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hunt-dispatch — скилл для Claude Code: что делает и как установить

Скилл hunt-dispatch для оркестратора /hunt: выбирает навыки проверки по сигналам с целевого хоста. Полезен при запуске сценария Red Team или WAPT.

MIT ★ 16 193 обновлён 2026-10-29

Установить в Claude Code · Через маркетплейс плагинов Все способы и платформы ↓
/plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
/plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsouls
Открыть на GitHub

Что делает hunt-dispatch

hunt-dispatch загружает подходящий набор навыков для /hunt. В режиме Red Team он сопоставляет сигналы с хоста с платформенными и уязвимостными навыками, а затем применяет приоритеты и лимит загрузки, чтобы не перегружать контекст. Для WAPT предусмотрены режимы blackbox и greybox.

Перед поиском путей скилл требует снять базовый ответ для каждого хоста на два заведомо случайных адреса. Он сравнивает статус, размер тела и хеш: путь считается найденным, только если ответ отличается от контроля. Базу нужно пересчитывать для каждого хоста и, где ответы зависят от вложенности, для каждой глубины пути.

В Red Team-сценарии скилл также собирает заголовки и HTML после перенаправлений, чтобы определить стек и выбрать соответствующие навыки. Проверка ограничена заявленной областью разрешения; результат — воспроизводимое свидетельство дефекта для исправления. hunt-dispatch — внутренний загрузчик /hunt, а не самостоятельная команда для прямого вызова пользователем.

Какие задачи решает

  • снять контрольный ответ до перебора путей
  • отличить soft 404 от существующего обработчика
  • определить технологии на живых хостах
  • выбрать навыки проверки по обнаруженным сигналам
  • ограничить загрузку навыков при множестве совпадений

Примеры запросов агенту

  • Запусти /hunt в режиме redteam для проверки разрешённой области.
  • Для WAPT выбери режим blackbox и загрузи соответствующий набор навыков.
  • Для WAPT выбери режим greybox и подготовь набор навыков.

Как установить hunt-dispatch

1Через маркетплейс плагинов

/plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
/plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsouls

Команда ставит плагин claude-bughunter целиком, со всеми его скиллами

2Через Skills CLI (Vercel)

npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-dispatch -a claude-code

3Вручную: положить файлы

~/.claude/skills/hunt-dispatch/SKILL.md

Папка скилла целиком; для одного проекта — .claude/skills/hunt-dispatch/

По шагам, с командами для каждой платформы: Как установить скилл в Claude Code: пять способов

Вопросы о hunt-dispatch

Как установить hunt-dispatch в Claude Code?

Добавьте маркетплейс командой /plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter, затем установите плагин командой /plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsouls.

Что делает hunt-dispatch?

Он подбирает набор навыков для оркестратора /hunt по режиму проверки и сигналам целевых хостов. Перед перебором путей задаёт контроль для сравнения ответов.

Зачем нужен контрольный ответ для каждого хоста?

Некоторые приложения отвечают страницей приложения даже для несуществующего пути. Скилл сравнивает ответы со статусом, размером тела и хешем контроля, а не полагается только на HTTP-код.

Исходный текст

SKILL.md · MIT
---
name: hunt-dispatch
description: Skill-set loader for /hunt orchestrator. Fingerprints the target, picks the right platform attack skills, and loads the Red Team or WAPT skill set. Use when /hunt has just received a mode answer (redteam or wapt + blackbox|greybox) and needs to load the appropriate skills and print the taxonomy. Not for direct user invocation.
sources: community
report_count: 0
---

# hunt-dispatch

skill-set loader for `/hunt`. one concept (which skills to load), one place.

