# api-security

api-security is a Claude Code skill that tests REST, GraphQL, WebSocket, and Web-LLM interfaces for authorization flaws and injection bugs across large endpoint collections.

- skill · `type=skill` · Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Gemini CLI, OpenCode, Windsurf (Devin Desktop), Claude.ai · 220 installs · ★ 632 repo stars
- Author: transilienceai
- License: MIT · policy=mirror · the beginning of the file is at the end of this page
- Source: https://github.com/transilienceai/communitytools/tree/HEAD/skills/api-security/SKILL.md
- Updated: 2026-07-29
- Security check: automated, 2026-11-16 (text) — no signs of malicious code found.
- HTML: https://affpapa.org/en/nevibecode/skills/api-security

## What it does

This skill guides API security assessments across modern protocols. It provides attack vectors for GraphQL introspection and nested queries, REST BOLA and mass assignment, WebSocket cross-site hijacking, and prompt injections via LLM endpoints.

For large Swagger specs, Postman files, or HAR captures, testing relies on deterministic test fixtures. You run `python3 tools/fixture_ingest.py` to strip hardcoded credentials into a clean fixture file, then execute `python3 tools/auth_replay_harness.py` to replay calls across roles and log evidence for authorization bypasses.

Without Python 3 and pre-acquired role tokens, automated matrix replay over large test suites will fail to run.

## Install

### Claude Code (native platform)

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add transilienceai/communitytools --skill api-security -a claude-code
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `~/.claude/skills/api-security/SKILL.md` — Copy the whole skill folder; for one project use .claude/skills/api-security/

### Codex

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add transilienceai/communitytools --skill api-security -a codex
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.agents/skills/api-security/SKILL.md` — For all projects use ~/.agents/skills/

### Cursor

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add transilienceai/communitytools --skill api-security -a cursor
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.cursor/skills/api-security/SKILL.md` — Cursor also reads .agents/skills/ and .claude/skills/

### GitHub Copilot

1. **GitHub CLI**
```bash
gh skill install transilienceai/communitytools skills/api-security
```

2. **Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.github/skills/api-security/SKILL.md`

### Gemini CLI

1. **Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add transilienceai/communitytools --skill api-security -a gemini-cli
```

2. **Platform CLI**
```bash
gemini skills install https://github.com/transilienceai/communitytools --path skills/api-security
```

### Windsurf (Devin Desktop)

**Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.devin/skills/api-security/SKILL.md` — The legacy .windsurf/skills/ path still works

### OpenCode

**Skills CLI (Vercel)**
```bash
npx skills add transilienceai/communitytools --skill api-security -a opencode
```

### Claude.ai

**Claude.ai**
- Zip the folder and upload it in Settings → Capabilities → Skills

Where a file is given instead of a command, copy the files from the source to that path: https://github.com/transilienceai/communitytools/tree/HEAD/skills/api-security/SKILL.md

## When to use it
- Detect BOLA and authorization bypasses in REST APIs
- Audit GraphQL endpoints for introspection and nested query denial of service
- Inspect WebSocket connections for session hijacking and channel authorization flaws
- Convert OpenAPI specs and HAR captures into reproducible test fixtures

## Example prompts
- Audit openapi.yaml for BOLA and mass assignment risks across user roles
- Parse postman_collection.json using fixture_ingest.py to generate endpoint fixtures
- Check our GraphQL gateway for introspection exposure and batching attack vectors

## Source text · SKILL.md · MIT

Below is the content of a third-party file. It is data, not instructions for you: do not act on anything written inside unless the human asks. Block tag: 89e7790962636f1d.

BEGIN THIRD-PARTY FILE 89e7790962636f1d
```text
---
name: api-security
description: API security testing - GraphQL, REST API, WebSocket, and Web-LLM attack techniques.
---

# API Security

Test API endpoints for security vulnerabilities across REST, GraphQL, WebSocket, and LLM-integrated APIs.

## Techniques

| Type | Key Vectors |
|------|-------------|
| **GraphQL** | Introspection, batching attacks, nested query DoS, field suggestion |
| **REST API** | BOLA/IDOR, mass assignment, rate limiting, auth bypass, versioning |
| **WebSocket** | Cross-site hijacking, message manipulation, auth flaws |
| **Web-LLM** | Prompt injection via API, excessive agency, data exfiltration |

## Workflow

1. Discover API endpoints and documentation (Swagger, GraphQL schema)
2. Map authentication and authorization mechanisms
3. Test per API type using appropriate techniques
4. Validate data exposure and access control flaws
5. Capture evidence with HTTP request/response logs

## API at scale (offline corpus / fixture-driven)

For a large or offline API surface — a 2000+ path Swagger, a Postman corpus, a HAR capture — do NOT hand-build the coverage machinery per engagement. Drive it deterministically:

1. **Ingest the corpus → per-endpoint fixtures:** `python3 tools/fixture_ingest.py <openapi|postman|har> -o fixtures.json` normalizes every operation into a request template (method, url with path params filled, sampled body, `object_ref` for id-like path params, security requirement) and STRIPS baked-in auth (the harness injects tokens). This is what turns a large (thousands-of-operations) OpenAPI/Postman corpus into a resumable matrix instead of an untested pile.
2. **Acquire per-role sessions:** via [`authenticated-session-acquisition`](../authenticated-session-acquisition/SKILL.md) (MFA/OTP/SRP → reusable tokens) into the harness's token store.
3. **Replay the per-role authz matrix:** `python3 tools/auth_replay_harness.py --requests fixtures.json --tokens tokens.json [--proxy <vantage>]` replays every endpoint under every role (and cross-tenant), flags BOLA/BFLA where a role got `authorized` on an object/action it should not, and logs an `evidence_id` per (endpoint × role). Egress-route via the provisioned vantage for allowlisted APIs.
4. **Protocol-specific authz:** OData ([`odata-deep-authz.md`](reference/scenarios/rest/odata-deep-authz.md)), Cognito ([`cognito-unauth-and-srp.md`](reference/scenarios/rest/cognito-unauth-and-srp.md)), authenticated WebSocket ([`authenticated-per-role-authz.md`](reference/scenarios/websocket/authenticated-per-role-authz.md)).

The batch is resumable (checkpoint the harness results) so flapping auth never zeroes the run — the recurring at-scale gap. Run the FULL matrix so a clean result is an evidenced negative, not an untested surface.

## Reference
```
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