Analyzing Windows Event Logs in Splunk — скилл для Claude Code
Скилл analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk для анализа журналов Windows Security, System и Sysmon в Splunk.
Apache-2.0 251 установок ★ 36 511 обновлён 2026-08-31
npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk -a claude-codeЧто делает analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk
Скилл помогает аналитикам SOC расследовать инциденты на Windows-хостах: разбирает события аутентификации, анализирует процессы, отслеживает изменения реестра и задач планировщика. Содержит готовые SPL-запросы для обнаружения brute-force и password-spray атак, создания новых администраторских учётных записей, манипуляций с токенами, планирования задач через T1053.005, модификации Run-ключей реестра и подписок WMI.
Скилл включает запросы для отслеживания горизонтального движения — удалённые подключения через EventCode 4624 с Logon_Type=3 или RDP (Logon_Type=10), а также обнаружение PsExec и SMB-эксплуатации. Требует, чтобы в Splunk уже были загружены события WinEventLog:Security, WinEventLog:System и XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational.
Для полноценной работы на endpoints должен быть развёрнут Sysmon с конфигурацией SwiftOnSecurity или Olaf Hartong, а в Splunk включено ускорение данных для моделей Endpoint и Authentication. Скилл привязан к техникам MITRE ATT&CK T1110, T1053.005, T1547.001, T1021.002, T1558.003 и T1003.006.
Какие задачи решает
- обнаружить brute-force и password-spray атаки на основе EventCode 4625
- найти новые администраторские учётные записи и проверить привилегии пользователей
- отследить создание планировщика задач, изменения Run-ключей и WMI-подписок
- выявить удалённое подключение и горизонтальное движение по сети
- собрать форензическую временную шкалу активности хоста или контроллера домена
Примеры запросов агенту
- Покажи попытки brute-force на Windows за последние сутки, сгруппировав по IP и типу аутентификации
- Найди успешный вход после серии неудачных попыток одного пользователя с одного IP
- Построй запрос для обнаружения создания новых задач планировщика с PowerShell или cmd
Как установить analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk
1Через Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk -a claude-code2Вручную: положить файлы
~/.claude/skills/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk/SKILL.mdПапка скилла целиком; для одного проекта — .claude/skills/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk/
1Через Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk -a codex2Вручную: положить файлы
.agents/skills/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk/SKILL.mdДля всех проектов — ~/.agents/skills/
1Через Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk -a cursor2Вручную: положить файлы
.cursor/skills/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk/SKILL.mdCursor читает и .agents/skills/, и .claude/skills/
1GitHub CLI
gh skill install mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills skills/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk2Вручную: положить файлы
.github/skills/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk/SKILL.md1Через Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk -a gemini-cli2Командой платформы
gemini skills install https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --path skills/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunkВручную: положить файлы
.devin/skills/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk/SKILL.mdСтарый путь .windsurf/skills/ тоже читается
Через Skills CLI (Vercel)
npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk -a opencodeClaude.ai
Упакуйте папку в zip и загрузите в Settings → Capabilities → Skills
По шагам, с командами для каждой платформы: Как установить скилл в Claude Code: пять способов
Вопросы об analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk
Как установить analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk в Claude Code?
Выполни npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk -a claude-code, затем открой файл ~/.claude/skills/analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk/SKILL.md.
Что делает этот скилл?
Скилл предоставляет готовые SPL-запросы для анализа событий Windows в Splunk: обнаруживает brute-force, password-spray, создание учётных записей в группе администраторов, манипуляции с регистром и WMI, а также отслеживает удалённые подключения и боковое движение.
Какие требования для использования скилла?
В Splunk должны быть загружены события Windows с sourcetype WinEventLog:Security, WinEventLog:System и XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational. На endpoints требуется Sysmon с конфигурацией SwiftOnSecurity или Olaf Hartong, а также ускорение CIM-моделей Endpoint и Authentication.
Исходный текст
SKILL.md · Apache-2.0
---
name: analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk
description: 'Analyzes Windows Security, System, and Sysmon event logs in Splunk to
detect authentication attacks, privilege escalation, persistence mechanisms, and
lateral movement using SPL queries mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques. Use when SOC
analysts need to investigate Windows-based threats, build detection queries, or
perform forensic timeline analysis of Windows endpoints and domain controllers.
'
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: soc-operations
tags:
- soc
- splunk
- windows-events
- sysmon
- event-logs
- mitre-attack
- active-directory
version: '1.0'
author: mahipal
license: Apache-2.0
d3fend_techniques:
- Restore Access
- Password Authentication
- Biometric Authentication
- Strong Password Policy
- Restore User Account Access
nist_csf:
- DE.CM-01
- DE.AE-02
- RS.MA-01
- DE.AE-06
mitre_attack:
- T1110
- T1053.005
- T1547.001
- T1021.002
- T1558.003
- T1003.006
---
# Analyzing Windows Event Logs in Splunk
## When to Use
Use this skill when:
- SOC analysts investigate alerts related to Windows authentication, process execution, or AD changes
- Detection engineers build SPL queries for Windows-based threat detection
- Incident responders need forensic timelines of Windows endpoint or domain controller activity
