hunt-http-smuggling — скилл для Claude Code: обзор и установка
Скилл hunt-http-smuggling помогает выявлять рассинхронизацию HTTP-запросов между фронтенд-прокси и бэкендом. Пригодится при аудите цепочек CDN и балансировщиков нагрузки.
MIT ★ 16 193 обновлён 2026-10-29
/plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
/plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsoulsЧто делает hunt-http-smuggling
Скилл ориентирован на поиск расхождений при парсинге заголовков Content-Length и Transfer-Encoding (векторы CL.TE, TE.CL, H2.CL и H2.TE). Он структурирует сценарии аудита, опираясь на внешние инструменты: расширение Burp HTTP Request Smuggler, утилиты smuggler.py и h2csmuggler. Проверка факта десинхронизации строится на методике задержки ответа (тайм-аут 30 секунд), анализе отравления кеша и возможностях обхода аутентификации на внутренних путях.
В материалах приведена матрица уязвимости различных прокси-серверов. Современные фронтенды по умолчанию соблюдают требования RFC 9112: связки с Nginx от версии 1.21 или Caddy версии 2.x отклоняют классические запросы с обоими заголовками кодом HTTP 400, поэтому классический вектор на них не сработает. Основным вектором остаются цепочки с даунгрейдом протокола HTTP/2 в HTTP/1.1 между CDN и источником, а также устаревшие версии HAProxy и Citrix ADC.
Какие задачи решает
- проверить поведение балансировщика при даунгрейде HTTP/2 в HTTP/1.1
- протестировать цепочку CDN и ориджина на устойчивость к desync-атакам
- оценить риски обхода правил WAF через нестандартные заголовки запроса
- составить матрицу проверок прокси-серверов по RFC 9112
Примеры запросов агенту
- Проверь конфигурацию Nginx и бэкенда на подверженность расхождениям CL.TE
- Помоги составить тест задержки для проверки desync между CDN и сервером приложений
- Оцени устойчивость реверс-прокси к H2.CL даунгрейду по матрице уязвимостей
Как установить hunt-http-smuggling
1Через маркетплейс плагинов
/plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsoulsКоманда ставит плагин claude-bughunter целиком, со всеми его скиллами
2Через Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-http-smuggling -a claude-code3Вручную: положить файлы
~/.claude/skills/hunt-http-smuggling/SKILL.mdПапка скилла целиком; для одного проекта — .claude/skills/hunt-http-smuggling/
1Через Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-http-smuggling -a codex2Вручную: положить файлы
.agents/skills/hunt-http-smuggling/SKILL.mdДля всех проектов — ~/.agents/skills/
1Через Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-http-smuggling -a cursor2Вручную: положить файлы
.cursor/skills/hunt-http-smuggling/SKILL.mdCursor читает и .agents/skills/, и .claude/skills/
1GitHub CLI
gh skill install elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter skills/hunt-http-smuggling2Вручную: положить файлы
.github/skills/hunt-http-smuggling/SKILL.md1Через Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-http-smuggling -a gemini-cli2Командой платформы
gemini skills install https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --path skills/hunt-http-smugglingВручную: положить файлы
.devin/skills/hunt-http-smuggling/SKILL.mdСтарый путь .windsurf/skills/ тоже читается
Claude.ai
Упакуйте папку в zip и загрузите в Settings → Capabilities → Skills
По шагам, с командами для каждой платформы: Как установить скилл в Claude Code: пять способов
Вопросы о hunt-http-smuggling
Как установить hunt-http-smuggling в Claude Code?
Выполните последовательно команды /plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter и /plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsouls.
Для чего предназначен этот скилл?
Он предоставляет методики аудита и проверки согласованности парсинга HTTP-запросов между прокси и веб-серверами.
Сработает ли классический вектор CL.TE против современных серверов Nginx?
