gha-security-review — скилл для Claude Code
Скилл gha-security-review находит эксплуатируемые уязвимости в GitHub Actions workflows — от injection-атак в выражениях до кражи токенов. Каждый найденный баг включает конкретный сценарий атаки и способ исправления.
Apache-2.0 5 100 установок ★ 1 193 обновлён 2026-10-23
npx skills add getsentry/skills --skill gha-security-review -a claude-codeЧто делает gha-security-review
gha-security-review ищет уязвимости, которые внешний злоумышленник может использовать без доступа на запись в репозиторий. Скилл анализирует workflows в .github/workflows/, локальные actions в .github/actions/ и конфиг-файлы, которые загружаются при запуске CI. Это не теория — паттерны взяты из реальных атак на GitHub Actions.
Скилл проверяет восемь классов уязвимостей: pwn-request (checkout форк-кода в pull_request_target), injection в ${{ }} выражениях внутри run: блоков, выполнение команд из issue-комментариев без проверки прав, кража токенов, отравление конфиг-файлов (.cursorrules, CLAUDE.md), непричерченные third-party actions, и неправильные permissions. Для каждого находит точку входа (через PR, комментарий, имя ветки), сам payload и пять элементов PoC: entry point, payload, механизм выполнения, impact и конкретные шаги атаки.
Скилл не флагит то, что кажется опасным в теории, но на деле безопасно: numeric values вроде github.event.pull_request.number (только цифры, не injectable), ${{ }} внутри if: условий (runtime их обрабатывает), third-party actions с полным SHA (immutable). Требует только HIGH и MEDIUM уверенность — LOW findings не выводит.
Какие задачи решает
- найти injection в выражениях GitHub Actions, которые выполняются в shell
- обнаружить pwn-request уязвимость: когда fork-код checkout-ится и исполняется
- проверить workflow на кражу secrets и токенов
- выявить непинованные third-party actions в привилегированных workflow-ях
- найти отравление конфиг-файлов (
.cursorrules,CLAUDE.md) от PR-кода
Примеры запросов агенту
- Проверь
.github/workflows/на pwn-request и injection уязвимости - Аудит GitHub Actions: найди, как внешний хакер может украсть secrets без write-доступа
- Просмотри workflow на эксплуатируемые баги — только с PoC и fix
Как установить gha-security-review
1Через Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add getsentry/skills --skill gha-security-review -a claude-code2Вручную: положить файлы
~/.claude/skills/gha-security-review/SKILL.mdПапка скилла целиком; для одного проекта — .claude/skills/gha-security-review/
1Через Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add getsentry/skills --skill gha-security-review -a codex2Вручную: положить файлы
.agents/skills/gha-security-review/SKILL.mdДля всех проектов — ~/.agents/skills/
1Через Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add getsentry/skills --skill gha-security-review -a cursor2Вручную: положить файлы
.cursor/skills/gha-security-review/SKILL.mdCursor читает и .agents/skills/, и .claude/skills/
1GitHub CLI
gh skill install getsentry/skills skills/gha-security-review2Вручную: положить файлы
.github/skills/gha-security-review/SKILL.md1Через Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add getsentry/skills --skill gha-security-review -a gemini-cli2Командой платформы
gemini skills install https://github.com/getsentry/skills --path skills/gha-security-reviewВручную: положить файлы
.devin/skills/gha-security-review/SKILL.mdСтарый путь .windsurf/skills/ тоже читается
Через Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add getsentry/skills --skill gha-security-review -a opencodeClaude.ai
Упакуйте папку в zip и загрузите в Settings → Capabilities → Skills
По шагам, с командами для каждой платформы: Как установить скилл в Claude Code: пять способов
Вопросы о gha-security-review
Как установить gha-security-review в Claude Code?
Выполни в терминале npx skills add getsentry/skills --skill gha-security-review -a claude-code, потом открой ~/.claude/skills/gha-security-review/SKILL.md. Для Cursor: npx skills add getsentry/skills --skill gha-security-review -a cursor и .cursor/skills/gha-security-review/SKILL.md. Для GitHub Copilot: gh skill install getsentry/skills gha-security-review.
Что делает gha-security-review?
Ищет эксплуатируемые уязвимости в GitHub Actions workflows, которые внешний злоумышленник может использовать через PR или комментарий — без доступа на запись. Для каждой находит точку входа, payload, механизм выполнения и конкретный сценарий атаки.