- Periodic threat hunting targets Windows-specific ATT&CK techniques
**Do not use** for Linux/macOS endpoint analysis or network-only investigations.
## Prerequisites
- Splunk with Windows Event Log data ingested (sourcetype `WinEventLog:Security`, `WinEventLog:System`, `XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational`)
- Sysmon deployed on endpoints with SwiftOnSecurity or Olaf Hartong configuration
- CIM data model acceleration for Endpoint and Authentication data models
- Knowledge of Windows Security Event IDs and Sysmon event types
## Workflow
### Step 1: Authentication Attack Detection
**Brute Force Detection (EventCode 4625 — Failed Logon):**
```spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4625
| stats count, dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_users, values(TargetUserName) AS targeted_users
by src_ip, Logon_Type, Status
| where count > 20
| eval attack_type = case(
Logon_Type=3, "Network Brute Force",
Logon_Type=10, "RDP Brute Force",
Logon_Type=2, "Interactive Brute Force",
1=1, "Other"
)
| eval status_meaning = case(
Status="0xc000006d", "Bad Username or Password",
Status="0xc000006a", "Incorrect Password (valid user)",
Status="0xc0000234", "Account Locked Out",
Status="0xc0000072", "Account Disabled",
1=1, Status
)
| sort - count
| table src_ip, attack_type, status_meaning, count, unique_users, targeted_users
```
**Password Spray Detection:**
```spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3
| bin _time span=10m
| stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_users, count AS total_attempts,
values(TargetUserName) AS users_targeted by src_ip, _time
| where unique_users > 10 AND total_attempts < unique_users * 3
| eval spray_confidence = if(unique_users > 25, "HIGH", "MEDIUM")
```
**Successful Logon After Failures (Compromise Indicator):**
```spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security"
(EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624) src_ip!="127.0.0.1"
| sort _time
| stats earliest(_time) AS first_seen, latest(_time) AS last_seen,
sum(eval(if(EventCode=4625,1,0))) AS failures,
sum(eval(if(EventCode=4624,1,0))) AS successes
by src_ip, TargetUserName, ComputerName
| where failures > 10 AND successes > 0
| eval time_to_success = round((last_seen - first_seen)/60, 1)
| sort - failures
```
### Step 2: Privilege Escalation Detection
**New Admin Account Created (T1136.001):**
```spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4720
| join TargetUserName type=left [
search index=wineventlog EventCode=4732 TargetUserName="Administrators"
| rename MemberName AS TargetUserName
]
| table _time, SubjectUserName, TargetUserName, ComputerName
| eval alert = "New account created and added to Administrators group"
```
**Special Privileges Assigned (EventCode 4672):**
```spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4672
SubjectUserName!="SYSTEM" SubjectUserName!="LOCAL SERVICE" SubjectUserName!="NETWORK SERVICE"
| stats count, values(PrivilegeList) AS privileges by SubjectUserName, ComputerName
| where count > 0
| search privileges IN ("SeDebugPrivilege", "SeTcbPrivilege", "SeBackupPrivilege",
"SeRestorePrivilege", "SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege")
```
**Token Manipulation Detection (T1134):**
```spl
index=sysmon EventCode=10 TargetImage="*\\lsass.exe"
GrantedAccess IN ("0x1010", "0x1038", "0x1fffff", "0x40")
| stats count by SourceImage, SourceUser, Computer, GrantedAccess
| where NOT match(SourceImage, "(svchost|csrss|wininit|MsMpEng|CrowdStrike)")
| sort - count
```
### Step 3: Persistence Mechanism Detection
**Scheduled Task Creation (T1053.005):**
```spl
index=wineventlog (sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4698)
OR (sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
Image="*\\schtasks.exe")
| eval task_info = coalesce(TaskContent, CommandLine)
| search task_info="*powershell*" OR task_info="*cmd*" OR task_info="*http*" OR task_info="*\\Temp\\*"
| table _time, Computer, SubjectUserName, TaskName, task_info
```
**Registry Run Key Modification (T1547.001):**
```spl
index=sysmon EventCode=13
TargetObject IN (
"*\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*",
"*\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\\*",
"*\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\\*",
"*\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\*"
)
| stats count by Computer, Image, TargetObject, Details
| where NOT match(Image, "(explorer\.exe|msiexec\.exe|setup\.exe)")
| sort - count
```
**WMI Event Subscription (T1546.003):**
```spl
index=sysmon EventCode=20 OR EventCode=21
| stats count by Computer, Operation, Consumer, EventNamespace
| where count > 0
```
### Step 4: Lateral Movement Detection
**Remote Service Exploitation (T1021.002 — SMB/Windows Admin Shares):**
```spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3
| stats dc(ComputerName) AS unique_destinations, values(ComputerName) AS targets
by src_ip, TargetUserName
| where unique_destinations > 3
