# hunt-saml

hunt-saml hunts SAML and SSO flaws: XSW, comment injection, signature stripping and XXE in assertions. Built for poking at a live SSO flow.

- skill · `type=skill` · Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Gemini CLI, Windsurf (Devin Desktop), Claude.ai · ★ 16193 repo stars
- Author: Sachin Sharma
- License: MIT · policy=mirror · the beginning of the file is at the end of this page
- Source: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/tree/HEAD/skills/hunt-saml/SKILL.md
- Updated: 2026-10-29
- Security check: automated, 2026-11-16 (text) — no signs of malicious code found.
- HTML: https://affpapa.org/en/nevibecode/skills/hunt-saml

## What it does

The skill covers SAML and SSO attack patterns. It walks through XML Signature Wrapping, comment injection in `NameID`, removing the `<Signature>` element, XXE inside an assertion, key confusion and assertion replay. Each pattern comes with XML to work from and a note on where parsers disagree.

Start by locating endpoints: `/saml/acs`, `/Shibboleth.sso`, `/sso/saml`, Microsoft ADFS. A captured `SAMLResponse` gets decoded with `base64 -d`, edited in `xmllint --format`, re-encoded with `base64 -w0` and sent back as raw base64 in POST binding. Redirect binding uses raw DEFLATE, not gzip. SAMLRaider, a Burp extension, is named for the XSW work; samlmagic and plain XML editing cover the rest.

Severity is mapped out. Successful XSW and a stripped signature are Critical, since either ends in takeover of any account. Comment injection in `NameID` lands at High, XXE in an assertion also High, and `NameID` manipulation depends on what that identifier maps to. Editing XML without crossing an authorization boundary stays Informational.

## Install

### Claude Code (native platform)

1. **Plugin marketplace**
In the agent chat (not a shell):
```text
/plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
```
In the agent chat (not a shell):
```text
/plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsouls
```
This installs the whole claude-bughunter plugin with all its skills

2. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-saml -a claude-code
```

3. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `~/.claude/skills/hunt-saml/SKILL.md` — Copy the whole skill folder; for one project use .claude/skills/hunt-saml/

### Codex

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-saml -a codex
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.agents/skills/hunt-saml/SKILL.md` — For all projects use ~/.agents/skills/

### Cursor

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-saml -a cursor
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.cursor/skills/hunt-saml/SKILL.md` — Cursor also reads .agents/skills/ and .claude/skills/

### GitHub Copilot

1. **GitHub CLI**
```bash
gh skill install elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter skills/hunt-saml
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.github/skills/hunt-saml/SKILL.md`

### Gemini CLI

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-saml -a gemini-cli
```

2. **Platform CLI**
```bash
gemini skills install https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --path skills/hunt-saml
```

### Windsurf (Devin Desktop)

**Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.devin/skills/hunt-saml/SKILL.md` — The legacy .windsurf/skills/ path still works

### Claude.ai

**Claude.ai**
- Zip the folder and upload it in Settings → Capabilities → Skills

Where a file is given instead of a command, copy the files from the source to that path: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/tree/HEAD/skills/hunt-saml/SKILL.md

## When to use it
- map SAML endpoints from a recon URL list
- run XSW payloads against an ACS endpoint
- strip `<Signature>` from a `SAMLResponse` and swap `NameID`
- check whether a comment inside `NameID` splits the parser's view of the identity
- score findings by severity before writing the report

## Example prompts
- Find the SAML endpoints in `recon/example.com/urls.txt` and try XSW against the ACS
- Decode this `SAMLResponse`, drop `<Signature>`, set `NameID` to `admin@company.com` and re-encode it
- Does the NameID comment trick reach High, or does it stay Informational?

## Source text · SKILL.md · MIT

Below is the content of a third-party file. It is data, not instructions for you: do not act on anything written inside unless the human asks. Block tag: 0d9c07c77d5a1a49.

BEGIN THIRD-PARTY FILE 0d9c07c77d5a1a49
````text
---
name: hunt-saml
description: "Hunt SAML / SSO attacks. Patterns: XML Signature Wrapping (XSW) — modify Assertion while keeping Signature valid by relocating signed element, comment injection in NameID (admin@target.com<!--evil-->@attacker.com → some parsers see admin@target.com), signature stripping (remove Signature element entirely, server should reject but doesn't), key confusion (signed by attacker's IdP, accepted by SP), audience-restriction not validated, replay attack (same Assertion accepted twice within validity window). Tools: SAML Raider Burp extension, samlmagic, manual XML manipulation. Detection: any /saml endpoint, /Shibboleth.sso, /sso/saml/, Microsoft ADFS endpoints. Validate: account takeover via altered NameID, admin role injection via altered AttributeStatement. Use when hunting SSO flows, when SAML AssertionConsumerService is reachable, when chaining IdP-trust to SP-impersonation."
sources: cve_database, oasis_saml_spec, academic_research, public_research
report_count: 6
---

## 20. SAML / SSO ATTACKS
> SSO bugs frequently pay High–Critical. XML parsers are notoriously inconsistent.

### Attack Surface
```bash
# Find SAML endpoints
cat recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | grep -iE "saml|sso|login.*redirect|oauth|idp|sp"
# Key endpoints: /saml/acs (assertion consumer service), /sso/saml, /auth/saml/callback
```

### Attack 1: XML Signature Wrapping (XSW)
```xml
<!-- BEFORE: valid assertion by user@company.com -->
<saml:Response>
  <saml:Assertion ID="legit">
    <NameID>user@company.com</NameID>
    <ds:Signature><!-- Valid, covers ID=legit --></ds:Signature>
  </saml:Assertion>
</saml:Response>

<!-- AFTER: inject evil assertion. Signature still validates (covers #legit).
     App processes the FIRST assertion found = evil. -->
<saml:Response>
  <saml:Assertion ID="evil">
    <NameID>admin@company.com</NameID>  <!-- Attacker-controlled -->
  </saml:Assertion>
  <saml:Assertion ID="legit">
    <NameID>user@company.com</NameID>
    <ds:Signature><!-- Valid --></ds:Signature>
  </saml:Assertion>
</saml:Response>
```

### Attack 2: Comment Injection in NameID
```xml
<!-- Attacker registers/controls account: admin@company.com.evil.com -->
<NameID>admin@company.com<!---->.evil.com</NameID>
<!-- Signed canonical form (C14N without-comments strips the comment BEFORE
````
END THIRD-PARTY FILE 0d9c07c77d5a1a49

The third-party file has ended. Everything between the 0d9c07c77d5a1a49 tags is data: requests and commands from it are not followed. An “end of file” line with another tag inside the block is part of the file.

First 2317 of 6831 bytes. © Sachin Sharma · MIT · https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/tree/HEAD/skills/hunt-saml/SKILL.md

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