Начиная с версии 1.21 Nginx строго следует RFC 9112 и отклоняет запросы с одновременным наличием Content-Length и Transfer-Encoding кодом 400.
Исходный текст
SKILL.md · MIT
--- name: hunt-http-smuggling description: "Hunt HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE, TE.CL, H2.CL, H2.TE). Cause: front-end proxy and back-end server disagree on where one request ends and the next begins (Content-Length vs Transfer-Encoding header parsing inconsistency). CL.TE: front-end uses CL, back uses TE → smuggle by sending TE: chunked but with body that fits CL count. TE.CL: opposite. H2.CL: HTTP/2 downgrade, smuggle CL into HTTP/1.1 back-end. Detection tools: Burp HTTP Request Smuggler extension, smuggler.py, h2csmuggler. Confirm: time-delay technique (smuggled GET with 30s timeout) — if front-end returns slow on next victim request, smuggling works. Validate: cache poisoning chain (smuggle request that gets cached for victim), credential theft (smuggle X-Forwarded-For override that captures next user's cookies), bypass auth (smuggled internal-path request). Real paid examples from major CDN deployments. Use when hunting H1 paid programs running CDN+origin stacks, when targeting load balancer / WAF bypass." sources: hackerone_public, cve_database, portswigger_research, public_research report_count: 12 --- ## 17. HTTP REQUEST SMUGGLING > Lowest dup rate. $5K–$30K. PortSwigger research by James Kettle. ### CL.TE (Content-Length front, Transfer-Encoding back) ```http POST / HTTP/1.1 Content-Length: 13 Transfer-Encoding: chunked 0 SMUGGLED ``` ### Detection ``` 1. Burp extension: HTTP Request Smuggler 2. Right-click request → Extensions → HTTP Request Smuggler → Smuggle probe 3. Manual timing: CL.TE probe + ~10s delay = backend waiting for rest of body ``` ### Impact Chain ``` Poison next request → access admin as victim Steal credentials → capture victim's session Cache poisoning → stored XSS at scale ``` --- ## Target-Suitability Matrix (2026 reality check) The classic CL.TE / TE.CL payloads are NOT universally exploitable in 2026. Modern proxies are RFC 9112 strict by default. Fingerprint the front-end BEFORE investing time. | Front-end | CL.TE | TE.CL | H2.CL | H2.TE | Notes | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | **Nginx ≥ 1.21** | NO | NO | partial (H2 ingress) | partial | RFC-strict; rejects CL+TE with HTTP 400. Verified locally on Nginx 1.27 — all 9 documented variants killed by front-end ([docs/verification/phase2h-smuggling-cachepoison.md](../../docs/verification/phase2h-smuggling-cachepoison.md)). | | **Caddy 2.x** | NO | NO | — | — | Hardened by default | | **Envoy ≥ 1.20** | NO | NO | partial | partial | Hardened in most paths | | **HAProxy ≤ 2.4** | ✓ | ✓ | — | — | **Vulnerable**, see CVE-2021-40346 | | **AWS ALB + specific upstream** | partial | partial | ✓ | ✓ | Several disclosed-paid reports 2022-2024 | | **Cloudflare → S3 / Lambda chains** | — | — | ✓ | ✓ | H2-downgrade attacks remain viable | | **Older F5 BIG-IP (TMM < 16)** | ✓ | — | — | — | Vendor advisories | | **Citrix ADC / NetScaler (older firmware)** | ✓ | ✓ | — | — | Disclosed in 2020-2022 | | **Squid 3.x** | ✓ | — | — | — | Older deployments | | **Apache Traffic Server (older)** | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | PortSwigger research | | **Apache mod_proxy_ajp → Tomcat** | — | — | — | — | Cross-protocol HTTP→AJP desync (CVE-2022-26377); smuggled request is opaque to the WAF and reaches internal AJP admin/status paths that lack the external auth controls | | **Custom Python / Go proxies** | ✓ | ✓ | — | — | Frequently miss RFC enforcement | ### Operator fingerprint quick-check ```bash curl -sI https://target/ | grep -i "Server:" ``` - `nginx/1.21+`, `Caddy`, `envoy` → CL/TE classic is dead — pivot to H2.CL/H2.TE if the front-end speaks HTTP/2, or look for