| sort - unique_destinations
| table src_ip, TargetUserName, unique_destinations, targets
```
**PsExec Detection (T1021.002):**
```spl
index=sysmon EventCode=1
(Image="*\\psexec.exe" OR Image="*\\psexesvc.exe"
OR ParentImage="*\\psexesvc.exe"
OR OriginalFileName="psexec.c")
| table _time, Computer, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine
```
**RDP Lateral Movement (T1021.001):**
```spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=10
| stats count, dc(ComputerName) AS rdp_targets, values(ComputerName) AS destinations
by src_ip, TargetUserName
| where rdp_targets > 2
| sort - rdp_targets
```
### Step 5: Build Forensic Timeline
Create comprehensive timeline for a compromised host:
```spl
(index=wineventlog OR index=sysmon) Computer="WORKSTATION-042"
earliest="2024-03-14T00:00:00" latest="2024-03-16T00:00:00"
| eval event_description = case(
EventCode=4624, "Logon: ".TargetUserName." (Type ".Logon_Type.")",
EventCode=4625, "Failed Logon: ".TargetUserName,
EventCode=4688 OR (sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:*Sysmon*" AND EventCode=1),
"Process: ".Image." CMD: ".CommandLine,
EventCode=4698, "Scheduled Task: ".TaskName,
EventCode=3, "Network: ".DestinationIp.":".DestinationPort,
EventCode=11, "File Created: ".TargetFilename,
EventCode=13, "Registry: ".TargetObject,
1=1, "Event ".EventCode
)
| sort _time
| table _time, EventCode, event_description, User, src_ip
```
### Step 6: Create Lookup Tables for Enrichment
Build reference lookups for Windows Event ID context:
```spl
| inputlookup windows_eventcode_lookup.csv
| table EventCode, Description, ATT_CK_Technique, Severity
```
If lookup doesn't exist, create it:
```csv
EventCode,Description,ATT_CK_Technique,Severity
4624,Successful Logon,T1078,Informational
4625,Failed Logon,T1110,Low
4648,Explicit Credential Logon,T1078,Medium
4672,Special Privileges Assigned,T1134,Medium
4688,New Process Created,T1059,Informational
4698,Scheduled Task Created,T1053.005,Medium
4720,User Account Created,T1136.001,High
4732,Member Added to Security Group,T1098,High
4768,Kerberos TGT Requested,T1558,Informational
4769,Kerberos Service Ticket,T1558.003,Low
4771,Kerberos Pre-Auth Failed,T1110,Low
```
## Key Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|------|-----------|
| **EventCode 4624** | Successful logon event — Logon_Type 2 (interactive), 3 (network), 10 (RDP), 7 (unlock) |
| **EventCode 4625** | Failed logon event — Status code indicates failure reason (bad password, account locked, disabled) |
| **Sysmon EventCode 1** | Process creation with full command line, parent process, and hash information |
| **Sysmon EventCode 3** | Network connection initiated by a process — source/dest IP, port, and process context |
| **Logon Type 3** | Network logon (SMB, WMI, PowerShell Remoting) — key indicator of lateral movement |
| **Logon Type 10** | Remote interactive logon via RDP/Terminal Services |
## Tools & Systems
- **Splunk Enterprise**: SIEM platform with SPL query engine for Windows event log analysis and correlation
- **Sysmon (System Monitor)**: Microsoft Sysinternals tool providing detailed process, network, and file activity logging
- **Splunk CIM**: Common Information Model mapping Windows events to normalized fields for cross-source queries
- **Windows Event Forwarding (WEF)**: Built-in Windows mechanism for centralizing event logs to a collector server
## Common Scenarios
- **Kerberoasting (T1558.003)**: Detect EventCode 4769 with encryption type 0x17 (RC4) for non-standard service accounts
- **DCSync (T1003.006)**: Detect EventCode 4662 with DS-Replication-Get-Changes from non-DC sources
- **Golden Ticket (T1558.001)**: Detect EventCode 4769 with abnormal ticket properties (long lifetime, non-standard encryption)
- **Pass-the-Hash (T1550.002)**: Detect EventCode 4624 Logon_Type 3 with NTLM authentication from unexpected sources
- **DLL Side-Loading (T1574.002)**: Sysmon EventCode 7 showing unsigned DLLs loaded by legitimate processes
## Output Format
```
WINDOWS EVENT LOG ANALYSIS — HOST: WORKSTATION-042
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Period: 2024-03-14 to 2024-03-15
Events: 12,847 total (Security: 9,231 | Sysmon: 3,616)
Authentication Summary:
Successful Logons (4624): 487 (Type 3: 312, Type 10: 45, Type 2: 130)
Failed Logons (4625): 847 (from 192.168.1.105 — BRUTE FORCE)
Explicit Creds (4648): 12
Suspicious Findings:
[HIGH] 847 failed logons followed by success at 14:35 from 192.168.1.105
[HIGH] New user "backdoor_admin" created (4720) at 14:38
[HIGH] User added to Administrators group (4732) at 14:38
[MEDIUM] schtasks.exe creating persistence task at 14:42
[MEDIUM] PowerShell encoded command execution at 14:45
ATT&CK Mapping:
T1110.001 — Password Guessing (847 failed logons)
T1136.001 — Local Account Creation (backdoor_admin)
T1053.005 — Scheduled Task (persistence)
T1059.001 — PowerShell (encoded execution)
```
© mahipal · Apache-2.0 · mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills