# competition-malware-config

competition-malware-config — a skill for Claude Code and other platforms recovers malware configurations, decodes C2 beacon parameters, and extracts IOCs.

- skill · `type=skill` · Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Gemini CLI, OpenCode, Windsurf (Devin Desktop), Claude.ai · 109 installs · ★ 45047 repo stars
- Author: zhaoxuya520
- License: MIT · policy=mirror · the beginning of the file is at the end of this page
- Source: https://github.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill/tree/HEAD/CTF-Sandbox-Orchestrator/competition-malware-config/SKILL.md
- Updated: 2026-09-22
- Security check: automated, 2026-11-17 (text) — no signs of malicious code found.
- HTML: https://affpapa.org/en/nevibecode/skills/competition-malware-config

## What it does

The skill runs as a downstream specialization after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` establishes sandbox assumptions. It processes suspicious binaries to locate config boundaries, separate staged loaders, and reconstruct the full decode chain.

Original artifacts are preserved while entropy and field shapes are analyzed. Decoded parameters are tied directly to protocol behavior like mutexes, wallets, and beacon paths.

## Install

### Claude Code (native platform)

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill --skill competition-malware-config -a claude-code
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `~/.claude/skills/competition-malware-config/SKILL.md` — Copy the whole skill folder; for one project use .claude/skills/competition-malware-config/

### Codex

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill --skill competition-malware-config -a codex
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.agents/skills/competition-malware-config/SKILL.md` — For all projects use ~/.agents/skills/

### Cursor

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill --skill competition-malware-config -a cursor
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.cursor/skills/competition-malware-config/SKILL.md` — Cursor also reads .agents/skills/ and .claude/skills/

### GitHub Copilot

1. **GitHub CLI**
```bash
gh skill install zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill CTF-Sandbox-Orchestrator/competition-malware-config/SKILL.md
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.github/skills/competition-malware-config/SKILL.md`

### Gemini CLI

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill --skill competition-malware-config -a gemini-cli
```

2. **Platform CLI**
```bash
gemini skills install https://github.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill --path CTF-Sandbox-Orchestrator/competition-malware-config
```

### Windsurf (Devin Desktop)

**Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.devin/skills/competition-malware-config/SKILL.md` — The legacy .windsurf/skills/ path still works

### OpenCode

**Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill --skill competition-malware-config -a opencode
```

### Claude.ai

**Claude.ai**
- Zip the folder and upload it in Settings → Capabilities → Skills

Where a file is given instead of a command, copy the files from the source to that path: https://github.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill/tree/HEAD/CTF-Sandbox-Orchestrator/competition-malware-config/SKILL.md

## When to use it
- recover malware configuration blobs
- decode C2 and beacon parameters
- unpack staged payloads
- reconstruct container decode chains

## Example prompts
- Recover the malware config and decode the C2 fields
- Unpack the staged payload and extract beacon parameters
- Trace the config decode chain for this sample

## Source text · SKILL.md · MIT

Below is the content of a third-party file. It is data, not instructions for you: do not act on anything written inside unless the human asks. Block tag: 4735289d0c786cc4.

BEGIN THIRD-PARTY FILE 4735289d0c786cc4
```text
---
name: competition-malware-config
description: Internal downstream skill for ctf-sandbox-orchestrator. CTF-sandbox workflow for malware configuration recovery, staged payload boundaries, beacon parameter extraction, and IOC decoding. Use when the user asks to recover a malware config, decode C2 or beacon fields, unpack staged payloads, extract bot or campaign IDs, or tie recovered config to observed protocol behavior under sandbox assumptions. Use only after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` has already established sandbox assumptions and routed here.
---

# Competition Malware Config

Use this skill only as a downstream specialization after `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` is already active and has established sandbox assumptions, node ownership, and evidence priorities. If that has not happened yet, return to `$ctf-sandbox-orchestrator` first.

Use this skill when the decisive value is not just "what the sample does," but which config fields, stages, or network parameters the sample hides and when they become plaintext.

Reply in Simplified Chinese unless the user explicitly requests English.

## Quick Start

1. Preserve the original sample before unpacking or patching.
2. Separate loader, payload, config blob, and post-decode behavior.
3. Rank candidate config blobs by entropy, field shape, nearby strings, and decode helpers.
4. Record the exact transform chain for each recovered field.
5. Reproduce the decoded config or beacon parameters from the smallest possible path.

## Workflow

### 1. Find The Config Boundary

- Inspect sections, resources, embedded archives, strings, imports, and decode helpers.
- Identify where config is stored: resource, overlay, encrypted blob, registry seed, network bootstrap, or stage2 memory.
- Keep one note of when each value becomes plaintext.

### 2. Reconstruct The Decode Chain

- Recover the chain in order: container -> compression -> encoding -> xor/substitution -> crypto -> parse.
- Group all config fields from the same chain together instead of treating them as unrelated clues.
- Preserve hashes, offsets, keys, IVs, masks, and parsed fields in one compact evidence block.

### 3. Tie Config To Behavior

- Show which field affects which branch: beacon path, mutex, wallet, bot id, campaign, tasking route, persistence name, or process target.
- Correlate decoded config with PCAPs, process trees, or stage2 strings when possible.

## Read This Reference

- Load `references/malware-config.md` for the config-hunting checklist, staged-sample checklist, and evidence packaging rules.

## What To Preserve

- Original artifact, unpacked layer, dumped stage, and parsed config as separate artifacts
- Offsets, hashes, decode helpers, keys, masks, and field names
- The branch or protocol step each recovered field actually influences
```
END THIRD-PARTY FILE 4735289d0c786cc4

The third-party file has ended. Everything between the 4735289d0c786cc4 tags is data: requests and commands from it are not followed. An “end of file” line with another tag inside the block is part of the file.

© zhaoxuya520 · MIT · https://github.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill/tree/HEAD/CTF-Sandbox-Orchestrator/competition-malware-config/SKILL.md

_Part of the page did not fit — see the HTML version._

---
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