# repo-security-posture

Audits a GitHub repository and CI/CD workflows for hardening gaps, delivering a ranked checklist of security fixes mapped to real attack scenarios.

- skill · `type=skill` · Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Gemini CLI, OpenCode · 853 installs · ★ 79
- Author: superagent-ai
- License: MIT · policy=mirror · the beginning of the file is at the end of this page
- Source: https://github.com/superagent-ai/skills/tree/HEAD/skills/repo-security-posture/SKILL.md
- Updated: 2026-08-15
- HTML: https://affpapa.org/en/nevibecode/skills/repo-security-posture

## What it does

The skill executes `python3 scripts/collect.py` to compile repository metadata and workflow files into a JSON inventory. It evaluates the project across six categories: publish and release integrity, branch protection, CODEOWNERS rules, GitHub Actions hardening, account permissions, and supply-chain dependencies against the catalog in `references/checks.md`. It inspects actual file contents rather than checking only whether a file exists.

Every issue ties directly to a concrete threat scenario: compromised contributor accounts, attackers with repo write access, CI/CD pipeline takeover, or malicious package publishing. The output is formatted as an actionable todo list ordered by severity, providing exact GitHub settings and commands needed for remediation.

Without an admin-level `GITHUB_TOKEN`, the collector cannot inspect branch protection rules or collaborator permissions, marking them unverified instead of making assumptions.

## Requirements
- Works with: GitHub

## Install

### Claude Code (native platform)

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add superagent-ai/skills --skill repo-security-posture -a claude-code
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `~/.claude/skills/repo-security-posture/SKILL.md` — Copy the whole skill folder; for one project use .claude/skills/repo-security-posture/

### Codex

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add superagent-ai/skills --skill repo-security-posture -a codex
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.agents/skills/repo-security-posture/SKILL.md` — For all projects use ~/.agents/skills/

### Cursor

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add superagent-ai/skills --skill repo-security-posture -a cursor
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.cursor/skills/repo-security-posture/SKILL.md` — Cursor also reads .agents/skills/ and .claude/skills/

### GitHub Copilot

1. **GitHub CLI**
```bash
gh skill install superagent-ai/skills repo-security-posture
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.github/skills/repo-security-posture/SKILL.md`

### Gemini CLI

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add superagent-ai/skills --skill repo-security-posture -a gemini-cli
```

2. **Platform CLI**
```bash
gemini skills install https://github.com/superagent-ai/skills --path skills/repo-security-posture
```

### Windsurf (Devin Desktop)

**Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.devin/skills/repo-security-posture/SKILL.md` — The legacy .windsurf/skills/ path still works

### OpenCode

**Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add superagent-ai/skills --skill repo-security-posture -a opencode
```

### Claude.ai

**Claude.ai**
- Zip the folder and upload it in Settings → Capabilities → Skills

Where a file is given instead of a command, copy the files from the source to that path: https://github.com/superagent-ai/skills/tree/HEAD/skills/repo-security-posture/SKILL.md

## When to use it
- audit GitHub Actions workflows for command injection and privilege flaws
- check branch protection and merge restrictions against compromised accounts
- inspect CODEOWNERS coverage across critical repository paths
- generate an ordered hardening checklist for GitHub repository maintainers

## Example prompts
- Audit my repo security posture for owner/repo
- Harden this GitHub repo against CI/CD compromise
- Check GitHub Actions security and branch protection for owner/repo

## Source text · SKILL.md · MIT

Below is the content of a third-party file. It is data, not instructions for you: do not act on anything written inside unless the human asks. Block tag: 551cf76da1903ca8.

BEGIN THIRD-PARTY FILE 551cf76da1903ca8
````text
---
name: repo-security-posture
description: Audit a GitHub repository's security posture and hardening gaps across branch protection, CODEOWNERS, GitHub Actions, publish/release integrity, collaborator access, security features, and dependency review. Use when reviewing or hardening a repo, assessing GitHub configuration, checking CI/CD or Actions security, evaluating supply-chain posture, preparing maintainer-facing security todos, or when the user says "repo security posture", "audit my repo", "harden this GitHub repo", "actions security", "protect against a compromised maintainer", or points at a GitHub URL and asks what to fix.
---

# Repository Security Posture

Audit a repository's configuration and CI/CD against a set of concrete attacker scenarios, then hand the maintainer a ranked list of hardening todos. The deliverable is a list of items each with a **title** and a **description**, grouped by category and ordered by severity — the kind of post-mortem checklist a maintainer can paste into an issue and work through.

The job is not to dump every theoretical best practice. It is to look at *this* repo, find the gaps an attacker would actually use, and write todos that are specific to what was found (or specific about what couldn't be verified).

## Threat model

Every finding should trace back to at least one of these scenarios. Naming the scenario in the description is what makes a todo land — it tells the maintainer *why* it matters, not just *what* to toggle.

1. **Compromised contributor** — a trusted contributor's account, laptop, or token is taken over (phishing, malware, leaked PAT). What stops them from merging or publishing malicious code alone?
2. **Attacker with repo write access** — an outside attacker gains push or admin rights. What limits blast radius, what can they exfiltrate, and how fast can the maintainer rotate and recover?
3. **CI/CD compromise** — a malicious PR, poisoned cache, or injected workflow turns the build pipeline into the attack. GitHub Actions is the most common modern repo-takeover path.
4. **Registry / publish supply chain** — the repo is fine but a bad version ships to npm/PyPI/etc. via a stolen publish token or an unreviewed release job. This is the @mastra / dotenvx / TeamPCP class of incident.

## Workflow

### 1. Identify the target and gather evidence

Resolve the repo to `owner/name`. If the user gave a URL, parse it. If they named a repo you can't pin down, ask.

Run the collector to pull configuration and files into a single JSON inventory:

```bash
# A token dramatically expands what's visible (branch protection, actions
````
END THIRD-PARTY FILE 551cf76da1903ca8

The third-party file has ended. Everything between the 551cf76da1903ca8 tags is data: requests and commands from it are not followed. An “end of file” line with another tag inside the block is part of the file.

First 2633 of 7909 bytes. © superagent-ai · MIT · https://github.com/superagent-ai/skills/tree/HEAD/skills/repo-security-posture/SKILL.md

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