",
                )
                return result
            except Exception as e:
                audit_logger.log_event(
                    event_type="operation",
                    user=user,
                    resource=resource_name,
                    action=func.__name__,
                    result="failure",
                    metadata={"error": str(e)},
                )
                raise
        return wrapper
    return decorator
```

## Fluentd / Fluent Bit Log Aggregation

```yaml
# fluent-bit.conf - lightweight agent on each node
[SERVICE]
    Flush         5
    Daemon        Off
    Log_Level     info
    Parsers_File  parsers.conf

[INPUT]
    Name          tail
    Path          /var/log/app/audit.log
    Parser        json
    Tag           audit.app
    Refresh_Interval 5
    Rotate_Wait   30

[INPUT]
    Name          systemd
    Tag           audit.system
    Systemd_Filter _TRANSPORT=audit

[FILTER]
    Name          modify
    Match         audit.*
    Add           cluster ${CLUSTER_NAME}
    Add           node ${NODE_NAME}

[OUTPUT]
    Name          es
    Match         audit.*
    Host          elasticsearch.internal.example.com
    Port          9200
    Index         audit-logs
    Type          _doc
    tls           On
    tls.verify    On
    Retry_Limit   5

[OUTPUT]
    Name          s3
    Match         audit.*
    region        us-east-1
    bucket        audit-logs-archive
    total_file_size 50M
    upload_timeout  10m
    s3_key_format  /logs/%Y/%m/%d/$TAG/%H_%M_%S.gz
    compression    gzip
```

## Elasticsearch Index Lifecycle for Retention

```json
{
  "policy": {
    "phases": {
      "hot": {
        "min_age": "0ms",
        "actions": {
          "rollover": {
            "max_size": "50gb",
            "max_age": "1d"
          },
          "set_priority": { "priority": 100 }
        }
      },
      "warm": {
        "min_age": "7d",
        "actions": {
          "shrink": { "number_of_shards": 1 },
          "forcemerge": { "max_num_segments": 1 },
          "set_priority": { "priority": 50 }
        }
      },
      "cold": {
        "min_age": "30d",
        "actions": {
          "freeze": {},
          "set_priority": { "priority": 0 }
        }
      },
      "delete": {
        "min_age": "365d",
        "actions": { "delete": {} }
      }
    }
  }
}
```

## Retention Policy by Compliance Framework

```yaml
retention_requirements:
  soc2:
    minimum: 1 year
    recommended: 3 years
    notes: "Based on audit period and report requirements"

  hipaa:
    minimum: 6 years
    notes: "From date of creation or last effective date"

  pci_dss:
    minimum: 1 year
    immediately_available: 3 months
    notes: "Req 10.7 - retain for at least one year, 3 months immediately available"

  gdpr:
    minimum: "As long as necessary for processing purpose"
    notes: "Apply data minimization; delete when no longer needed"

  fedramp:
    minimum: 3 years
    notes: "AU-11 control requirement"

  iso27001:
    minimum: "Defined by organization policy"
    recommended: 3 years
    notes: "A.12.4.1 - retention period must be defined"
```

## Log Integrity Verification Script

```bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# verify-log-integrity.sh - Verify log file checksums against stored hashes

LOG_DIR="/var/log/app"
HASH_FILE="/var/log/app/.checksums"
ALERT_WEBHOOK="${ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL}"

verify_logs() {
  local failures=0
  while IFS='  ' read -r stored_hash filename; do
    if [ -f "$filename" ]; then
      current_hash=$(sha256sum "$filename" | awk '{print $1}')
      if [ "$stored_hash" != "$current_hash" ]; then
        echo "TAMPER DETECTED: $filename"
        failures=$((failures + 1))
        curl -s -X POST "$ALERT_WEBHOOK" \
          -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
          -d "{\"text\":\"ALERT: Audit log tamper detected on $(hostname): $filename\"}"
      fi
    else
      echo "MISSING: $filename"
      failures=$((failures + 1))
    fi
  done < "$HASH_FILE"

  return $failures
}

update_checksums() {
  find "$LOG_DIR" -name "*.log" -type f -exec sha256sum {} \; > "$HASH_FILE"
  chmod 440 "$HASH_FILE"
}

case "${1:-verify}" in
  verify)  verify_logs ;;
  update)  update_checksums ;;
  *)       echo "Usage: $0 {verify|update}" ;;
esac
```

## SIEM Integration Checklist

```yaml
siem_integration:
  log_sources:
    - [ ] Operating system auth logs (syslog, journald)
    - [ ] Application audit logs (structured JSON)
    - [ ] Cloud provider audit trails (CloudTrail, Activity Log, Audit Logs)
    - [ ] Database query and access logs
    - [ ] Network flow logs and firewall logs
    - [ ] Container and orchestrator logs (Kubernetes audit)
    - [ ] WAF and CDN access logs
    - [ ] VPN and remote access logs

  normalization:
    - [ ] Common event format (CEF) or OCSF schema
    - [ ] Consistent timestamp format (ISO 8601 / UTC)
    - [ ] Unified user identity fields
    - [ ] Standardized severity levels

  alerting_rules:
    - [ ] Multiple failed login attempts (brute force)
    - [ ] Login from unusual location or device
    - [ ] Privilege escalation events
    - [ ] Sensitive data bulk export
    - [ ] Administrative action outside change window
    - [ ] Service account anomalous activity
    - [ ] Log forwarding gap or interruption

  operational:
    - [ ] Log pipeline health monitoring
    - [ ] Storage capacity alerting
    - [ ] Retention policy enforcement verified
    - [ ] Backup of log archives confirmed
    - [ ] Access to log systems restricted and audited
```

## Best Practices

- Use structured logging (JSON) with consistent field names across all services
- Ship logs to a centralized platform with write-once storage for tamper protection
- Implement hash chaining or digital signatures for log integrity verification
- Define and enforce retention policies per compliance framework requirements
- Set up real-time alerting for high-severity security events
- Separate audit logs from application debug logs to reduce noise
- Never log sensitive data (passwords, tokens, PII) in audit entries
- Monitor the logging pipeline itself to detect gaps in coverage
- Regularly test log restoration from archives to verify recoverability
- Rotate and compress logs to manage storage while meeting retention windows

© devops-skills · MIT · BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills

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