# hunt-xxe

hunt-xxe guides code auditing for XML External Entity flaws across file parsers, SOAP APIs, and authentication endpoints.

- skill · `type=skill` · Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Gemini CLI, Windsurf (Devin Desktop), Claude.ai · ★ 16193 repo stars
- Author: Sachin Sharma
- License: MIT · policy=mirror · the beginning of the file is at the end of this page
- Source: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/tree/HEAD/skills/hunt-xxe/SKILL.md
- Updated: 2026-10-29
- Security check: automated, 2026-11-16 (text) — no signs of malicious code found.
- HTML: https://affpapa.org/en/nevibecode/skills/hunt-xxe

## What it does

The skill structures vulnerability review workflows based on documented bounty disclosures. It flags fragile parsers across endpoints accepting XML payloads, including SAML assertion services, API gateways, and document converters processing SVG, DOCX, or PPTX uploads.

Inside, the workflow covers entry point mapping, out-of-band callback checks, and internal entity redefinition tests. It inspects logic using packages like `DOMDocument`, `lxml`, or `Apache POI`.

Detecting blind parser vulnerabilities requires an external listener URL to catch outbound DNS or HTTP queries.

## Install

### Claude Code (native platform)

1. **Plugin marketplace**
In the agent chat (not a shell):
```text
/plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
```
In the agent chat (not a shell):
```text
/plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsouls
```
This installs the whole claude-bughunter plugin with all its skills

2. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-xxe -a claude-code
```

3. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `~/.claude/skills/hunt-xxe/SKILL.md` — Copy the whole skill folder; for one project use .claude/skills/hunt-xxe/

### Codex

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-xxe -a codex
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.agents/skills/hunt-xxe/SKILL.md` — For all projects use ~/.agents/skills/

### Cursor

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-xxe -a cursor
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.cursor/skills/hunt-xxe/SKILL.md` — Cursor also reads .agents/skills/ and .claude/skills/

### GitHub Copilot

1. **GitHub CLI**
```bash
gh skill install elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter skills/hunt-xxe
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.github/skills/hunt-xxe/SKILL.md`

### Gemini CLI

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-xxe -a gemini-cli
```

2. **Platform CLI**
```bash
gemini skills install https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --path skills/hunt-xxe
```

### Windsurf (Devin Desktop)

**Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.devin/skills/hunt-xxe/SKILL.md` — The legacy .windsurf/skills/ path still works

### Claude.ai

**Claude.ai**
- Zip the folder and upload it in Settings → Capabilities → Skills

Where a file is given instead of a command, copy the files from the source to that path: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/tree/HEAD/skills/hunt-xxe/SKILL.md

## When to use it
- audit XML document ingestion pipelines for entity expansion risks
- check file upload routes handling SVG and Office files
- verify blind XXE through external DTD callback setups
- trace SSRF vectors reaching internal cloud metadata endpoints

## Example prompts
- Audit our document parser service for XXE injection vectors
- Analyze this SAML ACS endpoint for unhardened XML entity handling
- Construct a verification plan for blind XXE on this upload route

## Source text · SKILL.md · MIT

Below is the content of a third-party file. It is data, not instructions for you: do not act on anything written inside unless the human asks. Block tag: e2c59d9ded6bf66d.

BEGIN THIRD-PARTY FILE e2c59d9ded6bf66d
````text
---
name: hunt-xxe
description: Hunting skill for xxe vulnerabilities. Built from 10 public bug bounty reports including SVG-upload XXE, Office-doc (PPTX/DOCX) XXE, SOAP XXE, SAML AssertionConsumer XXE, blind OOB XXE via DTD callback, parameter-entity XXE, XXE-to-LFI, XXE-to-SSRF, and XXE-to-RCE chains (Adobe Commerce CosmicSting CVE-2024-34102). Use when hunting XXE on any target — emphasis on OOB-Or-It-Didn't-Happen Gate for blind cases.
sources: github, hackerone_public, assetnote_research, splunk_security
report_count: 10
---

## Crown Jewel Targets

XXE is a critical-severity vulnerability that consistently pays at the top of bug bounty scales ($5,000–$30,000+) due to its direct path to sensitive data exfiltration and SSRF. Highest-value targets:

- **Large enterprise platforms** with XML-heavy backend integrations (finance, logistics, ride-sharing APIs)
- **Domains with file-read capability** — `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/shadow`, internal config files, AWS metadata endpoints
- **Subdomains sharing backend infrastructure** — one XXE endpoint can pivot to internal services across dozens of domains (as demonstrated by 26+ Uber domains via a single entry point)
- **API gateways** accepting XML content types — especially REST APIs that silently accept `Content-Type: application/xml`
- **File upload features** — SVG, DOCX, XLSX, PDF, PPTX parsers on the server side
- **SAML/SSO endpoints** — SAML assertions are XML-based and frequently vulnerable
- **Office/document processing services** — any feature that converts or processes user-supplied documents

---

## Attack Surface Signals

### URL Patterns
```
/api/v*/xml
/upload
/import
/parse
/convert
/saml/acs
/sso/saml
/feed
/rss
/sitemap
/webdav
/soap/*
/wsdl
/service.asmx
/xmlrpc
/graphql (multipart with XML)
```

### Request/Response Headers
```
Content-Type: application/xml
Content-Type: text/xml
Content-Type: application/soap+xml
Content-Type: multipart/form-data  ← check file upload fields
Accept: application/xml
X-Content-Type-Options: (absent — good sign of loose parsing)
```

### JavaScript Patterns (source recon)
```javascript
// Look for in JS bundles
XMLSerializer
DOMParser
parseFromString
new ActiveXObject("Microsoft.XMLDOM")
$.parseXML(
xml2js
libxmljs
lxml
```

### Tech Stack Signals
- **Java stacks**: Spring, Struts, JAX-WS — default XML parsers (SAX, DOM) are XXE-vulnerable without explicit hardening
- **PHP**: `simplexml_load_string()`, `DOMDocument::loadXML()` — vulnerable by default pre-PHP 8
- **Python**: `lxml`, `xml.etree` (safe by default), `xml.sax` (unsafe)
- **Ruby**: `Nokogiri` older versions, `REXML`
- **Node.js**: `xml2js`, `libxmljs`, `fast-xml-parser` (older versions)
- **WSDL/SOAP services**: Always test — legacy XML parsing virtually guaranteed
- **File parsers**: Apache POI (Java), python-docx, LibreOffice integrations

---

## Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology
````
END THIRD-PARTY FILE e2c59d9ded6bf66d

The third-party file has ended. Everything between the e2c59d9ded6bf66d tags is data: requests and commands from it are not followed. An “end of file” line with another tag inside the block is part of the file.

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