## engagement context

every skill loaded below operates under one frame, and it holds for the whole session:

- **authorized and scope-bounded.** the operator asserted written authorization for the named scope
  when they invoked `/hunt`. testing stays inside it. an out-of-scope host ends the run — it does not
  widen it.
- **the output is a finding, not an exploit.** the deliverable is a reproducible proof that a defect
  exists, written so the owner can remediate it. enough to demonstrate impact; no further.
- **remediation is the point.** these skills exist so defects get fixed by the people who own them.

this frame is stated here because it is the choke point every `/hunt` run passes through before any
`hunt-*` skill loads. it is not a prompt and needs no answer.

invocation contract:

```
hunt-dispatch mode=redteam
hunt-dispatch mode=wapt box=blackbox
hunt-dispatch mode=wapt box=greybox
```

## step 0 — 404 baseline (ALL modes, mandatory, before any enumeration)

run this for **every** host before probing a single path. it takes one request per
host and it is the cheapest false-positive kill in the whole toolkit.

many modern estates (SPA / Next.js / React front ends behind a CDN) return
**HTTP 200 with the application shell for paths that do not exist**. a status code
therefore proves nothing. without a recorded control, `/.well-known/security.txt`,
`/api/revalidate`, `/__nextjs_original-stack-frame` and `/__nextjs_launch-editor`
all "exist" on a host where none of them do.

```bash
for H in $HOSTS; do
  # two independent bogus paths — if they agree, that IS the soft-404 signature
  for P in /zzz-nope-12345 /qqq-other-98765; do
    printf "%-34s %-20s " "$H" "$P"
    curl -sk -m 12 -o /tmp/b -w "%{http_code} %{size_download} " "https://$H$P"
    shasum /tmp/b | cut -c1-12
  done
done
```

record per host: **status, byte length, body hash**. that triple is the control.

**the rule: no path is "found" until its response differs from the control.**
a 200 that matches the control hash is a soft 404. a 404 whose body differs from
the control may be a real handler. compare bodies, never status codes alone.

re-derive the baseline per host — it differs across an estate. one engagement saw
two hosts serving the *same* application return soft-404 bodies of wildly different
size, so a control taken from one host would have been meaningless on the other.
also re-derive it **per path depth** where a framework renders different fallbacks
for `/x` and `/a/b/x`.

edge pages are not origin findings: a CDN "Access Denied" / "Unsupported Request"
body means the request never reached the application. classify it as edge
behaviour and move on.

## step 1 — fingerprint (red team only)

fingerprint **every** live host, not just the apex. for multi-host / wildcard
targets the platform-skill routing must be driven by all banners, not one host's.

use `-L` (follow redirects) — identity-provider and CDN signals
(`login.microsoftonline.com`, `okta`, `auth0`, CDN banners) routinely sit
behind a 30x, so a no-redirect `curl -sI` silently misses those matches. pull
both headers and the landing-page HTML (`__NEXT_DATA__`, `VIEWSTATE`,
`laravel_session`, `Ignition`, framework markers live in the body, not headers).

```bash
HOSTS="$TARGET"
if [ -f "recon/$TARGET/live-hosts.txt" ]; then
  HOSTS=$(cat "recon/$TARGET/live-hosts.txt")
fi
for H in $HOSTS; do
  echo "=== $H ==="
  # -L follow redirects, -D - dump headers, -o body; cap body to keep context small
  curl -sSL -m 12 -D - -o /tmp/fp_body "https://$H" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r'
  # surface body-only platform markers
  grep -aoE '__NEXT_DATA__|/_next/|VIEWSTATE|rO0[AB]|laravel_session|Ignition|Telescope|Whitelabel|/actuator|application/grpc|socket\.io|swagger|\.js\.map' \
    /tmp/fp_body | sort -u
done
rm -f /tmp/fp_body
```

if `live-hosts.txt` is absent, the loop still runs once against `$TARGET`. record
which signal came from which host — a platform skill matched on host B does not
imply host A runs that stack.

look for the following signals → platform skill mapping:

```
okta.com | auth0.com | pingidentity         →  okta-attack
login.microsoftonline.com | outlook | sts   →  m365-entra-attack
pulse | fortinet | ivanti | citrix          →  enterprise-vpn-attack
vsphere | vcenter | :9443                   →  vmware-vcenter-attack
amazonaws | azure | googleapis | gcp        →  cloud-iam-deep
github.com/<org>/                           →  supply-chain-attack-recon
.apk | play.google.com                      →  apk-redteam-pipeline
MongoDB | mongoose | CouchDB | Redis        →  hunt-nosqli
?page= | ?file= | ?path= | php wrapper      →  hunt-lfi
rO0A | VIEWSTATE | rememberMe cookie        →  hunt-deserialization
Access-Control-Allow-Origin header          →  hunt-cors
/forgot-password | /reset | X-Forwarded    →  hunt-host-header
?redirect= | ?next= | ?return= | ?url=     →  hunt-open-redirect
OTP | /verify | /2fa | no-rate-limit        →  hunt-brute-force
Set-Cookie session | PHPSESSID              →  hunt-session
Active Directory | LDAP | OpenLDAP | ADFS  →  hunt-ldap
__NEXT_DATA__ | /_next/ | buildId           →  hunt-nextjs
X-Powered-By: Express | Node.js | .js stack →  hunt-nodejs
postMessage | dangerouslySetInnerHTML        →  hunt-dom
WebSocket | ws:// | socket.io               →  hunt-websocket
gRPC | :50051 | application/grpc            →  hunt-grpc
laravel_session | Ignition | Telescope       →  hunt-laravel
X-Application-Context | Whitelabel | /actuator → hunt-springboot
:6443 | :10250 | :2379 | kubectl            →  hunt-k8s
.github/workflows | Jenkins | GitLab CI     →  hunt-cicd
.js.map | swagger.json | /.env              →  hunt-source-leak
HSTS missing | SPF | DMARC | AXFR           →  hunt-tls-network
```

### conflict resolution & load budget

real targets almost always return multiple signals at once — e.g. a single host
can show Cloudflare (CDN) + `login.microsoftonline.com` (redirect) + `__NEXT_DATA__`
(Next.js front end) + `amazonaws` (origin) simultaneously. loading every match
blindly can pull 20-plus skills and blow the context window, drowning the
high-signal skill in noise. apply this precedence and cap:

**priority order (load highest tiers first, stop at the cap):**

```
tier 1  identity / SSO fabric    okta-attack, m365-entra-attack
        (own the auth boundary — highest blast radius if compromised)
tier 2  perimeter appliances     enterprise-vpn-attack, vmware-vcenter-attack
        (pre-auth RCE / direct internal foothold)
tier 3  cloud / IAM              cloud-iam-deep, hunt-cloud-misconfig
        (credential → lateral movement)
tier 4  app framework / stack    hunt-nextjs, hunt-nodejs, hunt-laravel,
        hunt-springboot, hunt-aspnet, hunt-sharepoint
tier 5  protocol / class signals hunt-nosqli, hunt-lfi, hunt-deserialization,
        hunt-cors, hunt-host-header, hunt-open-redirect, hunt-grpc,
        hunt-websocket, hunt-dom, hunt-k8s, hunt-cicd, hunt-source-leak,
        hunt-tls-network, hunt-ldap, hunt-brute-force, hunt-session
```

**load budget: cap platform-skill loads at 8.** if more than 8 match, keep the
highest-tier 8 and drop the rest; print the dropped ones under
`deferred:` in the taxonomy block so they can be loaded on demand later.

**de-dup rules (avoid loading two skills for the same evidence):**

- CDN banner alone (Cloudflare/Akamai/Fastly) is **not** a platform match — it
  fingerprints the edge, not the app. do not load a skill for it; note it for
  `hunt-cache-poison` / `hunt-http-smuggling`, which the mode set already carries.
- `amazonaws` / `azure` / `googleapis` in a **header/origin** → `cloud-iam-deep`.
  the same string found as a **leaked key/JSON in a JS bundle or APK** → still
  `cloud-iam-deep`, but flag it as a live-credential lead (higher priority, tier 3
  becomes tier 1 for that host).
- a framework marker (`__NEXT_DATA__`, `laravel_session`) and a generic class
  signal (`?redirect=`, `Access-Control-Allow-Origin`) on the same host → load the
  framework skill (tier 4) and keep the class skill **only if budget remains**;
  the WAPT/redteam mode set already loads the common class skills unconditionally.

