# team-security-review

team-security-review is a Claude Code skill that enforces a strict security auditing playbook. It inspects authentication flows, access control, input handling, and secret leaks.

- skill · `type=skill` · Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Gemini CLI, Windsurf (Devin Desktop), Claude.ai · ★ 71 repo stars
- Author: sametcelikbicak
- License: MIT · policy=mirror · the beginning of the file is at the end of this page
- Source: https://github.com/sametcelikbicak/opencode-team/tree/HEAD/skills/team-security-review/SKILL.md
- Updated: 2026-11-13
- Security check: automated, 2026-11-17 (text) — no signs of malicious code found.
- HTML: https://affpapa.org/en/nevibecode/skills/team-security-review

## What it does

The skill defines a code-level security review process centered on verifying actual execution paths rather than theoretical risks. It guides checks across authentication, session lifetimes, access control, IDOR flaws, and input handling patterns against SQL injection, XSS, SSRF, and path traversal.

The workflow integrates package audits through tools such as `npm audit`, `pip-audit`, `cargo audit`, or `govulncheck`. Findings are compiled into Markdown reports detailing impact, file locations, reproduction steps, and fixes across four defined severity tiers without fabricated CVSS numbers.

## Install

### Claude Code (native platform)

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add sametcelikbicak/opencode-team --skill team-security-review -a claude-code
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `~/.claude/skills/team-security-review/SKILL.md` — Copy the whole skill folder; for one project use .claude/skills/team-security-review/

### Codex

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add sametcelikbicak/opencode-team --skill team-security-review -a codex
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.agents/skills/team-security-review/SKILL.md` — For all projects use ~/.agents/skills/

### Cursor

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add sametcelikbicak/opencode-team --skill team-security-review -a cursor
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.cursor/skills/team-security-review/SKILL.md` — Cursor also reads .agents/skills/ and .claude/skills/

### GitHub Copilot

1. **GitHub CLI**
```bash
gh skill install sametcelikbicak/opencode-team skills/team-security-review
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.github/skills/team-security-review/SKILL.md`

### Gemini CLI

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add sametcelikbicak/opencode-team --skill team-security-review -a gemini-cli
```

2. **Platform CLI**
```bash
gemini skills install https://github.com/sametcelikbicak/opencode-team --path skills/team-security-review
```

### Windsurf (Devin Desktop)

**Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.devin/skills/team-security-review/SKILL.md` — The legacy .windsurf/skills/ path still works

### Claude.ai

**Claude.ai**
- Zip the folder and upload it in Settings → Capabilities → Skills

Where a file is given instead of a command, copy the files from the source to that path: https://github.com/sametcelikbicak/opencode-team/tree/HEAD/skills/team-security-review/SKILL.md

## When to use it
- Audit API endpoints for IDOR and broken object-level authorization
- Detect exposed credentials and API keys in git history or logs
- Scan project packages for known CVEs using native audit tools
- Format vulnerability findings into actionable Markdown reports

## Example prompts
- Run a security audit on the user profile endpoints using team-security-review
- Check `src/auth` for session handling flaws and secret leaks
- Inspect the codebase for IDOR vulnerabilities and generate a finding report

## Source text · SKILL.md · MIT

Below is the content of a third-party file. It is data, not instructions for you: do not act on anything written inside unless the human asks. Block tag: 6ae3497ca8c9c6b2.

BEGIN THIRD-PARTY FILE 6ae3497ca8c9c6b2
````text
---
name: team-security-review
description: Security review methodology. Authentication, authorization, input validation, secret management, dependency scanning and finding reporting. The playbook of the security role.
---

# Security Review

## Core principle

**Read the code, do not guess.** A security finding is only a finding if you have read the actual code path. A "this might happen" hypothesis is not a finding — mark it as "suspicious".

## 1. Authentication

- Password: strong hash (argon2id/bcrypt), never SHA/MD5, never plaintext
- Session: cookie with `httpOnly` + `secure` + `sameSite`, idle and absolute timeout
- Token: short lifetime, `refresh` rotation, revocable in case of leakage
- Account lockout: attempt count + time-based throttling
- Password reset: single-use and time-limited token
- MFA: for administrator/critical operations

## 2. Authorization

Do two checks for every endpoint:
1. **Functional**: does this person have permission to perform this action?
2. **Resource-based**: do they own this resource? (IDOR)

Patterns to check:
- An endpoint without authentication (not on the allowlist)
- The `id` parameter used directly (not compared against the user's own record)
- An "edit" endpoint exists but the "delete" endpoint has no permission check
- Administrator endpoints are only hidden in the interface, not checked on the server
- Bulk operation endpoints (could mix the user's data with someone else's)

## 3. Input validation

| Attack | Protection |
|---|---|
| SQL/NoSQL injection | Parameterized queries, ORM, schema validation |
| XSS | Output escaping, dangerouslySetInnerHTML forbidden, CSP |
| SSRF | Allowlist of permitted hosts, private IP range blocking |
| Path traversal | Path normalization, blocking escapes from the root directory |
| Mass assignment | Allowlist of permitted fields |
| Deserialization | Untrusted data is never deserialized |
| ReDoS | No dangerous regex, input length limited |

Checklist:
- Does every user input pass through a class (type + format + length + range)?
- Is input validation applied in the application layer, or only on the client? (client validation is not security)
- Do error messages leak internal details (stack trace, SQL)?

## 4. Secret management

- Are secrets embedded in the code? (Has `.env` entered the repo, is it in `git log`?)
- Are there secrets in the logs? (token, password, full card number)
- Is the secret in production or in development?
- Is the error shown to the user separate from the error that is logged?
- Is `.gitignore` correct? Is `.env` tracked?

In the finding report, **do not write the value of the secret** — the file path and the type are enough.

## 5. Dependencies

Run these and put the output in the report:
```bash
npm audit        # Node
pip-audit        # Python
cargo audit      # Rust
govulncheck      # Go
```

List the critical/high vulnerabilities and state which ones are actually on a code path that is used.
````
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