Какие уязвимости находит скилл?
Pwn-request (checkout fork-кода в pull_request_target), expression injection в run-блоках, выполнение команд из комментариев без проверки прав, кража токенов, отравление конфиг-файлов, непинованные third-party actions и неправильные permissions в workflows.
Исходный текст
SKILL.md · Apache-2.0
---
name: gha-security-review
description: 'GitHub Actions security review for workflow exploitation vulnerabilities. Use when asked to "review GitHub Actions", "audit workflows", "check CI security", "GHA security", "workflow security review", or review .github/workflows/ for pwn requests, expression injection, credential theft, and supply chain attacks. Exploitation-focused with concrete PoC scenarios.'
allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob Bash Task
---
<!--
Attack patterns and real-world examples sourced from the HackerBot Claw campaign analysis
by StepSecurity (2025): https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/hackerbot-claw-github-actions-exploitation
-->
# GitHub Actions Security Review
Find exploitable vulnerabilities in GitHub Actions workflows. Every finding MUST include a concrete exploitation scenario — if you can't build the attack, don't report it.
This skill encodes attack patterns from real GitHub Actions exploits — not generic CI/CD theory.
## Scope
Review the workflows provided (file, diff, or repo). Research the codebase as needed to trace complete attack paths before reporting.
### Files to Review
- `.github/workflows/*.yml` — all workflow definitions
- `action.yml` / `action.yaml` — composite actions in the repo
- `.github/actions/*/action.yml` — local reusable actions
- Config files loaded by workflows: `CLAUDE.md`, `AGENTS.md`, `Makefile`, shell scripts under `.github/`
### Out of Scope
- Workflows in other repositories (only note the dependency)
- GitHub App installation permissions (note if relevant)
## Threat Model
Only report vulnerabilities exploitable by an **external attacker** — someone **without** write access to the repository. The attacker can open PRs from forks, create issues, and post comments. They cannot push to branches, trigger `workflow_dispatch`, or trigger manual workflows.
**Do not flag** vulnerabilities that require write access to exploit:
- `workflow_dispatch` input injection — requires write access to trigger
- Expression injection in `push`-only workflows on protected branches
- `workflow_call` input injection where all callers are internal
- Secrets in `workflow_dispatch`/`schedule`-only workflows
## Confidence
Report only **HIGH** and **MEDIUM** confidence findings. Do not report theoretical issues.
| Confidence | Criteria | Action |
|---|---|---|
| **HIGH** | Traced the full attack path, confirmed exploitable | Report with exploitation scenario and fix |
| **MEDIUM** | Attack path partially confirmed, uncertain link | Report as needs verification |
| **LOW** | Theoretical or mitigated elsewhere | Do not report |
For each HIGH finding, provide all five elements:
1. **Entry point** — How does the attacker get in? (fork PR, issue comment, branch name, etc.)
2. **Payload** — What does the attacker send? (actual code/YAML/input)
3. **Execution mechanism** — How does the payload run? (expression expansion, checkout + script, etc.)
4. **Impact** — What does the attacker gain? (token theft, code execution, repo write access)
5. **PoC sketch** — Concrete steps an attacker would follow
If you cannot construct all five, report as MEDIUM (needs verification).
---
## Step 1: Classify Triggers and Load References
For each workflow, identify triggers and load the appropriate reference:
| Trigger / Pattern | Load Reference |
|---|---|
| `pull_request_target` | `references/pwn-request.md` |
| `issue_comment` with command parsing | `references/comment-triggered-commands.md` |
| `${{ }}` in `run:` blocks | `references/expression-injection.md` |
| PATs / deploy keys / elevated credentials | `references/credential-escalation.md` |
| Checkout PR code + config file loading | `references/ai-prompt-injection-via-ci.md` |
| Third-party actions (especially unpinned) | `references/supply-chain.md` |
| `permissions:` block or secrets usage | `references/permissions-and-secrets.md` |
| Self-hosted runners, cache/artifact usage | `references/runner-infrastructure.md` |
| Any confirmed finding | `references/real-world-attacks.md` |
Load references selectively — only what's relevant to the triggers found.
## Step 2: Check for Vulnerability Classes
### Check 1: Pwn Request
Does the workflow use `pull_request_target` AND check out fork code?
- Look for `actions/checkout` with `ref:` pointing to PR head
- Look for local actions (`./.github/actions/`) that would come from the fork
- Check if any `run:` step executes code from the checked-out PR
### Check 2: Expression Injection
Are `${{ }}` expressions used inside `run:` blocks in externally-triggerable workflows?
- Map every `${{ }}` expression in every `run:` step
- Confirm the value is attacker-controlled (PR title, branch name, comment body — not numeric IDs, SHAs, or repository names)
- Confirm the expression is in a `run:` block, not `if:`, `with:`, or job-level `env:`
### Check 3: Unauthorized Command Execution
Does an `issue_comment`-triggered workflow execute commands without authorization?
- Is there an `author_association` check?
- Can any GitHub user trigger the command?
- Does the command handler also use injectable expressions?
### Check 4: Credential Escalation
Are elevated credentials (PATs, deploy keys) accessible to untrusted code?
- What's the blast radius of each secret?
- Could a compromised workflow steal long-lived tokens?
### Check 5: Config File Poisoning
Does the workflow load configuration from PR-supplied files?
- AI agent instructions: `CLAUDE.md`, `AGENTS.md`, `.cursorrules`
- Build configuration: `Makefile`, shell scripts
### Check 6: Supply Chain
Are **third-party** actions securely pinned to full SHAs?
- Pin third-party / external actions and reusable workflows only
- Do **not** flag first-party `actions/*` or `github/*` on version tags
- Do **not** flag same-repo / vendored (`./.github/actions/...`) as supply-chain pinning issues
- Only report when the job has secrets, OIDC, write token, release, deploy, package, or signing power — unprivileged read-only CI is not a finding
### Check 7: Permissions and Secrets
Are workflow permissions minimal? Are secrets properly scoped?
### Check 8: Runner Infrastructure
Are self-hosted runners, caches, or artifacts used securely?
## Safe Patterns (Do Not Flag)
Before reporting, check if the pattern is actually safe:
| Pattern | Why Safe |
|---|---|
| `pull_request_target` WITHOUT checkout of fork code | Never executes attacker code |
| `${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}` in `run:` | Numeric only — not injectable |
| `${{ github.repository }}` / `github.repository_owner` | Repo owner controls this |
| `${{ secrets.* }}` | Not an expression injection vector |
| `${{ }}` in `if:` conditions | Evaluated by Actions runtime, not shell |
| `${{ }}` in `with:` inputs | Passed as string parameters, not shell-evaluated |
| Third-party actions pinned to full SHA | Immutable reference |
| First-party `actions/*` / `github/*` on version tags | Outside third-party pinning policy — do not flag |
| Same-repo / vendored local actions | Not third-party supply chain (review pwn-request separately) |
| `pull_request` trigger (not `_target`) | Runs in fork context with read-only token |
| Any expression in `workflow_dispatch`/`schedule`/`push` to protected branches | Requires write access — outside threat model |
**Key distinction:** `${{ }}` is dangerous in `run:` blocks (shell expansion) but safe in `if:`, `with:`, and `env:` at the job/step level (Actions runtime evaluation).
## Step 3: Validate Before Reporting
Before including any finding, read the actual workflow YAML and trace the complete attack path:
1. **Read the full workflow** — don't rely on grep output alone
2. **Trace the trigger** — confirm the event and check `if:` conditions that gate execution
3. **Trace the expression/checkout** — confirm it's in a `run:` block or actually references fork code
4. **Confirm attacker control** — verify the value maps to something an external attacker sets
5. **Check existing mitigations** — env var wrapping, author_association checks, restricted permissions, SHA pinning
If any link is broken, mark MEDIUM (needs verification) or drop the finding.
**If no checks produced a finding, report zero findings. Do not invent issues.**
## Step 4: Report Findings
````markdown
## GitHub Actions Security Review
### Findings
#### [GHA-001] [Title] (Severity: Critical/High/Medium)
- **Workflow**: `.github/workflows/release.yml:15`
- **Trigger**: `pull_request_target`
- **Confidence**: HIGH — confirmed through attack path tracing
- **Exploitation Scenario**:
1. [Step-by-step attack]
- **Impact**: [What attacker gains]
- **Fix**: [Code that fixes the issue]
### Needs Verification
[MEDIUM confidence items with explanation of what to verify]
### Reviewed and Cleared
[Workflows reviewed and confirmed safe]
````
If no findings: "No exploitable vulnerabilities identified. All workflows reviewed and cleared."
© getsentry · Apache-2.0 · getsentry/skills