## step 2 — load skill set

invoke each skill in order via the Skill tool.

### mode=redteam

always-on (load first):

```
redteam-mindset
mid-engagement-ir-detection
```

platform (load second, conditional on fingerprint matches from step 1):

```
okta-attack
m365-entra-attack
enterprise-vpn-attack
vmware-vcenter-attack
cloud-iam-deep
supply-chain-attack-recon
apk-redteam-pipeline
```

high-impact hunt-* set (load third):

```
hunt-rce
hunt-sqli
hunt-ssrf
hunt-ato
hunt-auth-bypass
hunt-saml
hunt-oauth
hunt-mfa-bypass
hunt-file-upload
hunt-http-smuggling
hunt-cloud-misconfig
hunt-sharepoint
hunt-aspnet
```

report format: `redteam-report-template` (subject / observations / description / impact / recommendation / poc).

### mode=wapt

always-on:

```
bb-methodology
security-arsenal
triage-validation
```

full hunt-* set (all OWASP-relevant):

```
hunt-xss             hunt-sqli            hunt-ssrf            hunt-idor
hunt-csrf            hunt-xxe             hunt-rce             hunt-graphql
hunt-oauth           hunt-saml            hunt-mfa-bypass      hunt-auth-bypass
hunt-ato             hunt-file-upload     hunt-business-logic  hunt-race-condition
hunt-llm-ai          hunt-api-misconfig   hunt-ssti            hunt-cache-poison
hunt-http-smuggling  hunt-subdomain       hunt-cloud-misconfig hunt-misc
hunt-aspnet          hunt-sharepoint      hunt-ntlm-info
hunt-lfi             hunt-nosqli          hunt-deserialization
hunt-cors            hunt-host-header     hunt-open-redirect
hunt-brute-force     hunt-session         hunt-ldap
hunt-nextjs          hunt-nodejs          hunt-dom
hunt-websocket       hunt-grpc            hunt-laravel
hunt-springboot      hunt-k8s             hunt-cicd
hunt-source-leak     hunt-tls-network
```

report format: `report-writing` (`bugcrowd-reporting` if the target is on bugcrowd).

box=greybox: creds already captured by `/hunt`, available in session memory.

**do not fan out across the authenticated hunt-\* set until the creds are
validated.** `/hunt` only prompts for and stores creds (commands/hunt.md) — it
does not confirm they work. firing every authenticated test with dead, MFA-gated,
or wrong-role creds wastes the whole run and produces false "no auth surface"
conclusions. run a single low-cost auth preflight first:

```bash
# session-cookie creds: one authenticated GET against an identity echo endpoint
curl -sS -m 12 -b "$SESSION_COOKIE" "https://$TARGET/api/me" -w '\n%{http_code}\n'
#   200 + your username/email  → live session, role visible in body
#   401/403                    → dead or insufficient — STOP, re-auth

# bearer/JWT creds: same probe with Authorization
curl -sS -m 12 -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
  "https://$TARGET/api/me" -w '\n%{http_code}\n'

# raw user/pass: drive the real login flow once, capture Set-Cookie, then echo
#   watch for an MFA / step-up challenge in the response — if present, the creds
#   alone do not yield an authenticated session (see memory: operator-capability)
```

confirm three things from the preflight, and record them for the hunt-\* skills:

1. **live** — auth probe returns 200, not 401/403.
2. **role/privilege** — the `/api/me` (or equivalent) body shows the expected
   role/tenant/scopes. IDOR and authz tests need a known baseline identity; a
   silently-admin or silently-readonly cred skews every authz finding.
3. **not MFA-gated** — login did not stop at a 2fa/step-up challenge. if it did,
   you hold creds but **not** a session — default to least capability and confirm
   with the operator before claiming authenticated reach.

if the preflight fails, do **not** silently continue as blackbox — surface
"greybox creds did not validate (HTTP {code} / MFA challenge)" so the operator
can re-supply. only after a clean preflight: apply the validated session to every
authenticated test.

## step 3 — taxonomy print (once, at session start)

emit a deterministic block. plain text, lowercase, colon-delimited, no decoration.

### mode=redteam

```
loaded for red team: {N} skills
  mindset:    redteam-mindset
  platform:   {fingerprint-matched skills (<=8, tier order), or "none detected"}
  deferred:   {platform skills past the 8-cap, or omit line if none}
  auth:       hunt-ato, hunt-auth-bypass, hunt-saml, hunt-oauth, hunt-mfa-bypass
  inj:        hunt-rce, hunt-sqli, hunt-ssrf, hunt-file-upload
  infra:      hunt-http-smuggling, hunt-cloud-misconfig
  stack:      hunt-sharepoint, hunt-aspnet
  ir:         mid-engagement-ir-detection
```

### mode=wapt

```
loaded for wapt ({blackbox|greybox}): {N} skills
  inj:        hunt-xss, hunt-sqli, hunt-ssrf, hunt-rce, hunt-xxe, hunt-ssti, hunt-file-upload
  authz:      hunt-idor, hunt-auth-bypass, hunt-ato
  auth:       hunt-oauth, hunt-saml, hunt-mfa-bypass
  api:        hunt-graphql, hunt-api-misconfig
  logic:      hunt-business-logic, hunt-race-condition
  infra:      hunt-http-smuggling, hunt-cache-poison
  recon:      hunt-subdomain
  cloud:      hunt-cloud-misconfig
  ai:         hunt-llm-ai
  stack:      hunt-aspnet, hunt-sharepoint, hunt-ntlm-info
  misc:       hunt-misc, hunt-csrf
  reporting:  bb-methodology, security-arsenal, triage-validation
```

## subagent scope inheritance

if any part of the hunt is delegated to subagents, scope does **not** inherit
implicitly. every subagent prompt must carry:

1. **the authorized host list, verbatim, as data.** not "the target estate", not
   "*.target.com" — the explicit list. a subagent cannot infer the boundary.
2. **the discovered-host rule:** hosts found mid-run (via CT logs, CSP headers,
   JS bundles, CNAME chains, error messages) are **report-only**. resolve DNS,
   record, hand back. never probe, never write, until the operator re-authorizes.
3. **a deny-list of action-executing endpoints, applied BEFORE any allow-list.**
   deny by verb-in-name first: `refund`, `settle`, `payout`, `transfer`, `adjust`,
   `disburse`, `create`, `update`, `delete`, `rotate`, `reset`, `send`, `initiate`,
   `generate`, `process`. only then allow read-shaped names. order matters —
   a path like `refund/batch/status` matches the read-shaped keyword "status"
   but is a refund route; an allow-list applied first would probe it.
4. **"read-only" spelled out as forbidden verbs**, not as an adjective. "read-only"
   is routinely interpreted as "don't be destructive", which does not stop an agent
   sending `{}` to an endpoint whose name starts with `generate*` and creating a
   real record on production.

**lesson from an authorized engagement:** a subagent was told READ-ONLY and still
(a) created a live record on production because it expected `{}` to return a
validation error, and (b) wrote an object to a cloud bucket that was never on the
authorized list — one the parent prompt had named only for a DNS check. both were
disclosed in the deliverable. the fix is structural: pass scope as data, deny
by verb before allowing by verb, and treat every discovered host as out of scope
until told otherwise.

## step 4 — return control to /hunt

after taxonomy print, hand control back to `/hunt` for step 3 (sibling delegation) and step 4 (active testing). do not run probes here — this skill only loads context.