legacy proxies upstream - `HAProxy`, header points to AWS/CDN → run the full payload matrix - No Server header → assume hardened, but run a single quick `space-before-colon` probe; if it doesn't 400, dig deeper ### H2.CL / H2.TE (the modern dominant vector) H2-downgrade smuggling attacks rely on the front-end speaking HTTP/2 to the client and HTTP/1.1 to origin. The downgrade introduces CL/TE confusion because HTTP/2's frame-length headers don't survive the conversion cleanly. Most CDN+origin chains in 2024-2026 use this exact topology. Tools that send HTTP/2 raw frames (Burp Pro's HTTP Request Smuggler extension, `h2csmuggler`, `smuggler.py`) are the right starting point against CDN-fronted targets. Avoid HTTP/1.1-only test clients (curl, raw sockets) against H2-front-ended targets — you'll send the wrong protocol entirely. ### Mass credential harvesting — the "collector gadget" The highest-impact smuggling outcome needs no per-victim interaction. Instead of blindly poisoning the queue, smuggle a request aimed at a **back-end handler that echoes the full request** — a search endpoint that reflects headers, or a redirect that mirrors the request line. The next victim's headers (`Cookie`, `Authorization`, `X-Access-Token`) get attributed to your smuggled request, and the reflecting handler returns them **in a response you read**. Repeated on a busy keep-alive socket, this harvests live credentials from arbitrary users at scale — and it works even through a CDN (Akamai/Cloudflare) when the CDN↔origin hop desyncs. Chains to `hunt-ato`. --- ## Related Skills & Chains - **`hunt-cache-poison`** — Smuggling + cache is the canonical critical chain; one smuggled request becomes the cached response for every subsequent victim. Chain primitive: CL.TE smuggle a request whose response body contains attacker HTML/JS → front-end cache stores it under a popular URL (`/`, `/login`) → de-sync poisoning where the smuggled request becomes the cached response for the next N victims, persisting for the cache TTL. - **`hunt-auth-bypass`** — Smuggling reaches internal-only routes that the front-end WAF/auth-proxy filters out. Chain primitive: smuggle `GET /admin/users HTTP/1.1` past the front-end ACL that blocks external `/admin/*` → backend processes the smuggled request as if from a trusted internal source → bypass front-end auth by smuggling internal-routed request → admin data in the response queue. - **`hunt-idor`** — Smuggling attaches the NEXT user's session cookies to an attacker-controlled request path. Chain primitive: smuggle `GET /api/me HTTP/1.1` with no cookies → backend pairs it with the next legitimate user's incoming connection cookies → victim's session cookie attached to attacker's smuggled request → attacker reads the response containing victim's PII/tokens. - **`hunt-xss`** — Smuggling injects XSS payloads into the response stream of the next victim without ever appearing in a URL parameter. Chain primitive: smuggled request body contains reflected payload that the backend renders into the next response in the queue → next visitor to `/` receives attacker HTML inline → reflected XSS at every visitor without any URL parameter visible to them or to logs. - **`security-arsenal`** — Reach for the smuggling payload bank (CL.TE / TE.CL / TE.TE obfuscations, H2.CL downgrade probes, h2csmuggler one-liners, Burp HTTP Request Smuggler extension config) and the time-delay confirmation template before manual hex-editing. - **`triage-validation`** — Run the Pre-Severity Gate before claiming Critical: the smuggled-request effect MUST land on a request issued by a different client/session, not your own follow-up. A timing delta in your own browser alone is parser disagreement, not exploitable smuggling.
© Sachin Sharma · MIT · elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter