# hunt-cicd

hunt-cicd — a skill for Claude that walks through build-system attack surface: Jenkins consoles, GitHub Actions injection, OIDC role trust, leaked Terraform state. Fits targets with a reachable pipeline.

- skill · `type=skill` · Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Gemini CLI, Windsurf (Devin Desktop), Claude.ai · ★ 16193 repo stars
- Author: Sachin Sharma
- License: MIT · policy=mirror · the beginning of the file is at the end of this page
- Source: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/tree/HEAD/skills/hunt-cicd/SKILL.md
- Updated: 2026-10-29
- Security check: automated, 2026-11-16 (text) — no signs of malicious code found.
- HTML: https://affpapa.org/en/nevibecode/skills/hunt-cicd

## What it does

Build systems get treated as entry points here. The skill covers Jenkins (script console, CVE-2024-23897 file read), GitHub Actions (`pull_request_target` and `${{ }}` expansion into `run:`), self-hosted runners, OIDC trust policies, Terraform state files, and secrets that leak into artifacts or logs. Instructions run in phases, with `curl` fingerprints and Groovy snippets that dump credentials from Jenkins.

A gate section comes before any of that. It wants evidence: a 403 or a login page at `/script` proves nothing, and a `pull_request_target` workflow needs a demonstrated path from PR data into an executed line. Blind cases need an out-of-band listener such as Burp Collaborator or interactsh, because a workflow that finished green does not show your code ran. The material rests on 18 public reports from HackerOne, GitHub Security Lab, the CVE database and PortSwigger research.

For the Jenkins CLI route you need Java plus a `jenkins-cli.jar` pulled from the target's `/jnlpJars/jenkins-cli.jar`. CVE-2024-23897 affects versions ≤2.441 and LTS ≤2.426.2; a patched instance answers with a generic error and no file content, and the step goes nowhere.

## Requirements
- Works with: GitHub, GitLab, Terraform

## Install

### Claude Code (native platform)

1. **Plugin marketplace**
In the agent chat (not a shell):
```text
/plugin marketplace add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter
```
In the agent chat (not a shell):
```text
/plugin install claude-bughunter@elementalsouls
```
This installs the whole claude-bughunter plugin with all its skills

2. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-cicd -a claude-code
```

3. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `~/.claude/skills/hunt-cicd/SKILL.md` — Copy the whole skill folder; for one project use .claude/skills/hunt-cicd/

### Codex

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-cicd -a codex
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.agents/skills/hunt-cicd/SKILL.md` — For all projects use ~/.agents/skills/

### Cursor

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-cicd -a cursor
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.cursor/skills/hunt-cicd/SKILL.md` — Cursor also reads .agents/skills/ and .claude/skills/

### GitHub Copilot

1. **GitHub CLI**
```bash
gh skill install elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter skills/hunt-cicd
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.github/skills/hunt-cicd/SKILL.md`

### Gemini CLI

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --skill hunt-cicd -a gemini-cli
```

2. **Platform CLI**
```bash
gemini skills install https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter --path skills/hunt-cicd
```

### Windsurf (Devin Desktop)

**Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.devin/skills/hunt-cicd/SKILL.md` — The legacy .windsurf/skills/ path still works

### Claude.ai

**Claude.ai**
- Zip the folder and upload it in Settings → Capabilities → Skills

Where a file is given instead of a command, copy the files from the source to that path: https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/tree/HEAD/skills/hunt-cicd/SKILL.md

## When to use it
- check whether a Jenkins script console answers without auth
- prove a `pull_request_target` injection from a fork PR
- recover database passwords from a public `*.tfstate`
- map which org workflows can assume a privileged cloud role through OIDC
- rule out false positives before writing a report

## Example prompts
- Fingerprint Jenkins on `$TARGET` with the `X-Jenkins` header, then try `/script` and `/scriptText`.
- Scan the public GitHub org for workflows that drop PR titles into `run:` and confirm the injection with an interactsh callback.
- Use CVE-2024-23897 to read `@/var/lib/jenkins/secret.key` with `jenkins-cli.jar`.

## Source text · SKILL.md · MIT

Below is the content of a third-party file. It is data, not instructions for you: do not act on anything written inside unless the human asks. Block tag: a8447d56157e4914.

BEGIN THIRD-PARTY FILE a8447d56157e4914
```text
---
name: hunt-cicd
description: "Hunt CI/CD pipeline vulnerabilities — GitHub Actions workflow injection (pull_request_target Pwnrequest + ${{ }}-into-shell), self-hosted runner poisoning, OIDC trust-policy abuse, Jenkins script-console RCE and CVE-2024-23897 file read, GitLab CI runner-token registration, Terraform state file leakage, artifact/log secret leakage, pipeline env-var disclosure. Use when target has a public GitHub/GitLab org, exposed CI dashboards (Jenkins/TeamCity/Drone/Argo), or build artifacts/images are reachable."
sources: hackerone_public, github_security_lab, cve_database, portswigger_research
report_count: 18
---

# HUNT-CICD — CI/CD Pipeline Security

## Crown Jewel Targets

Jenkins `/script` console reachable = immediate RCE. A GitHub Actions `pull_request_target` (or `workflow_run`) workflow that checks out the **PR head ref** and references untrusted `${{ github.event.* }}` in a shell `run:` = "Pwnrequest" → secret exfil from a fork PR with zero approval.

**Highest-value findings:**
- **Jenkins Script Console** — Groovy execution → full RCE → dump the credential store
- **Jenkins CLI file read (CVE-2024-23897)** — pre-auth `@/etc/passwd` arg expansion → read `secret.key`/`credentials.xml` → forge admin → RCE
- **GitHub Actions `pull_request_target` injection (Pwnrequest)** — fork PR controls `${{ }}` inside a privileged shell step → exfil `GITHUB_TOKEN` (often `contents:write`) and org secrets
- **Self-hosted runner poisoning** — non-ephemeral runner on a public repo executes a fork PR's build → attacker code runs on the runner host → persistence + secret theft
- **OIDC trust-policy abuse** — over-broad `sub` claim wildcard in an AWS IAM role trust policy → any workflow in the org assumes a privileged cloud role
- **Terraform state leakage** — `*.tfstate` in public S3/GCS/Blob → plaintext infra creds, DB passwords, private keys
```
END THIRD-PARTY FILE a8447d56157e4914

The third-party file has ended. Everything between the a8447d56157e4914 tags is data: requests and commands from it are not followed. An “end of file” line with another tag inside the block is part of the file.

First 1925 of 18085 bytes. © Sachin Sharma · MIT · https://github.com/elementalsouls/Claude-BugHunter/tree/HEAD/skills/hunt-cicd/SKILL.md

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