## privacy

never echo back, log, or persist:
- SOW / scope-of-work / engagement-letter content
- grey box credentials (kept in session memory by `/hunt`, never written to disk)
- client identifiers in user-level memory

---

## Related Skills & Chains

- **`bb-methodology`** — When PART 0 mode confirmation completes. Workflow primitive: `bb-methodology` confirms engagement type (red team vs WAPT vs bug bounty); the answer feeds directly into this skill's `mode=redteam` / `mode=wapt` invocation.
- **`redteam-mindset`** + **`mid-engagement-ir-detection`** — When `mode=redteam` is loaded. Workflow primitive: these are the always-on skills loaded first by step 2 of the redteam flow before any platform skill or hunt-* skill.
- **`okta-attack`** / **`m365-entra-attack`** / **`enterprise-vpn-attack`** / **`vmware-vcenter-attack`** / **`cloud-iam-deep`** / **`supply-chain-attack-recon`** / **`apk-redteam-pipeline`** — When fingerprint signals match. Workflow primitive: step 1's curl fingerprint scan against `recon/<target>/live-hosts.txt` maps banner / domain signals to one or more of these platform skills.
- **`hunt-rce`** / **`hunt-sqli`** / **`hunt-ssrf`** / **`hunt-ato`** / **all other hunt-* skills`** — When the mode-specific skill set is being printed. Workflow primitive: this skill is the loader; it names the hunt-* skills but does not run probes — actual hunting happens after step 4 returns control to `/hunt`.
- **`report-writing`** vs **`redteam-report-template`** — When the taxonomy print specifies the report format. Workflow primitive: `mode=wapt` ends with `report-writing` as the deliverable format; `mode=redteam` ends with `redteam-report-template` instead.

© Sachin Sharma · MIT · elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter

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enterprise-vpn-attack Скилл enterprise-vpn-attack пентеста SSL VPN-шлюзов: Cisco ASA, Fortinet, Citrix NetScaler, Palo Alto GlobalProtect, Pulse Secure/Ivanti и другие — от распознавания вендора до CVE пред-авторизации. CX Codex +1 ★ 16 193звёзд репо hunt-grpc Скилл hunt-grpc помогает проверять gRPC-сервисы на проблемы с отражением, авторизацией и доверием к прокси. Пригодится при аудите микросервисов с HTTP/2. CX Codex +1 ★ 16 193звёзд репо mid-engagement-ir-detection Скилл mid-engagement-ir-detection для Claude, который учит замечать, как цель меняется по ходу теста: патчи SOC, новые правила WAF, чужой атакующий рядом — и превращать это в находки. CX Codex +1 ★ 16 193звёзд репо hunt-business-logic Скилл hunt-business-logic помогает находить уязвимости бизнес-логики в веб-приложениях и платёжных шлюзах. Пригодится при аудите чекаутов и систем верификации. CX Codex +1 ★ 16 193звёзд репо apk-redteam-pipeline Скилл apk-redteam-pipeline автоматизирует реверс Android-приложений: скачивает APK с Play Store, apkpure и apkmirror, декомпилирует через jadx, ищет секреты, JWT, Firebase-ключи, экспортированные компоненты и сертификаты. CX Codex +1 ★ 16 193звёзд репо hunt-brute-force Скилл hunt-brute-force проверяет защиту эндпоинтов от перебора паролей, OTP и перечисления пользователей. Помогает найти отсутствие лимитов запросов и выявить скрытый троттлинг. CX Codex +1 ★ 16 193звёзд репо hunt-api-misconfig Скилл hunt-api-misconfig помогает искать ошибки настройки API: массовое присваивание, загрязнение прототипа и подмену HTTP-методов. Пригодится при проверке безопасности веб-приложения. CX Codex +1 ★ 16 193звёзд репо hunt-cicd Скилл hunt-cicd для Claude Code проверяет сборочные пайплайны: Jenkins, GitHub Actions, OIDC-доверие, состояние Terraform. Работает при открытом Jenkins или доступной GitHub-организации. CX Codex +1 ★ 16 193звёзд репо

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