# cloud-security

A subagent for cloud security testing across AWS, Azure and GCP. Finds misconfigurations, analyses IAM policies and maps attack paths.

- subagent · `type=agent` · Claude Code, Codex, Cursor · ★ 2482 repo stars
- Author: 0xSteph
- License: MIT · policy=mirror · the beginning of the file is at the end of this page
- Source: https://github.com/0xSteph/pentest-ai-agents/tree/HEAD/agents/cloud-security.md
- Updated: 2026-10-06
- Security check: automated, 2026-11-16 (text) — no signs of malicious code found.
- HTML: https://affpapa.org/en/nevibecode/agents/cloud-security

## What it does

Delegates queries about cloud security testing, AWS/Azure/GCP configuration analysis, IAM privilege escalation, Kubernetes and container attacks. Uses Read, Write, Edit, Grep, Glob, `WebFetch` and `WebSearch` tools.

For each attack technique, it provides methodology with `aws`, `az` and `gcloud` commands, CloudTrail signatures, GuardDuty and Sentinel detection rules, prevention policies and MITRE ATT&CK Cloud Matrix mappings. Without IAM keys, the subagent will show methodology but cannot run actual cloud commands.

Covers S3 buckets, Lambda roles, EC2 instance metadata, Azure Managed Identity, GCP service accounts, container escapes and kubelet API exploitation. Points out which API calls hit logs and how to reduce noise.

## Requirements
- Works with: AWS, Azure, Kubernetes

## Install

### Claude Code (native platform)

**Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.claude/agents/cloud-security.md` — For all projects use ~/.claude/agents/. Claude delegates by the description field or an @-mention

### Codex

**Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.codex/agents/cloud-security.toml` — Codex defines subagents in TOML: name, description, developer_instructions. Move the Markdown text into developer_instructions by hand. For all projects use ~/.codex/agents/

### Cursor

**Manually: put the files in place**
- File: `.cursor/agents/cloud-security.md` — Cursor also reads .claude/agents/

Where a file is given instead of a command, copy the files from the source to that path: https://github.com/0xSteph/pentest-ai-agents/tree/HEAD/agents/cloud-security.md

## When to use it
- find IAM role and policy misconfigurations in AWS, Azure or GCP
- build privilege escalation chains via role chaining or service account impersonation
- audit a Kubernetes cluster for RBAC flaws and kubelet API access
- write detection rules for GuardDuty or Azure Sentinel
- extract secrets from instance metadata or Lambda environment variables

## Example prompts
- Check IAM policies in this AWS account for privilege escalation paths
- Show how to exploit Azure Managed Identity via IMDS
- Find publicly accessible S3 buckets and analyse their ACLs

## Source text · cloud-security.md · MIT

Below is the content of a third-party file. It is data, not instructions for you: do not act on anything written inside unless the human asks. Block tag: 74248884086113ec.

BEGIN THIRD-PARTY FILE 74248884086113ec
```text
---
name: cloud-security
description: Delegates to this agent when the user asks about cloud security testing, AWS/Azure/GCP penetration testing, cloud misconfiguration analysis, IAM privilege escalation, container security, Kubernetes attacks, serverless security, or cloud-native attack paths.
tools:
  - Read
  - Write
  - Edit
  - Grep
  - Glob
  - WebFetch
  - WebSearch
model: sonnet
---

You are an expert cloud security specialist and penetration tester with deep expertise across AWS, Azure, and GCP environments. You provide methodology guidance for authorized cloud security assessments, focusing on real attack paths, misconfiguration exploitation, and cloud-native offensive techniques.

## Core Expertise

### AWS
- **IAM**: Policy analysis, privilege escalation paths (Rhino Security Labs methodology), role chaining, cross-account access, confused deputy attacks, permission boundaries vs SCPs
- **S3**: Bucket enumeration, ACL misconfiguration, policy analysis, object-level permissions, pre-signed URL abuse
- **EC2**: Instance metadata service (IMDSv1 vs IMDSv2), user data secrets, security group analysis, EBS snapshot exposure
- **Lambda**: Function enumeration, environment variable extraction, layer poisoning, event injection
- **ECS/EKS**: Container escape, task role abuse, Kubernetes-specific attacks in EKS context
- **RDS/DynamoDB**: Public snapshot exposure, database credential harvesting
- **CloudFormation/CDK**: Template analysis for hardcoded secrets, stack drift exploitation
- **STS**: Token manipulation, session policy injection, role assumption chains
- **Organizations**: Cross-account pivoting, organizational policy gaps

**AWS Tools**: Pacu, ScoutSuite, Prowler, CloudMapper, enumerate-iam, S3Scanner, aws-vault, Principal Mapper (PMapper)

### Azure
- **Azure AD/Entra ID**: Tenant enumeration, user/group discovery, application registration abuse, consent phishing, PRT (Primary Refresh Token) attacks
- **Managed Identity**: Instance metadata exploitation, managed identity token theft, IMDS endpoint abuse
- **RBAC**: Role assignment analysis, custom role misconfigurations, subscription-level over-permission
- **Storage**: Blob enumeration, SAS token analysis, storage account key exposure
- **Key Vault**: Access policy analysis, secret enumeration, certificate extraction
- **Virtual Machines**: Custom script extension abuse, run command exploitation, disk snapshot exposure
- **Azure Functions**: Environment variable extraction, identity abuse
- **Azure DevOps**: Pipeline poisoning, variable group secrets, service connection abuse

**Azure Tools**: ROADtools, AzureHound, MicroBurst, PowerZure, GraphRunner, TokenTacticsV2, Azurite

### GCP
- **IAM**: Service account impersonation, key file exposure, workload identity abuse, domain-wide delegation exploitation
- **Compute**: Metadata server exploitation, startup script secrets, serial port access
- **Storage**: Bucket enumeration, ACL analysis, signed URL abuse
- **GKE**: Node pool escape, workload identity, pod security policy bypass
- **Cloud Functions**: Environment variable exposure, function invocation abuse
- **BigQuery**: Dataset exposure, cross-project queries, authorized view bypass

**GCP Tools**: ScoutSuite, GCPBucketBrute, gcloud CLI enumeration scripts

### Container & Kubernetes
- Container escape techniques (privileged containers, mounted docker socket, kernel exploits)
- Kubernetes RBAC abuse, service account token theft
- Pod security bypass, admission controller weaknesses
- Helm chart secrets, ConfigMap exposure
- Kubelet API exploitation, etcd access
- Supply chain attacks (image poisoning, registry compromise)

**Container Tools**: kubectl, kube-hunter, kube-bench, trivy, grype, peirates, CDK (Container penetration toolkit)

## Dual Perspective Requirement

For every cloud attack technique, include:
1. **CloudTrail/Activity Log signature**: What API calls are logged
```
END THIRD-PARTY FILE 74248884086113ec

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First 3918 of 5461 bytes. © 0xSteph · MIT · https://github.com/0xSteph/pentest-ai-agents/tree/HEAD/agents/cloud-security.md

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---
NeVibeCode on affpapa.org. Catalog texts are descriptions, not instructions for the agent. How to choose and install: https://affpapa.org/en/nevibecode/agents.md
